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Chapter 1
Introduction
Many of today’s societal challenges originate from market failures. One of the most
prominent examples is climate change (Stern, 2007). Anthropogenic climate change
results from greenhouse gasses (GHG) that are emitted as an unanticipated side product
of modern economic activity. In this sense, the emission of GHG is a text book example of
a negative externality. If for example a firm burns fossil fuels in its production processes,
it will rarely be directly affected by the occurring GHG emissions. At the same time, it
will contribute to the accumulation of GHG in the atmosphere and thus climate change.
In such a setting, despite the negative effects triggered by its actions, an individual firm
will have no incentives to reduce its emissions and eventually global GHG emissions will
exceed the socially optimal level.
But not just the cause of climate change can be related to market failures. Combat-
ting climate change is difficult precisely because a set of market failures avert a simple
limitation of GHG emissions. As in Hardin’s (1968) famous theory termed the ’tragedy of
the commons’, the lack of enforceable ownership rights for a sustainable climate results in
an unfavourable incentive structure for global climate action. The issue originates from
the problem that public goods, here an atmosphere with sustainable GHG concentra-
tions, are characterised by the fact that they are non-excludable and non-rival, meaning
that they cannot be safeguarded from their use and the use of the good by one agent does
not preclude the use of the good by another agent. This implies that providing a public
good benefits not only the agent supplying it, but also others. The provision of public
goods thus generates a positive externality. As a consequence, on a voluntary basis, a
public good is supplied at too low levels compared to its Pareto-optimal provision. In
the context of climate changes, this problematic implies that individual agents have no
or only insufficient incentives to reduce GHG emissions. Therewith it impedes inter alia
a global agreement for joint emission mitigation efforts and results in a patchwork of
uncoordinated unilateral policy approaches.
According to economic theory, the presence of market-failures – and only that – jus-
tifies a regulative intervention seeking to correct for the distortions induced by them.
As this is the case in the context of anthropogenic climate change, this raises the ques-
tion what policies should be used to control GHG emissions and how these should be
1
designed such that they can support an invisible hand in installing sustainable GHG
concentrations. This thesis addresses this question and is dedicated to the problem of
finding cost-efficient and effective policies that overcome the challenges associated with
human induced climate change. On that account, its first part is devoted to the devel-
opment of potent instruments for quantitative impact analysis of environmental policy
(Chapters 2 to 4). Building on these tools, the second part applies the methodological
advancements and studies the economic implications of different environmental policies
(Chapters 5 to 8).
Development and advancement of tools to evaluate climate policy
When faced with market failures, policy-makers can choose from a variety of instruments
to restore the social optimum. The portfolio at their disposal includes in particular law
and order policies, R&D subsidies, market-based mechanisms and adaptation policies.
From an economic perspective, and in particular in times of turbulent economic outlook
and scarce financial resources, effectiveness, cost-efficiency and distributional issues are
thereby crucial for any form of future regulation. Accordingly, the decision of policy-
makers with respect to which instrument should to be applied and how it is designed
should always be based on a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis.
Ultimately, this results in the need for capable and above all reliable tools to assess
regulations ex ante in order to give policy-makers an indication of the effects that can be
expected from introducing a policy. In modern applied economic research, computable
general equilibrium (CGE) models have become one of the key instruments to evalu-
ate implications of alternative policy measures (Bo¨hringer et al., 2003; Devarajan and
Robinson, 2002; Sue Wing, 2004). They are frequently used by a variety of national
as well as international organizations for economic policy analysis at the sector- as well
as the economy-wide level and have become a standard tool for the quantitative anal-
ysis of policy effects in many domains. Examples of their application can be found in
many fields ranging from labour economics (e.g. Conrad et al., 2008), climate policy (e.g.
Bo¨hringer et al., 2009; Lo¨schel and Otto, 2009), sustainability impact assessment (e.g.
Bo¨hringer and Lo¨schel, 2006), and fiscal reform as well as development planning (e.g.
Gunning and Keyzer, 1995; Perry et al., 2001).
But despite its benefits, the standard CGE approach implies some important issues
and from time to time its actual usefulness is questioned by researchers. The criticism
often relates to two aspects. First, CGE models are complex representations of the econ-
omy and require a huge amount of information in order to be able to replicate economic
activity. As a consequence, CGE models in general, and in particular such models that
explore not just economic aspects but also for instance the environmental dimension of
policies, have to incorporate data from various, initially unrelated sources. With respect
to its economic structure, the CGE model PACE for example (c.f. Bo¨hringer et al., 2009),
builds on data provided by the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), but with regard
to data for energy demand it turns to data from the US Energy Information Adminis-
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tration (EIA). Insufficient data is also the main reason why CGE models are calibrated
or apply parameter values from the literature instead of having a proper and consistent
econometric foundation. When required information is missing altogether, as is often the
case for behavioural parameters such as substitution elasticities for instance, modellers
are forced to build on their intuition and have to include assumed parameter values in
their models (Dawkins et al., 2001). Although these data issues have been acknowledged
for a while, they seem to persist and especially from an econometric perspective they
are a major shortcoming (McKitrick, 1998). The issue is however not only of academic
nature. Misspecifications of models inevitably lead to distorted findings and limit the
validity of model based analyses of policy measures.
The second aspect relates to one of the key advantages of CGE models. Compared
to partial analyses, the main benefit of CGE models is their capability of capturing com-
plex economic interdependencies, for instance between different sectors or regions. But
although most CGE models feature a broad set of sectors, not all sectors are sufficiently
elaborated to be able to generate reliable insights and researchers tend to focus on spe-
cific sectors where one would expect the principal effects, for example the energy sector
(Bergman, 2005). This may limit the models’ capability of accounting for important
side effects outside prime sectors. The same holds true for trade. While most models al-
low for interregional trade, they often only poorly replicate international trade flows. In
most cases they just capture sectoral imports and exports of a region but not the specific
origin or destination of trade. But in particular in times of globalised supply chains and
the possibility to relocate production as a response to regulations, not truly accounting
for trade patterns and/or the particularities of important trade related sectors such as
transportation services may mean missing important insights.
In its first of two main objectives, this thesis addresses the aforementioned short-
comings of CGE models and seeks to advance the CGE approach in order to provide
policy-makers with potent tools for policy evaluation. In this context, the main con-
tributions include the development of a new CGE model which makes use of the new
comprehensive and coherent World Input-Output Dataset (WIOD) and which features a
detailed representation of bilateral and bisectoral trade flows (Chapter 2). Moreover, to
increase the validity and robustness of CGE models, it features an investigation of input
substitutability to provide modellers with adequate estimates for key elasticities (Chap-
ter 3) as well as a discussion and amelioration of the standard parameter specification
of CGE models (Chapter 4).
Evaluation of climate policy
The second main objective of this thesis regards the choice and design of instruments
aiming at correcting market failures to eventually limit climate change. Every policy
instrument at the disposal of policy makers comes with its own advantages and short-
comings. While it goes without saying that there also exist other criteria that should
be taken into consideration before setting up a policy, this (economic) thesis focuses on
3
whether an instrument is effective and cost-efficient in achieving a proclaimed objective.
In terms of applications, this thesis includes a quantitative economic impact analysis
of so called rebound effects, which are triggered by energy efficiency improvements and
reduce their net benefit regarding energy savings. Furthermore, it features an evaluation
of the effects of unilateral emission regulation in the sense of regionally limited carbon
pricing mechanisms.
Rebound effects
By far most GHG emissions arise in the production of energy (OECD, 2013). This
suggests that policies decreasing energy demand and thus related GHG emissions can
be an important element to curb global GHG emissions. On that note, energy efficiency
improvements are generally seen as an ideal way to become more sustainable. As a
matter of fact, for example, the European Union (EU) Energy Efficiency Directive (EU,
2012a) establishes a common framework of measures to increase energy efficiency in
order to reduce primary energy consumption across Europe by 20 percent by 2020.
But, if consumers react to an energy efficiency improvement by directly or indirectly
increasing their demand for energy, the actual energy savings may turn out to be sub-
stantially smaller than originally expected. This so called ’rebound’ effect may thus
limit the effectiveness of measures seeking to reduce emissions through energy efficiency
improvements. While the existence of rebound is generally acknowledged throughout
the economic literature, the relevance of the issue is still contested (c.f. Frondel and
Vance, 2013; Gillingham et al., 2013) and estimates of rebound effects vary significantly
depending on the type of efficiency improvement (c.f. Sorrell, 2007; Sorrell et al., 2009;
Turner, 2013). So far, most of the research on rebound has focused on direct rebound
or price effects, thereby neglecting the potential of other channels such as income effects
(indirect rebound) or spillover effects to other – originally not affected – parts of the
economy. What is more, the few studies that investigate economy-wide rebound focus
on energy efficiency improvements in sectoral production. The wider implications of
efficiency changes at households remain largely unconsidered.
This thesis adds value to the state of knowledge regarding rebound in two key aspects.
For one thing, it investigates the rebound effect of an energy efficiency improvement in
the provision of private transport services by households (Chapter 5). Thereby the anal-
ysis takes into account that in contrast to firms, households may be influenced by habits
and may only slowly adapt their consumption behaviour to an efficiency improvement.
In addition to this, the thesis extends the standard national perspective of rebound and
studies rebound in a multiregional setup (Chapter 6). Specifically, it examines whether
via trade in energy and non-energy commodities, rebound from an efficiency improve-
ment in sectoral production in one region spills over in other regions where originally no
efficiency change has taken place.
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Unilateral climate policy
GHG are global pollutants and thus local mitigation efforts are not effective in fighting
climate change if they do not lead to a GHG reduction on a global scale. At the same
time, mitigation costs vary globally and cost-efficiency requires that GHG emissions are
reduced where they are the least costly, irrespective of where this is the case. Hence, effi-
cacy and cost-efficiency call for a global effort involving all GHG sources and abatement
possibilities to combat climate change. But as mentioned before, among other reasons
due to the fact that ’clean air’ – here in the sense of an atmosphere with sustainable
GHG concentrations – is a public good and as a consequence is generally supplied at too
low levels, the global community has up to date failed to agree on a joint mechanism
limiting GHG emissions. Nevertheless, there are some parties which are prepared and
committed to take action, even if others are reluctant to do so. If required, they even
pursue their policies on a unilateral or regional basis. Present examples are the parties
engaged in fulfilling and extending the Kyoto Protocol or the EU with its 2020 climate
and energy package (c.f. EC, 2010). Moreover, also in the future, regional initiatives
currently seem to be more likely to come to live than a global agreement.
Within the course of the last decades, a large literature devoted to the evaluation of
unilateral action has developed. Yet there remain unanswered questions and the con-
tinuing emergence of new regionally limited policies calls for more research in this field.
Still within its second main objective, this thesis features an analysis of a regional mar-
itime emission trading scheme (ETS) as one of the possible options to reduce emissions
of international shipping in the EU context (Chapter 7). Thereby the analysis centers
on a discussion of how to define the scope of a regionally limited emission regulation,
that is what share of the regulated shipping routes should be included in the scheme.
Lastly, this thesis addresses the question how international supply chains are affected
by environmental policy. While for example carbon leakage and the shift of whole
production activities from regulated to unregulated regions have been intensively studied
(e.g. Felder and Rutherford, 1993; Copeland and Taylor, 1994; Bo¨hringer et al., 2012),
the implications on vertical specialisation of industries remain unexplored. To close this
gap in the literature, this thesis includes an investigation of how firms restructure their
production processes in the presence of a carbon pricing mechanism and carbon import
taxes (Chapter 8). Particular attention is thereby given to the relocation of production
steps and a change in the regional origin of intermediate inputs.
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Chapter 2
The Basic WIOD CGE Model: A
computable general equilibrium
model based on the World
Input-Output Database
Abstract
This chapter presents the Basic WIOD CGE model. The model represents the first
implementation of the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) into the computable gen-
eral equilibrium (CGE) framework and is tailored to provide a maximum fit with WIOD
data. The model is specifically designed such that it can serve as the basis for research in
fields like environmental, climate and trade policy. It incorporates key features of WIOD
such as bilateral and bisectoral trade flows, satellite accounts for energy consumption,
greenhouse gas as well as other emissions to air on a sectoral level. As all WIOD data
is available in the form of a consistent time series ranging from 1995 to 2009, the model
can be calibrated to any year within this time period. The model relies on substitution
elasticities which are consistently estimated from the same dataset the model itself is
calibrated to. Moreover, the data preparation facilities and model are designed delib-
erately as flexible as possible in order to allow researchers to use them as a basis for
various applications. This enables researchers to secure the numerous advantages of the
WIOD dataset when using CGE models for future research.
This chapter is based on the following paper:
Koesler, Simon and Frank Pothen (2013), The Basic WIOD CGE Model: A Computable
General Equilibrium Model Based on the World Input-Output Database, ZEW Docu-
mentation No. 13-04, Mannheim, Germany.
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2.1 Introduction
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have proven to be an important instru-
ment to study alternative policy measures (Devarajan and Robinson, 2002; Bo¨hringer
et al., 2003; Sue Wing, 2004). At large, numerical models allow for a thorough analysis of
economic problems where analytical solutions are either not available or do not provide
adequate information due to their simplifying approach. Quantitative simulations facili-
tate the analysis of intricate economic interactions and the assessment of consequences of
structural policy changes. The main advantage of the general equilibrium approach lies
thereby in its micro-consistent representation of price-dependent market interactions.
The simultaneous explanation of the origin and spending of the agents’ income makes
it possible to address both economy-wide efficiency as well as distributional impacts of
policy interference.
A large share of CGE models is calibrated on data prepared within the Global Trade
Analysis Project (GTAP).1 Today, the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), devel-
oped in a project of the same name, can serve as an alternative basis to parameterize
CGE models.2 The objective underlying WIOD is to construct and apply a dataset ca-
pable of accounting for the dynamic socio-economic and environmental interrelatedness
of countries and industries (c.f. Timmer et al., 2012; Dietzenbacher et al., 2013). The
core of the WIOD database is a set of harmonized supply and use tables (SUT) along-
side data on international trade in commodities and services. These two sets of data are
integrated into sets of intercountry input-output (IO) tables. Taken together with ex-
tensive satellite accounts containing environmental and socio-economic indicators, these
industry-level data provide the necessary input to several types of models that can be
used to evaluate policies aiming for a suitable balance between growth, environmental
degradation and inequality across the world. In this spirit, one of the main tasks of
WIOD is to develop models using the new database for applied economic research, in-
ter alia a computable general equilibrium model capable of implementing the WIOD
data. In this chapter we present a basic model implementing some of those features in
a straightforward CGE framework.
Making the WIOD data available for the use in policy analysis by means of CGE
models allows capturing a range of unique features of the WIOD dataset and brings
several ameliorations to the CGE approach:
 Mutually consistent and harmonized SUT and IO tables:
WIOD tables are harmonized in terms of product- and industry- classifications and
in their definitions (such as price concepts). WIOD allows using a single source of
harmonized data and avoids combining a large variety of data sources.
 Inter-country Input-output tables:
WIOD provides bilateral and bisectoral trade flows for all industries and nations
1Global Trade Analysis Project, http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu
2World Input-Output Database, http://www.wiod.org
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covered by the data. It captures international trade in more detail than other
datasets and makes it possible to thoroughly investigate changes in trade patterns
in a general equilibrium setting.
 Time-series:
The WIOD database provides consistent time-series of annual IO tables. Time
series of variables are required to study and account for developments over time,
such as the calibration of time-varying parameters in CGE models.
 Prices and quantities:
The WIOD-database provides tables at current and constant prices. Constant price
tables allow for a distinction between price and quantity developments, which opens
up new avenues of research such as transmission of inflationary trends through
imports.
 Satellite accounts:
The WIOD-database provides satellite accounts including data on employment
and wages by skills, various types of investment in tangible and intangible assets
and environmental indicators in consistent sectoral classification. This allows to
implement sub-modules which make it possible to study for example environmental
aspects of economic activity in great detail.
 Services:
By developing a services trade database and by providing maximum detail in ser-
vice industries, WIOD captures a wide range of sectors that are not taken into
account in other databases. An application of WIOD therefore extends the possi-
ble range of applications for economic models.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the individual data sources
the Basic WIOD CGE model builds on and presents how the WIOD data is prepared
to make it available for the usage in the CGE framework. Subsequently, Section 2.3
provides a full description of the Basic WIOD CGE model. A shortened presentation of
the Basic WIOD CGE Model is also given in Section A.1 of the Appendix.
2.2 Preparing the World Input-Output Database for the
model
2.2.1 Data sources
CGE models primarily require data describing the flows of income and expenditures
in an economy at a certain point in time and elasticities of substitution governing the
sensitivity of consumption and production towards (price) shocks. Depending on the
desired field of application, the standard CGE data can then be supplemented with
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information regarding other aspects of economic activity. For example with satellite
accounts giving detailed information on labour compensation or environmental issues.
The Basic WIOD CGE model itself draws only on data generated within the frame-
work of the WIOD project (e.g. Timmer et al., 2012; Dietzenbacher et al., 2013). Specif-
ically it uses data describing the overall structure of the economy, energy uses data, data
linking economic activity to emissions and substitution elasticities. Figure 2.1 gives an
overview of the data used in the Basic WIOD CGE model and how it is prepared prior
to the implementation into the model.
WIOD Data
no aggregation
(WIODPreAgg.gdx)
World Input-Output Tables
(WIOT)
Socio-Economics Accounts
(SEA)
Emissions to Air
(AIR)
CO2 Emissions
(CO2)
Energy Use Emission 
Relevant
(EM)
Koesler and Schymura (2014)
WIOD Data
(WIOD.gdx)
WIOD Data (raw) WIOD Data (processed)
Aggregation of regions, sectors, 
final demand, energy 
commoditie,emission sources
Disaggregation of value added 
from WIOTs into labor and capital 
compensation 
WIOD CGE Model
Figure 2.1: Data structure of Basic WIOD CGE model
2.2.1.1 Economic and trade data
The basis of any CGE model is the economic structure of an economy in a predefined
benchmark year given by an Input-Output (IO) table. An IO table includes information
on the production and consumption of every industry and agent specified in the economy
and illustrates the relationships between producers and consumers in monetary terms.
To replicate the core economic structure and the trade activities of the economies
under investigation, the Basic WIOD CGE model builds on WIOD’s World Input-Output
Tables (WIOT Analytics). The WIOT Analytics table is a joined set of regional IO
covering the whole world. This dataset is available for the years from 1995 to 2009,
features data from 40 developed and developing countries as well as a rest of the world
region (ROW) and is disaggregated to 35 industries.
For every region, industry and agent covered by WIOD, the current WIOT Analytics
features information regarding its intermediate use, final consumption as well as related
taxes (net of subsidies), international transport margins, and value added. Furthermore,
they contain information on direct purchases on the domestic territory by non-residents,
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and direct purchases abroad by residents.3 Figure 2.2 illustrates the basic structure of
the WIOT Analytics.
Unfortunately, WIOT Analytics contain no separate information regarding the com-
pensation for labour and capital services and feature only information on value added.
In order to overcome this shortcoming we supplement the WIOT data with information
from the WIOD Socio-Economics Accounts (SEA). On a country specific basis, each
of these files contains detailed information regarding labour and capital inputs of all
industries. From the SEAs we retrieve data on the labour LAB Y L(r,i,t) and capital
CAP Y L(r,i,t) compensation for each WIOD industry. Subsequently LAB Y L(r,i,t) and
CAP Y L(r,i,t) are used to disaggregate the value added data from the WIOTs V A(r,i,t)
into labour and capital compensation.4
3For more detailed information regarding WIOTs the interested reader is kindly referred to Timmer
et al. (2012).
4For some regions WIOD Output and Labour Files contain no information regarding LAB Y L(r,i,t)
and CAP Y L(r,i,t). Consequently we cannot compute the labour share needed to divide V A(r,i,t). In
this case we assume a labour share of 70
100
.
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Figure 2.2: Schematic outline of a WIOT Analytic (for the case of two regions)
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2.2.1.2 Environmental satellite accounts
Aside from replicating the basic economic structures contained in the World Input-
Output Tables, the basic WIOD CGE model incorporates information from many of
the environmental satellite accounts available in the WIOD database. The Basic WIOD
CGE model implements information on energy use (broken down into a number of energy
carriers), CO2 emissions, and other emissions to air.
5 If required, further data available
in the WIOD, for example on land use, material use or water use, can be implemented
similarly, but is currently not included in the basic WIOD CGE model.
All satellite accounts consist of time series ranging from 1995 to 2009 and are provided
in a sectoral aggregation consistent to WIOT’s sectoral structure. They also include data
on the final demand of private households.6 Figure 2.3 gives a schematic representation
of the WIOD satellite accounts.
Region 
Time 
 Air Emissions (AIR) 
 Sources of CO2 Emissions (CO2) 
 Energy Use, Gross (EU) 
 Energy Use, Emission Relevant (EM) 
 Land Use (LAN) 
 Material Use (MAT) 
 Water Use (WAT) 
WIOD Sectors Data 
Final Demand Data 
Totals Data 
 
Figure 2.3: Schematic representation of WIOD Emissions to Air (AIR), CO2 Emissions
(CO2), Energy Use, Gross (EU) and Energy Use, Emission Relevant (EM) tables, Land
Use (LAN), Material Use (MAT) and Water Use (WAT)
We retrieve non-CO2 air emission data for all WIOD sectors and final demand from
the WIOD Emissions to Air tables (AIR). Carbon dioxide emissions are taken from the
CO2 Emissions tables (CO2). The data allows us to differentiate between energy-related
and process related CO2 emissions, which is of importance for climate policy analyses
(Bednar-Friedl et al. 2012). Furthermore, to replicate the energy system in the WIOD
CGE model, we draw on information from the WIOD Emission Relevant Energy Use
tables (EM).
5With regard to non CO2 emissions, WIOD includes N2O, CH4, NOX, SOX, NH3, NMVOC, CO and
it is planned to enlarge its scope of air emissions to SF6, PFC, HFC, CFC, HCFC, HALON, CH3Br,
CH3CCl3.
6For more information regarding the WIOD environmental satellite accounts the interested reader is
kindly referred to Timmer et al. (2012).
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2.2.1.3 Substitution elasticities
Elasticities are key parameters determining the comparative static behavior of eco-
nomic models and thereby strongly influence the results of counterfactual policy analysis
(Dawkins et al., 2001). Consequently, the choice of adequate elasticities is a crucial el-
ement in the development of all models. But despite their importance, the availability
of consistent elasticities for CGE model appears to be unsatisfying. In particular only
few estimates of elasticities of substitution suited for CGE modeling are available, e.g.
Okagawa and Ban (2008), van der Werf (2008) and Kemfert (1998). This problem has
also been tackled within the framework of the WIOD project. Exploiting the time series
nature of the data, Koesler and Schymura (2015) estimate substitution elasticities for all
sectors included in WIOD.7 Their results are incorporated into the Basic WIOD CGE
model. Thus the model uses substitution elasticities which are consistent to the data it
is calibrated to.
2.2.2 Transfer XLSX to GDX
Originally all WIOD data is available as Microsoft Excel spread sheets. The WIOT
Analytics are organised in 15 different files, each covering one year of the WIOD reporting
period from 1995 to 2009. WIOD SEA, WIOD EM, WIOD CO2 and WIOD AIR are
provided on a region specific basis, each including several worksheets covering one specific
year. Other satellite accounts exhibit the same format.
As the Basic WIOD CGE model is implemented in the mathematical optimization
program GAMS, the WIOD data needs to be transferred into the GAMS compatible data
format GDX in order to make it available for the further data handling and modelling.
In the process, all data points in the Excel spread sheets are transferred to the core data
GDX file WIOD PreAgg.gdx using the GAMS Data Exchange facilities. For example
all variables associated with the intermediate use of products are integrated into the
GDX parameter Intermedr,i,rr,ii,t with the dimensions r (region of origin), i (industry
of origin), rr (importing region), i (importing industry) and t (year) and stored in the
GDX data files.8 A comprehensive overview of the notation used in the core GDX file is
given in the Appendix. It is important to note that at this stage all data are transferred
to the GDX file. Further aggregation and merging of the data is done at a later stage.
2.2.3 Aggregation of the data
Originally, the WIOD data covers 40 regions plus ROW, 35 industries, 26 energy carriers
and five forms of final demand. A complete list of regions, sectors and final demand types
is given in the Appendix. Depending on the specific research question, it is important to
balance the level of detail needed with the benefits of a small, highly aggregated database
7For more information regarding their estimation procedure and the results, the interested reader is
referred to Koesler and Schymura (2015).
8Here and throughout the text, r alias rr or s stands for a region and i alias ii or j for a sector.
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offering easier handling and interpretation in the light of economic theory. Choosing an
adequate aggregation level is therefore an important step when preparing data for the
use in numerical models.
To facilitate future policy analyses and research using the WIOD data and to ease
the implementation of the desired aggregation level, we developed a simple but effective
aggregation routine based on GAMS. It can be applied using the visual interface of
the Java program WIODAgg developed by ZEW. This program enables researchers
to easily implement any desired aggregation scheme to the WIOD data and produces
the data file WIOD.gdx containing all aggregated values required by the Basic WIOD
CGE model. The aggregation routine allows researchers to aggregate industries, regions,
energy carriers, and final demand according to their proper needs. The elements of
the core data file are summed up according to aggregation matrices specified by the
researcher. As an example, Figure 2.4 gives a simplified illustration of the process when
aggregating parameter TotIntermed PreAgg(origR,origSec,t) into two industries and two
regions. origR and origSec denote the region and sector in the original WIOD data,
prior to aggregation.
ܶ݋ݐܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݉݁݀ሺݐሻ ൌ 	 ݂݈ܽ݃ܣ݃݃ܵ݁ܿെ1 ∗ ܶ݋ݐܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݉݁݀_ܲݎ݁ܣ݃݃ሺݐሻ ∗ ݂݈ܽ݃ܣܴ݃݃ 
with: ܶ݋ݐܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݉݁݀ሺݐሻ ൌ ൬ܶ݋ݐܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݉݁݀ሺݎ,݅,ݐሻ ⋯⋮ ⋱൰	 	 	 	 i	ൈ	r	
ܶ݋ݐܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݉݁݀_ܲݎ݁ܣ݃݃ሺݐሻ ൌ ൬ܶ݋ݐܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݉݁݀_ܲݎ݁ܣ݃݃ሺܱݎܴ݅݃ ,ܱݎ݅݃ܵ݁ܿ ,ݐሻ ⋯⋮ ⋱൰	 OrigSec	ൈ	OrigR	
݂݈ܽ݃ܣܴ݃݃ ൌ ቀܣ݃݃ሺܱݎܴ݅݃ ,ݎሻ ⋯⋮ ⋱ቁ 	ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܣ݃݃ሺܱݎܴ݅݃ ,ݎሻ ∈ 	 ሼ0,1ሽ	 	 OrigR	ൈ	r	
݂݈ܽ݃ܣ݃݃ܵ݁ܿ ൌ ቀܣ݃݃ሺܱݎ݅݃ܵ݁ܿ ,݅ሻ ⋯⋮ ⋱ቁ ݓ݅ݐ݄ ܣ݃݃ሺܱݎ݅݃ܵ݁ܿ ,݅ሻ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ 	 OrigSec ൈ	i
Figure 2.4: Illustration of general aggregation procedure
Where substitution elasticities are concerned, we deviate from this procedure. In this
case we weigh the respective substitution elasticities according to the value share of total
output of an industry within the associated industry aggregate (s(OrigR,OrigSec,r,i,t)) and
sum up the corresponding elasticities using these shares. As a result of this procedure,
although the substitution elasticities estimated by Koesler and Schymura (2015) feature
no temporal or regional specification, the computed aggregate substitution elasticities
may vary over time and space. This is due to the fact that the value shares of total
output vary over time and space and this characteristic is conveyed to the aggregated
substitution elasticities through the aggregation process. Figure 2.5 illustrates the ag-
gregation procedure for substitution elasticities.
An important shortcoming of the WIOD dataset concerns the modelling of energy
related sectors. Though the WIOD energy use data differentiates 26 energy carriers,
current WIOT data does not allow for a detailed replication of the energy sector and
14
݁ݏ_݈݇_ܭܵሺݐሻ ൌ 	݂݈ܽ݃ܣ݃݃ܵ݁ܿെ1 ∗ ݁ݏ_݈݇_ܭܵ_ܲݎ݁ܣ݃݃ሺݐሻ ∗ ݂݈ܽ݃ܣܴ݃݃ ∗ ܵ݁ܿ 
with: ݁ݏ_݈݇_ܭܵሺݐሻ ൌ ൬݁ݏ_݈݇_ܭܵሺݎ,݅,ݐሻ ⋯⋮ ⋱൰	 	 	 	 	 i	ൈ	r	
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݂݈ܽ݃ܣܴ݃݃ ൌ ቀܣ݃݃ሺܱݎܴ݅݃ ,ݎሻ ⋯⋮ ⋱ቁ 	ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܣ݃݃ሺܱݎܴ݅݃ ,ݎሻ ∈ 	 ሼ0,1ሽ	 	 OrigR	ൈ	r	
݂݈ܽ݃ܣ݃݃ܵ݁ܿ ൌ ቀܣ݃݃ሺܱݎ݅݃ܵ݁ܿ ,݅ሻ ⋯⋮ ⋱ቁ ݓ݅ݐ݄ ܣ݃݃ሺܱݎ݅݃ܵ݁ܿ ,݅ሻ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ 	 OrigSec ൈ	i
Figure 2.5: Illustration of the aggregation procedure for substitution elasticities
thus the 26 energy carriers can only enter the model in a highly aggregated form. This
results from the ambiguous specification of the industries in the original WIOT’s. With
respect to the energy systems this concerns in particular the industries Mining and
Quarrying (C), Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel (23), and Electricity, Gas
and Water Supply (E). Subsuming the supply of coke, refined petroleum and nuclear
fuel into one industry, for example, prohibits explicitly distinguishing between demand
and supply for coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel. To be able to replicate
the individual energy usage of the industries in detail and to allow for the substitution
of different energy carriers, information on the production and consumption flows within
the energy system is imperative. We would like to stress that the Basic WIOD CGE
model itself is capable of handling a wide range of energy commodities and as soon as
the energy related industries are disaggregate. A proper replication of the energy sector
is easily possible. But until then, the model distinguishes only between conventional
(fossil fuels apart from gas) and alternative energy carriers (non fossil fuels and gas).
2.3 The model
The model is a basic, static, multi-region, multi-sector CGE model replicating the pro-
duction and distribution of commodities in the global economy. In line with the WIOD
database and depending on the chosen aggregation scheme, it differentiates up to 40
regions plus ROW, 35 sectors and five forms of final demand. Figure 2.6 provides a di-
agrammatic overview of the basic economic structure of the model. The corresponding
notation is given in the Appendix.
The model has been designed in such a way that it can easily be calibrated to
any base year within the period from 1995 to 2009 according to the requirements of
researchers. This is possible thanks to the panel character of the WIOD dataset and may
help overcoming some of critique CGE models frequently face related to their calibration
to one specific base year.
Following Rutherford (2005) and Bo¨hringer et al. (2003), the equilibrium is charac-
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Figure 2.6: Basic structure of WIOD CGE Model
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terised through three types of equilibrium conditions, namely market clearance condi-
tions for all commodities and factors (supply = demand), income balances (net income
= net expenditure) and zero profit conditions (cost of inputs = value of output). The
variables defining the equilibrium are activity levels for the constant-returns-to-scale pro-
duction, commodity and factor prices, and the price of final consumption. In the basic
model, we assume perfect competition on all markets and constant returns to scale.
Numerically, the model is formulated as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP)
in the mathematical optimization program GAMS, a program that is frequently used
to develop and run CGE models. It is written in GAMS using the MPSGE syntax (c.f.
Rosenthal, 2010; Rutherford, 1999). The model is solved using the PATH algorithm (c.f.
Dirkse and Ferris, 1993).
2.3.1 Commodity production
The model distinguishes between two groups of commodities within the set i, energy
commodities (set eg) and non-energy commodities (set neg). The production of all
commodities Y(r,i) is captured by production functions characterizing technology through
substitution possibilities between various energy, non-energy inputs and old stock of
Y(r,i). Introducing stocks of Y(r,i) is necessary because of negative changes in inventories,
represented by negative consumption, in the WIOT Analytics. They reflect the reduction
of stocks and are interpreted as a perfect substitute to new Y(r,i) (es stock(r,i) = inf).
Nested CES functions with five levels are employed to specify the substitution pos-
sibilities between labour, capital, energy inputs, non-energy intermediate inputs and
existing stocks of Y(r,i). As described in Section 2.2.1.3, the corresponding substitution
elasticities are taken from Koesler and Schymura (2015). To account for air emissions
during commodity production (process and energy related emissions), the production
structure is supplemented with Leontief nests capturing emissions during the produc-
tion process.9 While the following highlights crucial blocks of the commodity production
structure, Figure 2.7 presents the production structure of the commodity production in
detail. The corresponding zero-profit condition is illustrated in Equation 2.1. Through-
out the text, pi denotes profits and CES stands for a constant elasticity of substitution
function. The arguments of the CES function is given in parentheses and the corre-
sponding elasticity of substitution in the upper index.
piY(r,i) ≤CES
σes stock
(r,i,t)
(r,i)
[
pstock(r,i,rr,FC HH), CES
0
(r,i)
[
CES0(r,i)(pem(em,ETSGroup)),
CES
σklem
(r,i,t)
(r,i)
[
CES
σms
(r,i,t)
(r,i) (pa(neg,r,i)), CES
σkle
(r,i,t)
(r,i)
[
CES
σe
(r,i,t)
(r,i) (pe em(eg,r,i)),
CES
σkl
(r,i,t)
(r,i) (pl(r), pk(r))
]]]]
.
(2.1)
9For more details regarding the modelling of air emission the interested reader is referred to Section
2.3.4 of this chapter.
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Figure 2.7: Structure of commodity production
At the top level of the production structure, a CES function describes the substitu-
tion possibilities between newly produced Y(r,i) and stocks of Y(r,i). Process emissions
join the production in the second level. An aggregate of non-energy intermediate inputs
enter in the third level. The fourth level describes the substitution possibilities between
value added and energy. Finally, in separate nests in the fifth level of the CES produc-
tion functions, labour and capital are combined to generate value added and energy is
composed from a set of energy commodities. Total output Y(r,i) is taxed and transport
margins are applied.10
2.3.2 Trade structure
The model features up to 40 regions plus one aggregate for ’Rest of the World’ (ROW) to
close the model. ROW is modelled as any other region in the model, the only exception
being that no CO2 or other air emissions are taken into account because no environmental
information for ROW is available in the WIOD dataset.
According to the general equilibrium approach, in a static setting the trade between
an individual region with all other regions should be balanced in the benchmark. Hence
no trade deficits or surpluses should exist in the economy. But in practice this is rarely
the case. Accordingly, when implementing the WIOD data, regions consume either
more or less than their income would allow for. Therefore, budget surpluses and deficits
occur regularly. To deal with these imbalances, international capital flows which equate
the surpluses and deficits on a global level have to be modelled. Following Rutherford
(2005), we denominate the account deficits or surpluses with the consumption price of
10For more information on taxes and transport margins, the interested reader is referred to Section
2.3.5 of this chapter.
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the numeraire region and adjust the endowments of the representative agents in order
to match households’ expenditures with their income.
Within the countries, the choice among imports and domestically produced com-
modities is based on Armington’s idea of regional product differentiation (Armington,
1969). Domestic and foreign commodities are distinguished by origin and they are
imperfect substitutes. Consequently, before the commodities can enter production as
intermediates, an Armington composite A(i,r,mkt) is produced from domestic production
and an import aggregate on the basis of a CES function. The import aggregate is a CES
composite of all imports of a commodity composed in the second level of the Armington
production function. WIOD does not feature any information on the substitutability
of domestic and foreign commodities, as a consequence the corresponding Armington
elasticities are set in the original version of the Basic WIOD CGE model to a fictive
value (es a(r,mkt,t) = es mm(r,mkt,t) = 5). However, if deemed appropriate, Armington
elasticities can easily be adjusted to appropriate levels.11
Each Armington composite is produced individually for the importing sectors or
types of final demand in each region. Thereby, bisectoral and bilateral trade flows can
be modelled specifically. This one of the main differences of model to other CGE models
and allows the WIOD CGE model to depict international trade in much greater detail
than standard CGE models. Figure 2.8 displays the structures underlying the Armington
aggregation. Equation 2.2 presents the corresponding zero-profit condition.
piA(i,r,mkt) ≤CES
σes a
(r,mkt,t)
(i,r,mkt)
[
py(r,i), CES
σes mm
(r,mkt,t)
(i,r,mkt) (py(rr,i))
]
with rr 6= r. (2.2)
A(i,r,mkt)
ρA(r,mkt,t)
Y(r,i)
ρMM(r,mkt,t)
Y(rr,i) XX. . .XXX
Figure 2.8: Structure of Armington aggregation
2.3.3 Final demand
For each region, the model incorporates the behaviour of representative agents RA(r,fd)
who in sum represent total final demand. In its standard version, the Basic WIOD CGE
model includes at least a representative household FC HH and a government agent
GOV . If desired, the model can encompass all five forms of final demand supported by
WIOD data or can subsume all final demand types in only one agent per region. In the
standard version, FC HH is endowed with the primary factors labour and capital, stocks
11Armington elasticities are for example supplied within the GTAP 7 dataset (c.f. Badri and Walmsley,
2008).
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of commodities (see subsection 2.3.1) and potentially emission allowances. Labour and
capital are mobile across sectors within regions but cannot be traded between different
regions. Commodity stocks are mobile across regions. In its basic version, the model
abstracts from interregional factor mobility and investment. Government GOV receives
income from taxes and possibly from selling emission allowances. As the budget of final
demand agents need not be balanced in the benchmark, savings and borrowing adjust
the budget appropriately and are incorporated as a fix additional endowment.
The behaviour of the representative agents can be described as choosing the bundle of
consumption goods maximizing their individual utility taking into account their budget
constraint. As described in Equations 2.3 and 2.4, their budget constraint is determined
from factor income, tax revenues, revenues from the auctioning of emission allowances
as well as by interregional and intertemporal saving or borrowing of the agent:
B(r,FC HH) =pk(r)
∑
i
(
K(r,i)
)
+ pl(r)
∑
i
(
L(r,i)
)
+
∑
rr
∑
i
(
Stock(rr,i,r,FC HH)
)
+ αEMA(r,FC HH)EMA(em,ETSGroup)
− Saving(r,FC HH) +Borrowing(r,FC HH),
(2.3)
respectively
B(r,GOV ) =Tax(r) + α
EMA
(r,GOV )EMA(em,ETSGroup)
− Saving(r,GOV ) +Borrowing(r,GOV ).
(2.4)
where EMA(em,ETSGroup) denotes the value of emission allowances available in ETSGroup
and αEMA(r,fd) the share of EMA(em,ETSGroup) sold in region r by GOV or FC HH. This
approach allows for emissions trading systems spanning over more than one region.
Final demand of the representative agent is modelled as a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) composite combining energy with a non-energy Armington bundle.
Energy is composed from a set of energy commodities on the basis of another CES func-
tion. Substitution patterns within the non-energy Armington bundle are also reflected
via CES functions. As WIOD once more does not supply the corresponding elastici-
ties, in the original Basic WIOD CGE model all three nests are reflected by Leontief
functions (es c(fd,r,t) = es ca(fd,r,t) = es ce(fd,r,t) = 0). But again, if deemed appro-
priate, the elasticites can easily be updated accordingly. Furthermore, to account for
air emissions during consumption, Leontief nests capturing emissions from final demand
are introduced.12 Eventually total final demand C(r,fd) is taxed and transport margins
are applied.13 The structure underlying final demand is displayed in Figure 2.9. The
corresponding zero-profit is presented in Equation 2.5.
12For more details regarding the modelling of air emission the interested reader is referred to Section
2.3.4 of this chapter.
13For more information on taxes and transport margins, the interested reader is referred to Section
2.3.5 of this chapter.
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piC(r,fd) ≤CES0(r,fd)
[
CES0(r,fd)
[
CES
σes ca
(r,fd,t)
(r,fd) (pa(neg,r,fd)),
CES
σes ce
(r,fd,t)
(r,fd) (pe em(eg,r,fd))
]
, CES0(r,fd)(pem(em,ETSGroup))
] (2.5)
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Figure 2.9: Structure of final demand
2.3.4 Carbon dioxide and other emissions
Besides the standard economic activity, the model makes provisions for the accounting
of CO2 and other air emissions caused by economic activity. According to Xepapadeas
(2005) and Koesler (2010) there are three basic approaches of how pollution can be
incorporated into an economic model. Firstly, emissions can be linked to the level
of private consumption. In such a setting emissions can be seen as a by-product of
consumption and final demand is directly responsible for determining how much pollution
is generated in the economy. Secondly, emissions can be related to the production
process, such that pollution is a necessary by-product of production. In this context,
the production sectors are directly responsible of how much emissions are generated,
although they have only an indirect influence on emissions by choosing their level of
output. Both approaches would imply determining the prevailing amount of emissions
in a model by combining consumption respectively output with a fixed factor outside
the actual optimisation problems of the agents. But, while this would enable the model
to account for emissions, it would do so in a rather passive manner and emissions would
have no direct effect on the agents’ behaviour.
As a third possibility, emissions may arise because they are needed as an input in
the production process for the goods traded in the economy. Here, the producing sec-
tors decide directly how much pollution will prevail in the economy by choosing which
inputs they use and what amount of output they will produce. Following the recent
CGE literature, we model emissions as the fictive necessary input pem(em,ETSGroup) into
the production of commodities and the consumption good. While the fictive input is
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Figure 2.10: Air emissions from commodity production
supplied by the representative agent GOV(r), it is paired with the input causing the
emission in a Leontief nest in the respective production function. Setting the endow-
ment of pem(em,ETSGroup) sufficiently large implies the supply of the fictive input to
outnumber demand as long as no regulation is assumed for. Hence, if emissions are not
taxed, the production costs induced by the usage of the fictive input are zero. Further-
more, pem(em,ETSGroup) is mobile between all sectors assigned to a group within the set
ETSGroup.
As far as CO2 emissions are concerned, the model distinguishes between energy
related CO2 emissions (arising due to the burning of fossil fuels) and process emissions
(e.g. caused during the production of cement). With respect to other air emissions (N2O,
CH4, NOX, SOX, NH3, NMVOC, CO), we also take into account that in principle these
emissions can emerge as a result of the general production process (process emissions)
as well as from energy-related processes. But at present the WIOD data does not
allow for a distinction between energy related air emissions and air emissions related
to general production because it includes only one general air emission data file for
emissions regardless of their origin. To overcome this problem, WIOD air emissions
data should be assigned to their respective point of origin, similar to the WIOD CO2
Emission files which attribute CO2 emissions to their source.
This discussion is of particular interest, as the modeller has to decide with which
input he associates the different pollutant, in our case emissions. Let us take CO2 as
an example. The majority of CO2 arises from the burning fossil fuels and should be
linked to the energy input. But a certain share of CO2 emissions is generated as process
emissions, for example in cement or steel production. Hence CO2 emissions should be
assigned to different parts in the production structure. Bednar-Friedl et al. (2012) show
that differentiating between energy-related and process emissions is of importance for
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Figure 2.11: Air emissions from final demand
climate policy.
The case is more complicated for other air pollutants for whom emissions cannot
be calculated as straightforwardly as for CO2. Emissions of NOx, for example, also
occur when burning fossil fuels. Their amount can be reduced by modifying the burning
process or by end-of-pipe measures. This is not possible for CO2.
Modelling pollutants other than carbon dioxide is beyond the scope of the basic
WIOD CGE model and needs further information. We only distinguish between energy
and process emissions of CO2 and treat all other air pollutants as process emissions
arising with from the general production process. However, the Basic WIOD CGE
model has been modelled in such a way that modellers can easily implement a split in
energy and process emissions for all air emission types if desired and the corresponding
data is available.
From a modelling perspective, when emissions are related to energy consumption,
they enter the production process parallel to the input energy. That is to say, the
respective emissions build with energy an energy-emission composite on the basis of fix
input shares which is then employed in the standard production process. Input shares
EmissionPerUnit(em,co2energy,r,mkt,t) vary depending on the type of accompanied energy
good and are determined according to
EmissionPerUnit(em,co2energy,r,mkt,t) =
Emission(em,co2energy,r,mkt,t)
InputDemand(eg,r,mkt,t)
. (2.6)
The modelling of process emissions is carried out along the same lines, with the
exception that process emissions appear only in the production in the top nest of the
production function. Figure 2.10 highlights the relevant nests in the structure of the
commodity production. Figure 2.11 does the same for the production of the consumption
good.
2.3.5 Taxes and international transport Margins
Besides consumption and production flows as well as air emissions, the model also repli-
cates the existing tax structure as well as international transport margins in a specific
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benchmark year. But in the current version of the WIOT Analytics taxes and interna-
tional trade margins are supplied only in the form of separate rows below the WIOD
Input-output table. Taxes have not been divided by product or final demand and in-
ternational trade margins are not allocated to the region/industry responsible for the
delivery of these services.14 As a result, no realistic tax, tariff and transport structure
can be incorporated into the model because taxes and transport margins can only be
assigned globally to the sector paying them. Given this problem of the presently avail-
able WIOD data, we model all taxes and transport margins as an ad valorem tax on the
production of commodities and consumption goods. Note that the WIOD data also does
not feature tariffs or input and factor taxes. Nevertheless, in order to allow for a simple
extension of the basic model, we include input taxes ti(r,i,t) and factor taxes tf(r,i,t) in the
commodity production structure, although in the benchmark these are set to be zero.
In the basic WIOD CGE model all tax income generated in region r is assigned to the
government GOV(r).
2.3.6 Climate policy
In order to allow for a first application of the Basic WIOD CGE model, we have imple-
mented basic climate policies and allow each air emission to be regulated by means of
an emission trading scheme. As described in Section 2.3.4, emissions are modelled as an
input pem(em,ETSGroup) into the production of commodities and the consumption good.
This additional input can be interpreted as an emission allowance. By assigning sectors
and consumption to a group whose members all use the same type of input, respec-
tively allowance, one can implement a trading group encompassing a set of sectors and
final demands subject to a common emission trading scheme. We assume that emission
allowances EMA(em,ETSGroup) are auctioned by GOV(r) or FC HH(r).
Originally, the price for allowances is zero as long as the supply of allowances by
GOV(r) is equal or bigger than demand. When capping their supply, the price of emis-
sion allowance becomes positive. In this case allowances become an ordinary (costly)
input into production. In this spirit we have incorporated into the model the parame-
ter EmissionRdcTarget(em,ETSGroup,t). It expresses the reduction targets for a certain
group of sectors defined within the set ETSGroup, relative to the benchmark emissions.
This effectively implements an emission trading scheme in the model. By choosing
different emission reduction targets and assigning sectors to different trading groups one
can effectively simulate different emission trading regimes.
14For more information the interested reader is referred to Timmer et al. (2012).
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2.3.7 Market clearance conditions
Finally, in equilibrium, a set of market clearance conditions must hold. The market
clearance condition for domestic production is given by:
Y(r,i) ≥
∑
ii
(
∂piY(r,ii)
∂py(r,i)
Y(r,ii)
)
+
∑
fd
(
∂piC(r,fd)
∂py(r,i)
C(r,fd)
)
+
∑
rr;r 6=rr
(
∂piM(rr,i)
∂py(r,i)
M(rr,i)
)
−
∑
rr
(
Stock(r,i,rr,FC HH)
)
,
(2.7)
where Y(r,i) is the value of domestic production, C(r,i) the value of domestic final de-
mand, M(r,i) the value of imports by foreign regions, and Stock(r,i,rr,FC HH) the value of
commodities stocked by households. The clearance of international commodity markets
demand:
M(r,i) ≥
∑
rr;rr 6=r
(
∂piM(rr,i)
∂pm(r,i)
Y(rr,i)
)
. (2.8)
Factor markets clear if:
K(r,i) ≥
∑
ii
(
∂piY(r,ii)
∂pk(r)
Y(r,ii)
)
, (2.9)
and
L(r,i) ≥
∑
ii
(
∂piY(r,ii)
∂pl(r)
Y(r,ii)
)
. (2.10)
The market for emission allowances is cleared if:
EMA(em,ETSGroup) ≥
∑
r
∑
i
(
∂piY(r,i)
∂pem(em,ETSGroup)
Y(r,i)
)
+
∑
r
∑
fd
(
∂piC(r,fd)
∂pem(em,ETSGroup)
C(r,fd)
)
,
(2.11)
To ensure that markets for the consumer goods clear the following must hold:
B(r,fd) ≥C(r,fd). (2.12)
2.4 Summary
This report presents the Basic WIOD CGE model. The model represents the first
implementation of the novel World Input-Output Database (WIOD) into the computable
general equilibrium (CGE) framework and is tailored to provide a maximum fit with the
available WIOD data. The model is set up as a basic, static, multi-region, multi-sector
CGE model which replicates the production and distribution of commodities in the global
economy. The data preparation facilities and model are designed deliberately as flexible
as possible in order to allow researchers to use them as a basis for various applications.
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The Baisc WIOD CGE model incorporates key features of WIOD including: bilateral
and bisectoral trade flows, satellite accounts for different types of energy consumption
and greenhouse gas as well as other emissions to air on a sectoral level. Thereby all
required data stems from one consistent database. As all WIOD data is available in the
form of a consistent time series ranging from 1995 to 2009, the model can be calibrated
to any year within this time period. For substitution elasticities, the Basic WIOD CGE
model relies on parameters which are consistently estimated from the same dataset the
model itself is calibrated to.
Given the comprehensive coverage of bilateral and bisectoral trade flows, the detailed
information on energy use and its potential to account for various types of environmental
aspects of economic activity, the Basic WIOD CGE model seems particularly potent in
serving as as the basis for research in fields of energy and environmental policy or trade
policy. Overall, the Basic WIOD CGE model enables researchers to secure the numerous
advantages of the WIOD dataset when using CGE models for future research.
Note
To allow interested researchers to use the WIOD data within the mathematical optimiza-
tion program GAMS, this presentation of the Basic WIOD CGE model is accompanied
by a GDX file including all the WIOD data required within the context of the WIOD
CGE model (Version: 14.4.2013). Moreover, we supply an aggregation routine which en-
ables researchers to tailor the WIOD data depending on their needs. The corresponding
ZIP file is available at www.zew.de/WIODAgg2013.
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Chapter 3
Substitution elasticities in a CES
framework: Empirical estimates
using non-linear least squares
Abstract
Elasticities are key parameters for any economic analysis. Using the World Input-Output
Database (WIOD), we estimate substitution elasticities for a three level nested CES
KLEM production structure using up to date non-linear least squares estimation proce-
dures. This allows us for the first time to use one coherent dataset for the estimation
process. Furthermore, it gives us the opportunity to derive elasticities from the same
data which researchers can use to calibrate their models. On the basis of our estima-
tions, we demonstrate that the practice of using Cobb-Douglas or Leontief production
functions in economic models must be rejected for the majority of sectors. We pro-
vide a comprehensive set of estimated substitution elasticities covering a wide range of
sectors. Our results suggest that no substantial change in input substitutability takes
place during the time period we consider. Moreover, there is no substantial variation in
substitution elasticities across regions.
This chapter is based on the following paper:
Koesler, Simon and Michael Schymura (2015), Substitution Elasticities in a CES Frame-
work - Empirical Estimates Using Non-Linear Least Squares, Economic Systems Re-
search 27(1), 101-121.
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3.1 Introduction
Elasticities are key parameters for any economic analysis. Ultimately, this results in
the need for informed and reliable estimates of elasticities. In this paper we provide a
comprehensive set of estimated elasticities covering a wide range of sectors. We focus
on substitution elasticities as they are in most cases required by Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) models. However, in principle there exist a multitude of potential
applications where our estimates could be used. Our main objective is twofold. First,
we want to contribute to the existing literature by employing a coherent dataset with
a balanced panel structure including a comprehensive sectoral and regional coverage,
namely the new World Input-Output Database (WIOD) (Timmer et al., 2012; Dietzen-
bacher et al., 2013). Second, we apply an up to date estimation procedure in the form
of non-linear least squares estimation.
For any policy-oriented numerical model, such as for example CGE models, elas-
ticities are key parameters since they are crucial for determining comparative static
behaviour and thereby strongly influence the results of any counterfactual policy analy-
sis undertaken with the help of these models (Dawkins et al., 2001). A good illustration
is provided by Jacoby et al. (2006), who perform a sensitivity analysis of structural pa-
rameters of their MIT-EPPA model. They conclude that assumptions with respect to
technical progress and in particular elasticities of substitution between energy and value
added are the main drivers of model results. Other crucial behavioural parameters are
Armington elasticities of trade. Hertel et al. (2007) illustrate the problem by demon-
strating that the choice of Armington elasticities can invert the predicted implications
of free trade agreements. However, in this paper, we focus on substitution elasticities
and leave the investigation of Armington elasticities to future research.
But despite the central role of elasticities within the framework of applied quantita-
tive simulations, only few studies address the issue in depth and although this situation
has been acknowledged for a long time (Mansur and Whalley, 1984; Dawkins et al.,
2001), there still appears to be room for improvements. According to Okagawa and
Ban (2008), this holds particularly true for the constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
framework commonly employed in CGE modelling and substitution elasticities. In this
context, few estimates of the required elasticities exist. Kemfert (1998) studies produc-
tion structures and substitution elasticities within the German industry. Her findings
suggest that substitution elasticities are positive but smaller than one. Balistreri et al.
(2003) focus on the input substitutability between capital and labour and estimate the
respective substitution elasticity for 28 US sectors. For the majority of sectors their
results support the use of the Cobb-Douglas specification in the nest including capital
and labour. Van der Werf (2008) supplies parameters for a set of two-level nested CES
functions with capital, labour and energy inputs. His results do also imply that substi-
tution elasticities are commonly smaller than one. Okagawa and Ban (2008) estimate
CES production functions using panel data from the EU KLEMS dataset. They find
that substitution elasticities for non-energy sectors are commonly set too high in existing
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models evaluating climate policy.
Due to the limited data availability, modellers frequently feel impelled to use elas-
ticities from various unrelated sources. Thereby they expose themselves to criticism
with respect to the use of potentially inconsistent parameter estimates. Another issue
regarding the problematic use of elasticity estimates in models relates to the inappropri-
ate use of elasticities and the conceptual mismatch between estimation results and the
policy experiment explored in the modelling framework. McKitrick (1998) for example
deplores the use of elasticities estimated for commodity classifications which are in dis-
accord with those represented in the model or for regions the model does not cover. In
turn, Browning et al. (1999) highlight the difficulties possibly arising due to the mis-
match of definitions, for instance the disregard of the differences between short-term
and long-term substitution elasticities. In some extreme cases, when estimates are not
available altogether, modellers even resort to the use of rather arbitrary values. In this
regard Dawkins et al. (2001) most fittingly term the frequent use of elasticities of unity
the ’idiot’s law of elasticities’ or the use of rather arbitrary values as ’coffee table elas-
ticities’. Both the use of inappropriate estimates or ’coffee table elasticities’ has resulted
in skepticism regarding, for example, CGE modelling, especially from an econometric
perspective (McKitrick, 1998).1
In this paper we seek to contribute to the solution to this problem and aim at supply-
ing elasticities for modellers. To this end, we estimate substitution elasticities building on
CES production functions as they are often employed in CGE models. More specifically,
we estimate elasticities of substitution for the well-established three level nested KLEM
production structure using non-linear least squares estimation procedures. In the process
we take advantage of the new WIOD data Timmer et al. (2012); Dietzenbacher et al.
(2013). The originality of our approach is that we combine a new dataset with recently
developed estimation techniques for non-linear estimations of CES functions presented
by Henningsen and Henningsen (2012). Furthermore, the new WIOD database allows
us for the first time to use one coherent dataset for the estimation process and gives us
the opportunity to derive elasticities from the same data, which researchers can use to
calibrate their simulations.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. After presenting in Section 3.2
the production structures for which the elasticities of substitution are estimated, we
describe the data and outline the estimation procedure in Section 3.3. The estimation
results are presented and discussed in Section 3.4. Finally, we summarise and conclude
in Section 3.5.
1If no generally accepted elasticities are employed, the validity of models should be tested ex-post
on the basis of a validation approach (e.g. Kehoe et al., 1995). We thank an anonymous referee for
suggesting such an approach.
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3.2 Specification of production structures
A multitude of different elasticities define the substitutability between inputs. In the
following section we introduce the underlying economic structure, for which we estimate
elasticities. Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functions have become very pop-
ular among modellers not only in general equilibrium models but also in other economic
applications with a micro-consistent basis. There are three main reasons for this. First,
in contrast to less restricted functions such as translog functions, CES functions fea-
ture convenient mathematical characteristics (regularity) allowing for easier analytical
treatment (Bo¨hringer et al., 2003). Second, they are sufficiently flexible to characterise
a range of different economic behaviour (Bo¨hringer et al., 2003; Sancho, 2009). Third,
CES functions can be expressed in such a way that they can be easily be calibrated to
benchmark values (Rutherford, 2002; Klump and Saam, 2008; Sancho, 2009).
The question to what extent factors of production are substitutable in a production
process has long been an important focus of economic research. It originates in the
fundamental work of Solow (1956). Solow considered three cases of production functions.
He called the first ’Harrod-Domar’ (Solow, 1956, p. 73) function with an elasticity of
substitution equal to zero, the ’Cobb-Douglas’ case (Solow, 1956, p. 76) with an elasticity
of one and a third, not explicitly named possibility with a flexible elasticity (Solow, 1956,
p. 77). Solow elaborated the idea of CES production functions for the first time, and,
five years later, together with his co-authors (Arrow et al., 1961) he conceptualised
the general form of the two-factor constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) production
function (see e.g. Klump and De la Grandville (2000)). This CES production function
can be seen as a generalisation of the two older concepts of the Harrod-Domar-Leontief
production function, which is based on the assumption that there is no substitutability
between factors, and the Cobb-Douglas production function, which assumes unitary
factor substitution elasticity. Since the introduction of the CES production function
in 1956, a multitude of extensive studies on the elasticities of substitution between
production inputs have been published. One of the latest studies in this regard is the
work of Le´on-Ledesma et al. (2010), who investigate if a simultaneous identification of
the capital-labour substitution elasticity and the direction of technical change is feasible.
For the n-input case the basic CES function takes the form:
yCES n-input = γ
(
n∑
i=1
αix
−ρ
i
) 1
−ρ
, (3.1)
where y is output, xi is input i, αi is the distribution parameter related to input i, γ
represents a productivity parameter and ρ is the substitution parameter. Thereby the
following conditions must hold: 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1,
∑n
i=1 αi = 1, γ ≥ 0 and ρ ≥ −1. The
elasticity of substitution σ is given by σ = 11+ρ and thus σ ≥ 0 must also hold.
But in such a basic CES framework the production structure is limited to feature
equal substitution elasticities between all inputs. To overcome this Sato (1967) extended
the CES functional form and suggests the use of nested CES functions. The general idea
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behind Sato’s approach is to construct a separate CES function for each group of inputs
that share the same substitution elasticity and to combine different CES functions in
different levels or nests of the overall CES function. This allows easy implementation
even for complicated production structures and is one of the main advantages of the CES
functional form. In this estimation exercise, we focus on estimating elasticity of substi-
tutions for a three-level CES production representing the production structure with the
final output Y and including the inputs capital (K), labour (L), energy (E) and inter-
mediate inputs (M).2 In addition, during our analysis we concentrate on a ((KL)E)M
nesting structure. The (KL)E structure has been confirmed as a good approximation of
the production behaviour in several studies (e.g. Kemfert, 1998; van der Werf, 2008) and
the extended version ((KL)E)M has become a very popular CES form in CGE mod-
els (e.g. Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2012). Nevertheless, we are aware that a ((KL)E)M ,
respectively KLEM, structure is not the only way incorporate capital, labour, energy
and intermediate inputs in a CES production function (e.g. Lecca et al., 2011). But
with regard to this paper, we leave the analysis of other specifications to future research.
Following Sato (1967) and Henningsen and Henningsen (2011) with regard to the Hicks-
neutral technological change, a three-level CES nesting structure with capital and labour
in the lowest nest, where energy joins the capital-labour composite in the middle nest
and intermediates enter in the top nest, has the functional form:
Yt =γe
tλ
(
αKLEM (Mt)
−ρKLEM + (1− αKLEM )
((
αKLE(Et)
−ρKLE+
(1− αKLE) (V At)−ρKLE
) 1
−ρKLE
)−ρKLEM) 1−ρKLEM (3.2)
with
V At =
(
αKL(Kt)
−ρKL + (1− αKL) (Lt)−ρKL
) 1
−ρKL . (3.3)
In both equations t is a time variable and λ is the rate of technological change with λ ≥ 0.
Moreover, Y is again final output, K is capital, L is labour, V A is value-added as a
compound of capital and labour, E energy and M intermediate inputs. From Equations
3.2 and 3.3 one can already see, thanks to the characteristics of the CES functional
form, a three-level CES function can be segmented into one two-level structure and one
one-level structure which can be analysed separately if desired.
2Note, that we are not dependent of input prices due to the duality relationship of production functions
and cost functions (c.f. Varian, 2010).
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3.3 Data and estimation procedure
3.3.1 Data
For our analysis we make use of the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) (Timmer
et al., 2012; Dietzenbacher et al., 2013).3 Employing the WIOD dataset in our estimation
process involves three main benefits. First, we can estimate substitution elasticities
using one coherent dataset and do not have to merge potentially incompatible data.
Second, the comprehensive sectoral coverage of WIOD allows us to estimate substitution
elasticities for a broad set of sectors. Finally, for the first time, we can derive elasticities
from the same data which other researchers can use to calibrate their simulations.
The WIOD database has been constructed on the basis of national accounts data and
harmonisation procedures were applied in order to ensure international comparability.
The dataset covers 40 countries (27 EU countries and 13 other major regions), which
together account for approximately 85 % of world’s GDP in 2006. The WIOD data is
disaggregated in 35 industries and provides detailed information on primary (agriculture
and raw materials), secondary (manufacturing) as well as tertiary (services) sectors. In
addition, it offers annual data which range from 1995 to 2009, in some cases to 2011.
Beside its broad regional coverage, detailed sectoral disaggregation and time series char-
acter, the dataset has another important feature: it covers various aspects of economic
activity and involves accounts for energy and environmental issues, socioeconomic fac-
tors, and bilateral trade data. For more information in the WIOD dataset, the interested
reader is kindly referred to Timmer et al. (2012) and Dietzenbacher et al. (2013).
In our analysis, we use the WIOD Socio-Economic Accounts (SEA files) and the
WIOD Energy Use tables (EU files). Taken together, they form a balanced panel covering
40 regions and 34 sectors plus an economy-wide sector aggregate over a period of 15 years
(1995 to 2009) and include detailed information on production in- and outputs.4 More
specifically WIOD supplies us with data regarding the number of total hours worked by
persons engaged for the independent variable labour L, physical capital stock for the
independent variable K , gross value added at basic prices for the independent variable
value added V A, intermediate inputs at purchasers’ prices for the independent variable
materials M , gross energy use for the independent variable energy E and finally gross
output at basic prices for the dependent variable output Y . Even though WIOD provides
the necessary data up to the year 2009, in order to avoid drawing conclusions from a
period of economic turmoil we drop the years 2008 and 2009 from our analysis and focus
on the period from 1995 to 2007. For the estimation, all monetary values have been
transformed to 1995-US Dollars using the exchange rates provided in WIOD and are
reported at 1995 prices. Energy is measured in Terajoule. Labour is given in million
3The WIOD database is available at http://www.wiod.org. We use data from March 2012 in this
paper.
4While originally the WIOD dataset features information for 35 sectors, entries for the sector private
households with employed persons remain empty in the SEA and EU files. Consequently we undertake
the analysis only for the 34 remaining sectors plus the economy-wide sector total.
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Table 3.1: List of variables used in the estimation process
Variable Short Definition File Unit
Output Y Gross output at basic prices SEA million 1995 USD
Capital K Fixed capital stock SEA million 1995 USD
Labour L Total hours worked by persons engaged SEA million hours
Value Added VA Gross value added at basic prices SEA million 1995 USD
Energy E Gross energy use EU Terajouls
Materials M Intermediate inputs at purchasers’ prices SEA million 1995 USD
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Short Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Output Y 89776.3 653518.5 0.00 2.57e+07
Capital K 141423.7 1056758.0 0.04 3.02e+07
Labour L 2270.3 16497.5 0.00 468780.9
Value Added VA 45086.2 349024.7 0.00 1.40e+07
Energy E 660332.3 4649308.0 0.01 1.33e+08
Materials M 43330.9 278077.5 0.00 8992552
hours worked. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the variables used in the estimation
process and Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics. Overall, all variables are more
or less of comparable magnitude and we expect not to have problems with floating-point
numbers in our estimation process. A complete list of regions and sectors covered by
this analysis is given in the Appendix.
3.3.2 Estimation procedure
The elasticity estimates available in the literature have been produced using different
estimation approaches. In this paper we rely on non-linear least squares estimation
procedures. Nested CES functions feature additive components and are non-linear in
parameters; hence, parameters can initially not be estimated using standard non-linear
estimation techniques. For this reason and due to the so far rather tedious implemen-
tation of non-linear estimation procedures (Henningsen and Henningsen, 2012), most
researchers estimating elasticities of substitution within a CES framework work with
CES functions that have been linearised in some form or the other. Thereby, the so-
called Kmenta approximation (Kmenta, 1967) has been very popular. However, the
original CES function cannot be linarised analytically and using approximation meth-
ods to linearise the CES function can have drawbacks. Kmenta (1967) himself notes
that if in the production function under investigation the input ratio as well as the elas-
ticity of substitution are either very high or very low, his approximation method may
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not perform well. Maddala and Kadane (1967) and Thursby and Lovell (1978) confirm
this problem and show that the standard Kmenta procedure may not lead to reliable
estimates of parameters in a CES framework.
To avoid issues related to Kmenta approximations or linear estimation approaches in
general without having to use cumbersome non-linear estimation procedures, researchers
also make use of the cost function approach (e.g. van der Werf, 2008; Okagawa and
Ban, 2008). Thereby one can take advantage of the optimal cost function associated
with a specific production function and derive a linear system of equations from the
corresponding optimal input demand. This can subsequently be used to estimate the
function coefficients in question. But this approach requires comprehensive price data,
which in most cases is rather difficult to come by, especially when undertaking sector
specific analysis.
In contrast to the majority of other studies investigating the substitutability of inputs
within a CES production structure, we estimate substitution elasticities directly from
the CES production function and build on non-linear least-squares estimation procedures
as outlined by Henningsen and Henningsen (2012). As suggested by Henningsen and
Henningsen, we make use of starting values compiled by means of a preceding grid
search for the substitution parameter ρ.5 For the grid search, we employ the Levenberg-
Marquardt algorithm (LM) (Marquardt, 1963). For the estimations we rely on PORT
routines (Gay, 1990) which take longer but in contrast to LM allow us to run unrestricted
as well as restricted estimations.
For the actual estimation process we use the programming environment R with the
package micEconCES developed by Henningsen and Henningsen (2011). Besides allowing
for a convenient implementation of our estimation approach, the work of Henningsen and
Henningsen enables us to overcome the main issues when estimating the non-linear CES
functions outlined by Henningsen and Henningsen (2012). The micEconCES package
in its current version only allows estimation of parameters for a two-level nested CES
production function. To overcome this minor limitation, we benefit from the separability
implied by the CES framework and split the originally three-level nested KLEM CES
function into two individual CES functions. Accordingly we estimate the substitution
elasticities for the non-nested CES function
V At = γKLe
tλKL
(
αKL(Kt)
−ρKL + (1− αKL) (Lt)−ρKL
) 1
−ρKL , (3.4)
with the substitution elasticity σKL =
1
1+ρKL
and do the same for the two-level CES
5For more information on how adequate starting values are derived applying a preceding grid search,
the interested reader is kindly referred to Henningsen and Henningsen (2011). To check for sensitivity
with regard to starting values, we run the estimation twice, once with standard starting values given by
Henningsen and Henningsen (2011) and once with the starting values indicated by a grid search. This
admittedly limited sensitivity analysis suggests that the results do not depend on the choice of the to
starting values - although it does influence the rate of convergence, which is higher in the case of starting
values from a preceding grid search. Thus we proceed as suggested by Henningsen and Henningsen
(2012).
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function
Yt =γKLEMe
tλKLEM
(
αKLEM (Mt)
−ρKLEM + (1− αKLEM )
((
αKLE(Et)
−ρKLE+
(1− αKLE) (V At)−ρKLE
) 1
−ρKLE
)−ρKLEM) 1−ρKLEM
,
(3.5)
with the substitution elasticities σKLE =
1
1+ρKLE
and σKLEM =
1
1+ρKLEM
. Taken to-
gether, Equation (3.4) and Equation (3.5) represent the overall CES function in question,
whereas, as already indicated by Equation (3.2), Equation (3.4) is the bottom nest and
Equation (3.5) corresponds to the middle and upper nests of the production function
under investigation. We choose to split the original CES function into these two func-
tions instead of applying other possible segmentations, because, although we have data
for K, L, V A, E, M and Y , we do not have information on the value-added-energy
composite. Hence we can not analyse a single level CES function combining materials
and the value-added-energy composite.
We however deviate from Henningsen and Henningsen (2011) at one point and cal-
culate the estimated variation of the residuals (V̂ AR) by:
V̂ AR =
1
N − k
N∑
i=1
u2i , (3.6)
where N is the number of observations, k is the number of estimated coefficients and ui is
the residual of the i-th observation. That is, in contrast to Henningsen and Henningsen
(2011), we correct for the degrees of freedom.
The substitution elasticities are estimated individually for each of the 34 sectors
and one sector aggregate representing the total of all industries available in the WIOD
dataset. Thereby, we first pool all sectoral data across all regions. At a later stage we
evaluate whether input substitutability varies across regions. As indicated by Equation
(3.4) and (3.5), initially we assume that elasticities are constant over time. Hence, in our
setting technological progress can only take place through changes in overall productivity.
This assumption is relaxed at a later stage.
3.4 Estimation results
3.4.1 Basic results of estimations
Having described the data and the estimation procedure, we now turn to the empiri-
cal implementation and present our results. In the unrestricted estimation, for several
sectors the estimated substitution elasticities on the three different nests are negative
(σKL < 0, σKLE < 0 or σKLEM < 0) and thus violate the basic assumptions of the
standard CES framework which requires positive elasticities (σ ≥ 0 respectively ρ ≥ −1).
These violations indicate the need to incorporate the three parameter constraints im-
plied by the CES framework into our estimations, i.e. a positive productivity parameter
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(γ > 0), distributional parameters between zero and one (0 ≥ α ≥ 1) and positive
substitution elasticities (σ ≥ 0). Table 3.3 summarises the results for the substitution
elasticities σ when applying the restricted estimation to the time period 1995 to 2007
with pooled data including all regions.
We do not achieve convergence for the bottom nest of sector 23 (coke, refined
petroleum and nuclear fuel) for any acceptable convergence criteria and do not report
a value for the parameter controlling the substitutability between capital and labour
(ρKL). Moreover, some of the estimates for substitution elasticities (σ) feature high
standard errors, these estimates are reported in parentheses. For six out of the 105
estimated elasticities, the condition that σ ≥ 0 is binding, which results in a reported
estimated elasticity of Inf . This could be an indication that, for a small set of sectors,
the assumption of CES production structures provides a poor fit to the actual prevailing
production structure. However, for the large majority of sectors and nests our estima-
tion results seem to be reliable with regard to fit to the data and standard errors, and
as the use of of CES functions has proven to be very popular in particular in CGE
models, we proceed with our estimation process and continue including the constraints
on productivity, distribution parameters and substitution elasticities given by the CES
framework.
With few exceptions, most estimated substitution elasticities are smaller than one.
Sectors featuring a comparatively high substitutability between capital and labour in-
clude 61 (water transport), 64 (post and telecommunication) and AtB (agriculture, hunt-
ing, forestry and fishing). Sectors 52 (retail trade and repair of household goods) and
H (hotels and restaurants) find it rather difficult to use this substitution possibility.
Value-added and energy can be substituted relatively easily in sectors 27t28 (basic and
fabricated metal), 30t33 (electrical and optical equipment) and 61 (water transport).
The opposite seems to be true, for example, for sectors J (financial intermediation) and
M (education). A relatively high substitution elasticity between the value-added-energy
composite and intermediate inputs can be reported for M (education), 62 (air transport)
and AtB (agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing). A low substitutability in this nest
is observed in the sectors 27t28 (basic and fabricated metal), C (mining and quarry-
ing) and 60 (inland transport). When comparing the substitutability of inputs across
different nests, our results suggest that, while capital and labour tend to be more diffi-
cult to substitute with each other than value-added and energy, the value-added-energy
composite can be substituted with intermediate inputs relatively easily.
3.4.2 Cobb-Douglas or Leontief production structure
Given our estimates, we continue and investigate whether the common simplification of
using Cobb-Douglas or Leontief functions in economic models can be rejected by our
estimation results. On that account, we make use of a Lagrange-multiplier test and
benefit from the high number of observations which allows us to assume that our data
has a normal distribution. For all three nests the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas function
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(σKL = 1, σKLE = 1 or σKLEM = 1) can be dismissed with acceptable validity levels
(p-value > 0.1) for almost all sectors. Hence we can confirm the findings by van der
Werf (2008). A similar picture emerges for the assumption of a Leontief functional form
(σKL = 0, σKLE = 0 or σKLEM = 0). To be exact, in the bottom nest the Leontief
and the Cobb-Douglas framework must be rejected for the all sectors. While in the
middle nest the assumption of a Leontief-like production structure can not be discarded
for sector C (mining and quarrying), a Cobb-Douglas production function can not be
excluded in sectors C (mining and quarrying) and 27t28 (basic metals and fabricated
metal). A Leontief framework in the top nest can be rejected for all sectors except
sectors 30t33 (electrical and optical equipment) and 70 (real estate activities). The
same hold true for a Cobb-Douglas production structure. Overall, this strongly suggests
that a simplified approach to the choice of substitution elasticities including only Cobb-
Douglas or Leontief production functions is not appropriate and will eventually lead to
misleading results of any counterfactual analysis. This clearly emphasises the need for
appropriately estimated behavioural parameters.
3.4.3 Comparison with previous studies
With our estimates we contribute to the existing literature on substitution elasticities.
We compare the result of our estimations to the findings of Okagawa and Ban (2008),
van der Werf (2008) and Kemfert (1998). We focus on these three papers as they are very
popular among CGE modellers. At the same time we are aware of the critique that has
been stated in relation to these studies (e.g. Henningsen and Henningsen (2011)). Table
3.4 summarises the comparison. However, it must be noted that for several reasons a
direct comparison of the results is difficult. First, none of the studies exploits the same
data. But, as Okagawa and Ban (2008), van der Werf (2008) as well as Kemfert (1998)
use rather similar data and variables, these issues do not immediately suggest themselves
as the main reasons for the deviations. Second, all researchers undertake estimations
for a different set of sectors. Hence their findings can only be compared on the basis
of a specific (possibly arbitrary) sectoral mapping. Third, Okagawa and Ban (2008) as
well as Kemfert (1998) do not supply information on the standard error of their results.
Fourth, the studies employ different estimation techniques. In effect, while Okagawa
and Ban (2008) and van der Werf (2008) estimate substitution elasticities using linear
estimation processes and apply a cost function approach, the elasticities derived in this
paper stem from a non-linear estimation process using the original functional form of a
CES production function. Only Kemfert (1998) applies also a non-linear estimation to
the problem. As a consequence, we can not truly test whether our results differ from the
findings of other frequently cited studies. Nevertheless, keeping this in mind and being
aware of the standard errors of our own estimation, we observe that overall our estimates
for the substitution elasticities σKL, σKLE and σKLEM are neither consistently higher
nor smaller than the ones supplied by Okagawa and Ban. With few exceptions, compared
to the elasticities derived by van der Werf (2008) or Kemfert (1998), our estimates tend
38
to be smaller.
3.4.4 Changes in substitution elasticities over time
The time series character of our data allows us to engage in an additional analysis and
makes it possible to investigate whether substitution elasticities change over time. In the
economic literature, technological progress within the CES framework is mainly under-
stood as a change in input productivity, and researchers focus primarily on determining
the rate of technological change in the form of a general (neutral) or factor augmenting
(non-neutral) productivity increase. But in principle the CES framework leaves room for
technological change affecting not only productivity but also the substitutability between
different production inputs. The textile industry at the end of the 18th century provides
an excellent example of this form of technological change. As looms became more and
more advanced, human labour could be replaced more easily in the production process
(’Spinning Jenny Effect’). Eventually this had a huge effect on business and society in
that period (Allen, 2009). A modified CES function that takes into account changes
of the substitution parameter over time and incorporates Hicks-neutral technological
change takes the form:
yCES neutral time-dependent = γetλ
(∑
i
αi(xi)
−ρt
) 1
−ρt
. (3.7)
Unfortunately, our non-linear estimation structure does not allow direct estimates of
time fixed effects. Instead, we embark on a simple approach and test whether we can
observe a change in input substitutability over time by reestimating Equations (3.4) and
(3.5) and comparing the estimated elasticities for two different time periods (1995 to
1997 and 2005 to 2007). Table 3.5 summarises the results. Note that for some sectors
convergence or CES constraint issues arise when using a constraint time period, the
respective sectors are marked with an NA value. Again, blanks indicate that the null
hypothesis can not be rejected at an acceptable level (p-value > 0.1). In the bottom,
middle nest and top nest, the hypothesis that the substitution elasticities do not change
over time can be rejected at an acceptable level (p-value < 0.1) for about two thirds of
the sectors under investigation. When evaluating a less stringent comparison between
the two periods, the picture becomes even clearer, and we can reject an economically
substantial change in input substitutability for all but a handful of sectors.6 To allow for
a more detailed analysis investigating of whether there have been any structural changes
of the substitution elasticities over time, we split the results in five groups depend-
ing on the evaluated sector, namely Basic Materials, Energy, Manufacturing, Services
and Transport, the underlying mapping is outlined in Table B.2 in the Appendix. But
6To make the issue tangible, we assume that an economically substantial change would imply substi-
tution elasticities changing by more than one. That is |σ95−97 − σ05−07| > 1. In the special illustrative
case that σ95−97 = 0 and σ05−07 = 1, this would imply a production structure changing from Leontief
to Cobb Douglas.
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even when investigating only specific sectors groups, we do not observe any substan-
tial changes over time. Moreover, for all sector groups, the hypothesis that there has
been an increase in elasticities has to be rejected equally often as the hypothesis that
elasticities have decreased. Hence, our results suggest that there has been no structural
change in elasticities over time. One possible explanation for this could for instance
be a ’putty-clay’ structure of the physical capital stock which adjusts only slowly and
hence elasticities are not affected in the short run (Fuss, 1997). This implies also that
changing substitution elasticities are not a problem for our estimations, which originally
consider the complete time period between 1995 to 2007. But nevertheless, the issue is
potentially important. As a consequence, in future research this particular dimension of
technological progress needs to be taken into account and should be investigated with
more rigour. Ultimately this will require studying longer time periods as those under
investigation so far in studies on the substitutability of inputs and also a formalisation
of the issue within the CES framework.
3.4.5 Differences of substitution elasticities between regions
Having investigated the variability of input substitutability over time, we next evaluate
whether there are differences of elasticities between regions. Again, as our estimation
process does not allow to directly estimate regional fixed effects, we apply a similar
approach as before and compare estimates for different regions with each other to test
for regional variation. Here we only present the results of a comparison between the
estimates for the EU27 and the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China). A
similar picture emerges when contrasting the results for regions with a high productivity
to those featuring a relatively low productivity.7 Table 3.6 compares the results for the
EU27 with those for BRIC. Again, we do not achieve convergence for the bottom nest of
sector 23 (coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel) and in particular in the bottom nest
several estimates are driven by the constraints of the CES framework. These estimates
are marked with NAs. Once more, blank elements in the table indicate that the null
hypothesis can not be rejected at an acceptable level (p-value > 0.1). For all three
nests, there is no substantial difference in input substitutability between regions for the
large majority of sectors. Only for the groups associated with service and manufacturing
activities in the BRIC countries, we can not reject a higher input substitutability between
the capital-labour-energy composite and materials compared to estimates for the EU for
a fair number of sectors. For the other two nests and sector groups, one can not conclude
that elasticities are higher or lower in the EU compared to the BRIC countries, and vice
versa. Hence, there appears to be no regional variation in elasticities of substitution.
7For this analysis, we rank the regions under investigation according to their score in the index GDP
per person employed (constant 1990 PPP USD) from the World Bank.
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3.5 Summary and conclusion
Elasticities, in particular substitution elasticities, are vital parameters for any micro-
consistent economic model and crucially influence the results of any economic analysis.
But so far only few estimates of elasticities exist which rely on a consistent database.
With this paper we aim at overcoming this problem. Building on a coherent data set
based on WIOD data, we systematically investigate input substitutability in a CES
production framework for a KLEM production structure using non-linear estimation
procedures.
On the basis of our estimations, we confirm the findings by van der Werf (2008) and
demonstrate that the common practice of using Cobb-Douglas or Leontief production
functions in economic models must be rejected for the majority of sectors. This calls for
a more elaborate approach with regard to substitution elasticities. In particular in re-
sponse to this result, we provide a comprehensive set of estimated substitution elasticities
covering a wide range of sectors. Our results suggest that no economically substantial
change in input substitutability takes place during the time period we consider. Hence,
for most sectors we do not observe technological change through this channel, although
technological progress in the form of changing substitution elasticities may potentially be
an issue when studying longer time periods. Moreover, there is no substantial regional
variation in substitution elasticities. By providing an exhaustive set of substitution elas-
ticities and with our analysis of input substitutability over time and between regions, we
hope to make a valuable contribution to making economic analyses more reliable and to
support researchers as well as policy makers in their efforts to find solutions for today’s
challenges.
With regard to how the research presented here could be developed in the future, we
believe that applying the approach used in this paper to production setups other than
KLEM or for example Armington elasticities can unlock further insights on behaviourial
parameters. Moreover, a validation exercise studying different assumptions on the sub-
stitutability of production inputs could be used to evaluate our estimates in a modelling
framework.
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Chapter 4
Specifying parameters in CGE
models using Optimal Fingerprint
Detection Methods
Abstract
The specification of parameters is a crucial task in the development of economic models.
The objective of this paper is to improve the standard parameter specification of com-
putable general equilibrium (CGE) models. On that account, we illustrate how Optimal
Fingerprint Detection Methods can be used to identify appropriate values for various
parameters. This method originates from climate science and combines a simple model
validation exercise with a structured sensitivity analysis. The new approach has various
benefits: 1) It uses a structured optimisation procedure and does not revert to ad-hoc
model improvements. 2) It allows to account for uncertainty in parameter estimates by
using information on the distribution of parameter estimates from the literature. 3) It
can be applied for the specification of a range of parameters required in CGE models,
for example for the definition of elasticities or productivity growth rates.
This chapter is based on the following papers:
Koesler, Simon (2014), Specifying Parameters in Computable General Equilibrium Mod-
els using Optimal Fingerprint Detection Methods, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 14-092,
Mannheim, Germany.
Koesler, Simon (2015), Specifying Parameters in Computable General Equilibrium Mod-
els using Optimal Fingerprint Detection Methods, MIT Joint Program Report Series No.
276, Cambridge, USA.
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4.1 Introduction
The development of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models requires many as-
sumptions regarding their theoretical setup (e.g. the underlying factor market specifica-
tion) as well as the definition of required parameters (e.g. the specification of substitu-
tion elasticities). While without doubt both elements of model design are important and
require utmost accuracy to avoid false model results, in this paper we discuss the ame-
lioration of the process of parameter specification and present an alternative approach
that can be used to parameterise CGE models.
For the specification of parameters, modellers normally make use of calibration tech-
nics (c.f. Dawkins et al., 2001) or build on estimates from the literature. These ap-
proaches entail some important limitations. Standard benchmark calibration for instance
does not account for fluctuations over time and is thus prone to errors when special events
or situations in the benchmark year are not specifically taken into account. Picture for
example building on a biased economic structure because of an inflated tourism and
construction sector in a year where the Olympic Games take place. Applying estimates
from the literature is also not as straightforward as it may seem at first glance. If for
instance parameters are not specifically estimated for the implementation in models or
at least studied on the basis of the same underlying theoretical structure, conceptual and
definitional mismatches may lead to the misspecification of parameter values (Browning
et al., 1999). McKitrick (1998) illustrates the issue for the case of substitution elas-
ticities. What is more, simply using values from the literature neglects that in most
cases the information originates from estimation procedures and must thus associated
with some degree of uncertainty. While for instance most of the substitution elasticities
estimated by Koesler and Schymura (2015) feature small standard deviations, some es-
timates imply an important amount of variability of which modellers should be aware
of. All too often, modellers are also confronted with a situation in which no estimates
or data is available for the definition of required parameters. In this case, they have to
build on their experience and intuition and have only few options to truly evaluate their
model specification. This leads directly to the critique of McKitrick (1998) that CGE
models lack empirical foundations.
These difficulties motivate the main objective of this paper which is to improve the
parameter specification of CGE models. In the following we illustrate how Optimal
Fingerprint Detection Methods - an approach originally used in climate science (e.g.
IPCC, 2007; Forest et al., 2000, 2001) – can inspire the identification of appropriate
parameter values for CGE models. This method builds on a generalised multivariate
regression analysis and combines a simple model validation exercise with a structured
sensitivity analysis. Compared to other procedures, the new approach has various bene-
fits: 1) It uses a structured optimisation procedure and does not revert to ad-hoc model
improvements. 2) It allows to account for uncertainty in parameter estimates by using
information on the distribution of parameter estimates from the literature. 3) It can be
applied for the specification of various parameters required in CGE models, for example
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for the definition of elasticities or productivity growth rates.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we briefly provide a background on Optimal
Fingerprint Detection Methods, henceforth referred to as OFDM. Second, we demon-
strate how OFDM can be applied in the context of CGE modelling and explore its
capabilities in a CGE framework using a stylised small scale CGE model. Subsequently
we apply the new approach to the still simple but full-fledged Basic WIOD CGE Model
developed by Koesler and Pothen (2013) and derive a set of substitution elasticities for
the specification of production in the model. Finally, we summarise and conclude in the
last section.
4.2 Optimal Fingerprint Detection Methods (OFDM)
OFDM originate from climate science (e.g. Hasselmann, 1997; Allen and Tett, 1999).
Above all, they are used to detect climate change and to identify climate change drivers
(c.f. IPCC, 2007). On that account, a multivariate regression analysis is set up which
generally has the following form:
Y = Xa + e, (4.1)
where the vector Y includes data from observations (i.e. the climate record), X is a
vector of (expected) response patterns which determine the climate system in the model,
a is a vector of scaling factors which are used to adjust the response patterns so that
the simulation outcomes correspond the observational data and e is a vector with error
terms that is to be minimised. The underlying logic is thereby that if the estimated
response patterns in vector X is capable of replicating real world observations under
normal circumstances, that is in a situation with no climate change, then if the elements
in the vector a do not equal one when trying to replicate the current climate, there is
some disturbance of the climate system. Deviations can then potentially be attributed
to climate change.
OFDM have however also been applied to specify parameters in models simulating the
climate. To that end, Forest et al. (2000, 2001) use a multivariate regression analysis as
described in Equation 4.1, but with the difference that in their work the vector X includes
simulation results instead of expected response patterns. This regression setup relates
the climate record one to one to the climate model output (e.g. observed temperature
to simulated temperature) and allows for a structured validation of model results with
observed data. Also in this context, the underlying logic of the OFDM approach is
straightforward. As long as not all elements in the scaling vector a are equal to one,
the model is not perfectly capable of replicating the observed data and thus needs to be
refined. To judge the overall performance of the model when contrasting its output to
observed data, Forest et al. (2000, 2001) use a goodness-of-fit criterion r2 which builds
on the difference between actual observations and model results without scaling. That
is u˜ = Y − X with a being a unity vector (ai = 1∀i). The error u˜ captures element
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that are not taken into account by the model (e.g. internal climate variability) as well
as deviations that occur because of a non-perfect model specification. While the first
type of variability is intrinsic in any modeling approach - after all models are always
a simplification of the real world - it is the later that the method eventually seeks to
minimise. The criterion r2 itself is defined as:
r2 = u˜TCOV−1u˜, (4.2)
where COV is the error covariance matrix, which - as we illustrate in the next section
- can be estimated using model control runs. The aim of the modeler must then be
to minimise r2, respectively the deviations resulting from any model misspecification.
This can be done by means of a sensitivity analysis implementing different parameter
specifications and reevaluating each model setup using the goodness-of-fit criteria. The
most apt parameter specification will then be the one which provides the lowest r2.
4.3 Illustrative application of OFDM to CGE framework
4.3.1 Process
As indicated in the previous section, OFDM consists basically of a validation exercise
combined with a sensitivity analysis. The process of using OFDM to find adequate
parameter specifications for a CGE model involves three main steps.
To begin with, modellers have to chose a set of parameters for which they require
guidance regarding their specification and must create a portfolio of different specifica-
tions that should be tested. While in principle any parameter value can be evaluated
using ODFM, the choice of possible values can be guided in particular by available es-
timates from the literature. In this case, it is recommendable to build the portfolio of
different parameter values not just using the actual estimates, but in addition any avail-
able information of the distribution of the parameter value (i.e. information on standard
deviations and other higher moments). This allows to implement a more informed sen-
sitivity analysis similar to the structured sensitivity analyses described by Harrison and
Vinod (1992) or Hermeling et al. (2013) later in the process. This brings the additional
benefit of being able to account for the uncertainty attached to parameter estimates
when setting up the model.
The next step implements a validation exercise and investigates whether the CGE
model with a specific parameter setup from the portfolio developed in the previous step is
capable of replicating an observed record. Thereby a validation procedure as described by
Kehoe et al. (1995) and Kehoe (2005) is applied which contrasts historical developments
to model predictions. Although instead of using correlation and deviation coefficients
to judge the fit of the model output, here we use the goodness-of-fit criteria presented
in Equation 4.2. The procedure requires information on key economic indicators at two
points in time and knowledge of changes in variables exogenous to the model that have
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taken place in the meantime.1 The model is then calibrated to the earlier point in time
and equipped with the parameter setup that is to be tested. Subsequently, to generate
a set of predicted changes, the model is shocked with all observed changes in exogenous
variables. Finally the simulation result is compared to the observations from the second
point in time on the basis of the OFDM criteria from Equation 4.2. The resulting value
of r2 provides a first indication of the quality of the parameter setup under investigation.
The third and final step can be referred to as the sensitivity analysis part of the
OFDM. Basically, it involves repeating the previous step for all parameter specifications
that are to be tested and to compare the respective r2 values. The parameters combina-
tion featuring the lowest r2 and thus providing the best fit to the observed data without
having to scale the model output, can then be considered the most adequate parameter
specification.
4.3.2 Stylised CGE model
Before applying the OFDM method to a full scale CGE model, we demonstrate the
process and capabilities of OFDM in a CGE setting by making use of a small stylised
CGE model. The model is deliberately simple and features only one region, one final
demand agent and two production sectors. The model covers the time period t to t+ n
with n ≥ 1. Agents are assumed behave myopic and do not link different periods through
saving or investment. In accordance to this, in the following, we drop the time subscript
when describing agents behaviour.
The final demand agent supplies capital K and labour L and consumes two different
commodities A and B. Its consumption function is characterised by a constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) function of the form:
C = (αCA
ρC + (1− αC)BρC )
1
ρC , (4.3)
where ρC is the substitution parameter of final consumption which relates to the elasticity
of substitution for final consumption through ρC =
σC−1
σC
and αC the input share of final
consumption goods. The factor endowments grow at the constant rate γ every period.
In addition, there are two sectors A and B that produce commodities A and B on
the basis of two CES production functions:
A =
(
αAKLM
(
αAKLK
ρKL +
(
1− αAKL
)
LρKL
) ρKLM
ρKL
+
(
1− αAKLM
) (
αAMA
ρM +
(
1− αAM
)
BρM
) ρKLM
ρM
) 1
ρKLM
,
(4.4)
1While in general it is fairly easy to have access to data describing two points in time, it is difficult
to account for all changes that have taken place in between. We are aware of this problem, which we
believe is intrinsic in any validation exercises, and discuss this issue in more detail in Section 4.3.5.
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Table 4.1: Structure of generic model economy in period t and t+1
Period t Sector A Sector B Period t+1 Sector A Sector B
Input A 30.00 10.00 Input A 30.48 10.16
Input B 10.00 30.00 Input B 10.37 31.11
Capital 25.00 75.00 Capital 26.25 78.75
Labor 75.00 25.00 Labor 75.00 25.00
Output 140.00 140.00 Output 142.10 145.02
Final Demand 100.00 100.00 Final Demand 101.46 103.54
and
B =
(
αBKLM
(
αBKLK
ρKL +
(
1− αBKL
)
LρKL
) ρKLM
ρKL
+
(
1− αBKLM
) (
αBMA
ρM +
(
1− αBM
)
BρM
) ρKLM
ρM
) 1
ρKLM
,
(4.5)
where again ρ are the substitution parameters and α the input share parameters for the
different production nests.
For the sake of being able to assess the potential of OFDM, we assume that the ’true’
setup of the model involves all substitution elasticities being equal to one (σC = σKL
= σM = σKLM = 1), the capital growth rate γK is 5%, and there is no change in the
endowments of labour (γL = 0). However, to make the case for the need of an approach
to find an adequate parameter specification, we also assume that the true values of the
elasticities and the endowment growth rates are initially unknown. The objective of the
OFDM is then to identify the ’true’ parameter values. The input share parameters α
are calibrated to the overall structure of the economy which is given in Table 4.1 for
the periods t and t + 1. The data for t + 1 has been generated by running the model
featuring the aforementioned ’true’ parameter specification for one period.
Besides illustrating how OFDM can be applied to the CGE framework, the stylised
CGE model allows to explore its potential in a general equilibrium setting and how it is
best applied in this context. On that note, we seek to answer three main questions: 1) Is
OFDM successful in identifying an apt parameter specification and for what parameters
can it be applied? 2) What output variables should be included in the computation
if the goodness-of-fit criterion? 3) What type of shocks can be used in the validation
process necessary for OFDM?
4.3.3 Computation of covariance matrix
As becomes clear from Equation 4.2, OFDM requires knowledge of the interrelationship
between model output variables or more formally the covariance matrix COV. Ideally
COV would emerge from actual observations, but given the artificial nature of the
stylised model used in this section this is obviously no option. As a matter of fact,
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deriving COV is also a problem that climate scientist face when applying OFDM. The
size of their models does not allow inferring COV from the relatively short available
climate record as there are are not enough degrees of freedom available and the record
might be affected by external forcings which would lead to a bias (IPCC, 2007). The
first issue is also a problem when applying OFDM in the context of CGE modelling,
as also here there rarely exist appropriate time series data that could be used. The
problem can however be overcome by using ’pseudo-observations’ generated by control
runs of the model (Allen and Tett, 1999). The underlying idea is thereby to use the
model itself and a series of simulations to generate a data set that mimics the missing
actual observations.
We apply this approach and generate a series of pseudo observations in the form
of an artificial time series by solving the stylised CGE model described above with the
’true’ parameter setting for the period t = 0 to t = 150.2 Note, although we make use
of a change in factor endowments by applying the growth rate γ for different points in
time, the pseudo observations could in principle also be generated by using a change in
any other exogenous variable as a shock. Subsequently, to break the direct relationship
between the reported variables and to overcome the deterministic nature of the data
generated by the model, we multiply all reported variables with a parameter which
follows a normal distribution of the form N (1, 0.01). Finally, COV can be estimated
by:
ĈOV =
1
n
YPOY
T
PO, (4.6)
where n is the number of observation vectors (here 151) and YPO a matrix including
all observation vectors derived from the generated pseudo observations. The choice of
variables that is included in the observation vectors depends on the variable that will
be used in the actual OFDM process. Exploring which these should be in order to
have optimal results of the OFDM is one of the objectives of the next section. For the
illustrative example of this section, we eventually use all input variables, sectoral output
and total final demand.
4.3.4 Potential and best practice of OFDM in CGE context
4.3.4.1 Type of parameters that can be specified using OFDM
In CGE models there exists multitude of different parameters that need to be specified.
This includes in particular elasticities, input shares and growth rates. For the objective
of this paper we focus on substitution elasticities and the growth rates of productivity or
endowments. However, in principle, the approach could also be applied to other required
parameters.
To explore if applying the OFDM to the stylised model reveals the ’true’ underlying
substitution elasticities and growth rates we first generate a portfolio of different param-
2We demonstrate later in the paper that the pseudo observations could also be generated using a
model with other parameter settings.
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eter setups. For this we choose for each elasticity of substitution (σC , σKL, σM , σKLM )
250 different values on the basis of a normal distribution of the form N (1, 0.5). If this
process provides negative values for any of the elasticities, we repeat the draw and even-
tually implement a truncated normal distribution. Analogous to this but assuming a
distribution of the form N (0.05, 0.05), we also determine 250 different values for the
growth rates of capital γK and labour γL. Here negative values are not discarded. Be-
sides using these stochastic process to generate parameter values, we also include the
’true’ parameter values presented above in the portfolio. Subsequently the model is run
several times and for each simulation one or two different parameter setting from the
parameter portfolio is applied. Parameters values that are not iterated remain at their
’true’ values. For each run the model output is then contrasted to the ’observations’ in
time t+ 1 presented in Table 4.1 and we compute the goodness-of-fit criterion r2 of the
OFDM. Thereby and for the time being, we focus on the model predictions for factor
input, intermediate input, sectoral output and overall final demand. If the OFDM ap-
proach works, then r2 should be minimal - or even zero - for all model runs that apply
a parameter setup close to the ’true’ parameter values of the stylised model.
Figure 4.1 presents the r2 values for different model runs. Each dot represents a
different parameter specification. The axes depict the parameter values and the color
of the dots indicate the value of r2. Green dots translate into low levels of r2 and red
dots to high levels of r2. As becomes clear from all graphs and also when exploring the
underlying numerical values, there is only one parameter specification with a minimal
r2. Moreover, the parameter specification with the minimal r2 - in this illustrative
the situation where r2 = 0 - corresponds to the ’true’ parameter values of the stylised
model. Therefore we can conclude that the OFDM is capable of identifying the (here by
definition) most apt parameter setup for all substitution elasticities and growth rates.
Another important insight from all graphs in Figure 4.1 is that as the tested parameter
values approach their ’true’ value, deviations of model results and observed data become
smaller and r2 decreases.3 This suggests that even in a situation where the number
of parameter setups that can be tested is limited (e.g. because of long solving times)
OFDM is useful, because even then it can give guidance in what direction parameters
should be adjusted.
The combination of parameters that are iterated in the model runs is of no importance
for the accuracy of the OFDM procedure. As becomes clear from Graphs 4.1d and 4.1e,
OFDM is in both cases capable of identifying the ’true’ parameter value of the growth
rate of capital. This holds regardless of whether the capital growth rate is tested jointly
with a substitution elasticity or the labour growth rate.
While all other graphs in Figure 4.1 have been generated using the ’true’ parameter
specification described in the previous section, Graph 4.1f emerges from model setup
3At first sight, this may not be the case in Graph 4.1d. Note however that this is due to the fact that
as closer the growth rate of capital is to zero, the less important is the level of the substitution elasticity
σC and thus potentially any value of σC provides the same result.
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Figure 4.1: Goodness-of-fit criteria of OFDM for different parameters [axes give param-
eter values, color gives value of r2]
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where the ’true’ parameter values for the substitutability between intermediates and
value added (the capital-labour-composite) is no longer σAKLM = σ
A
KLM = 1 but is set to
be σAKLM = 1.25 and σ
B
KLM = 0.75. Since we use the same covariance matrix as before,
this also implies that here COV has been derived from pseudo-observations which have
been generated using an ’incorrectly’ specified model. What is more, in this particular
OFDM process, all substitution elasticities that are not tested have been set so that
they deliberately not match their ’true’ value, that is for this analysis we specify the
model such that (σC = σM = σKLM = 0.9). As OFDM is also in this case capable of
giving an identifying of the true parameter values, this allows to reveal three important
capabilities of OFDM. First, the approach is not limited to a situation where where
all elasticities are equal to one. Second, OFDM also works in a setting where not just
the tested parameters are unknown and potentially not correctly specified. Third, the
method is not affected by the (mis)specification of parameter values in the model that
is used to generate the pseudo-observations required for the estimation of the COV.
However, it must be noted that in this case the precision of the process is reduced. The
lowest r2 is achieved for σAKLM = 1.11 and σ
B
KLM = 0.67, so the ’true’ values are slightly
missed.
4.3.4.2 Choice of output variables included in goodness-of-fit criteria
The computation of the goodness-of-fit measure r2 and therefore also the covariance
matrix ĈOV requires choosing a set of relevant output variables. CGE models generally
provide a wide range of simulation results, including for example information on prices,
output levels, trade activities, factor use, employment, environmental indicators, etc..
In addition, potentially all data is available on a sectoral and/or regional level therewith
increasing the number of output variables. This raises the question, which of the output
variables are crucial and should be used in the OFDM process. While at first sight
it seems tempting to include all available variables, it soon becomes clear that even
for small models this involves processing a large amount of data. Especially for the
computation of the covariance matrix including a large number of output variables is
problematic as it requires to increase the amount of observations accordingly in order to
ensure that enough degrees of freedom are available. The issue is aggravated by the use
of pseudo-observations when deriving the covariance matrix. In a general equilibrium
context, many of the output variables feature linear relationships, thus feature a high
correlation, and therefore make it impossible to compute the inverse of the covariance
matrix required by Equation 4.2. For this reason for example total factor input and
total final demand cannot be used simultaneously in the computation of r2.
But if more is not better, what is the least amount of variables that should be
considered? Figure 4.2 provides the results of an analysis of σM , whereas once more
the OFDM procedure has been applied to the stylised model with the original ’true’
values of σC = σKL = σM = σKLM = 1, γK = 0.05 and γL = 0, but with the difference
that here various output variables are used to compute ĈOV and r2. For Graph 4.2a
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only intermediate inputs into the production of good A and B are considered. Although
σM = 1 is part of the parameter sets that can be deemed to provide a good fit, the
’true’ value can not be identified as the only apt specification. But if in addition to the
intermediate inputs also factor inputs to the two sectors are considered, as it is in Graph
4.2b, the ’true’ value of σM is revealed unambiguously. Then again, using only output
variables in the OFDM process that are not directly related to the tested parameter,
such as for example sectoral output and total final demand in Graph 4.2c, makes it
impossible to find an adequate parameter specification. However, as becomes the clear
from Graph 4.2d, adding these variables to the analysis using all input variables does not
affect the good result of the OFDM process. This allows us to reason that in order to
ensure that OFDM works well, at least the directly affected variables should be included
in the process and more variables do not harm the process - as long as the number of
variables is still tractable and variables are not a linear combination of each other. In
accordance to this and if not stated otherwise, we use for the OFDM applications in
this paper all input variables, sectoral output and total final demand to compute r2 and
ĈOV.
4.3.4.3 Type of shocks that can be used for ODFM
For a real world application, the validation step in the OFDM procedure will eventually
require keeping track of various types of changes and using these in the replication at-
tempt. This implies that OFDM must be able to identify the ’true’ underlying parameter
values independent of the type of shock that is applied. To explore this issue, we run
yet another series of OFDM procedures and seek to identify the ’true’ value of σKLM for
sector A and B, but this time use three different types of shocks. Figure 4.3 presents the
corresponding results. The first shock used for Graph 4.3a is an increase in the available
endowments, which is the type of shock that we have used so far in our deliberations.
Note that this type of shock corresponds to a change in factor productivity. For the
second Graph 4.3b we apply a tax on output of sector A and for the third Graph 4.3c
we consider a tax on capital inputs in sector A. Thereby it can be expected that the
effect of taxes will be similar to that of tariffs, although due to the limited scope of our
single region model we cannot undertake a true analysis of this here. As can be seen
from all graphs, OFDM always succeeds in identifying the ’true’ value of σKLM . Thus
we can conclude that OFDM appears to work with a variety of different shocks. It must
be noted however, that the shock that is applied must have a certain magnitude to allow
OFDM to work reliably. In our stylised example for instance, the results become blurry
if a tax of 5% or less is applied.
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Figure 4.2: Goodness-of-fit criteria of OFDM for σM using different output variables for
the computation of r2 and ĈOV [axes give parameter values, color gives value of r2]
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Figure 4.3: Goodness-of-fit criteria of OFDM for σKLM using different shocks in the
process [axes give parameter values, color gives value of r2]
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4.3.5 Discussion
Limits of validation
OFDM builds on a series of validation exercises. Therefore its results strongly depen-
dent on the availability of data for two different points in time and information on the
exogenous shocks that moved the economy from one state to the other. In particular
the latter is generally hard to come by, because at any moment in time there exists a
multitude of different shocks that influence the economy and it is clearly impossible to
account for all of them. This however implies that any validation exercise will always
miss a potentially important element of change and will as a consequence attribute the
adjustment of the system to a different (but accounted) channel. Ultimately this will also
affect the capabilities of the OFDM method. Research can however confine the problem
by limiting the number of relevant changes that are not accounted for. For this purpose
using comprehensive datasets such as the World Input-Output Database (WIOD, Tim-
mer et al. (2012); Dietzenbacher et al. (2013)) offer an opportunity to modellers. WIOD
offers a rich and consistent representation of most important economies and their trade
linkages in the form a time series. This allows to infer many changes that have taken
place over time, for example with respect to changes in endowments, taxes and tariffs,
trade structure, interregional and intertemporal saving and borrowing, and to take them
into account when validating models.
Multiple adequate parameter setups
In a general equilibrium model, the value of some parameters may influence the level
or importance of other parameters. To be able to judge the flexibility of production for
example, it is necessary to consider all substitution elasticities related to the process. If
the substitutability between intermediate and value added is very low, then the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labour may become less important when assessing
a shock in factor supply and could in an extreme case take any value without affecting
the model outcome. Potentially this may lead to a situation where there exists more
than one ’true’ parameter setup. For the OFDM process, this would imply that there
is not just one minimal r2, but many locally minimal r2. Although such as situation
has never occurred when using OFDM in our small stylised model framework, it is in
principle a possible outcome of OFDM. In this case either parameter setup seems equally
valid, as from a modelling perspective they all minimise the deviation of model output
to observations. To be able to judge whether there are multiple adequate parameter
setups, modellers should always consider in their parameter portfolio a sufficiently large
range of values and ideally include all possible parameter values in the OFDM process.
Taking a broader perspective with regard to possible parameter values also helps to
prevent identifying a locally minimal r2 as the optimal value by mistake.
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Figure 4.4: Goodness-of-fit criteria of OFDM for σKLM which includes all other elastic-
ities in the analysis [axes give parameter values, color gives value of r2]
Inaccuracy of OFDM if parameters are misspecified
As illustrated when discussing Graph 4.1f, OFDM appears become imprecise if some
of the model parameters are misspecified when seeking an adequate specification for
another set of parameters. Unfortunately, due to the lack of information on adequate
parameter values criticised in the outset of this paper, in any real world application this
will most likely be an issue for most applications of OFDM. The problem can however
be overcome by including all parameters of which modellers are unsure of in the OFDM
procedure. While this may require to enlarge the portfolio of parameter setups that
is to be tested and thus will be more demanding from a computational perspective,
it increases the degree of freedom and therefore the likelihood of applying the ’true’
parameter setup in one of the model runs. This in turn will allow to find a model setup
with truly minimal deviations and thus most adequate parameter values. Figure 4.4
demonstrates the functioning of this comprehensive approach. Here, the setup is similar
to the OFDM process used to generate Graph 4.1f, but instead of applying the false
parameter specifications, we include all elasticities in the process. Eventually and in
contrast to the earlier attempted, the ’true’ values of σAKLM = 1.25, σ
B
KLM = 0.75 and
although not pictured σC = σKL = σM = 1 are identified without any inaccuracy.
Optimisation vs. sensitivity analysis
Instead of using a structured sensitivity analysis with different parameter setups to
identify the most apt parameter setup, researchers could also apply an optimisation
process which minimises the goodness-of-fit criterion r2 to derive a suitable parameter
specification. Such an idea would follow an approach presented by Liu et al. (2004) in
a paper seeking to find a set of optimum Armington elasticities. Compared to a self-
contained optimisation, a sensitivity analysis has two main advantages. First, it does
not require to solve a complex system of equations and can be expected to be much
less computationally demanding. Second, it allows for an easy and straightforward
implementation of additional information on potentially good parameter values that has
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been supplied for example by estimates from the literature. However, using the goodness-
of-fit criteria from OFDM in an optimisation approach and contrasting the results to a
standard OFDM procedure is an interesting question for future research.
4.4 Application of OFDM to Basic WIOD CGE Model
After having presented and illustrated OFDM on the basis of a small stylised CGE
model, in this section we apply the method to a full scale CGE model. On that account,
we seek to identify adequate substitution elasticities for the specification of production
(σKL, σKLE and σKLEM ) for the Basic WIOD CGE Model. This model is a static, multi-
region, multi-sector CGE model that has been developed by Koesler and Pothen (2013).
With regard to the basic economic structure, the model builds on the comprehensive
World Input-Output Database (WIOD, Timmer et al., 2012; Dietzenbacher et al., 2013)
which will be an advantage for the validation part of OFDM.4 Details on the Basic
WIOD CGE Model are provided in Chapter 2 and in Appendix A.1.
Most importantly for our analysis, the model distinguishes between three groups
of commodities: energy commodities Y(eg,r), industry commodities Y(ind,r) and services
Y(ser,r). The production of these goods is characterised by production functions with
constant elasticities of substitution (CES) and constant returns to scale. Nested func-
tions with three levels are employed to specify the substitution possibilities between
capital K, labour L, energy inputs A(eg,r) and non-energy A(neg,r) inputs (including in-
termediates form industry and services). We apply a KLEM production structure, thus
capital and labour enter the production function on the lowest level, on the second level
value added is combined with energy and finally on the top level of the CES function the
energy-value-added composite is combined with a non-energy material aggregate. An
overview of the production structure is given in Figure 4.5.
Y(i,r)
ρKLEM(i,r)
A(neg,r)
ρKLE(i,r)
A(eg,r)
ρKL(i,r)
K(r) L(r)X
Figure 4.5: Structure of KLEM production function in Basic WIOD CGE Model
For our purpose, the WIOD data is aggregated into two regions (Europe (EUR)
and ’Rest of the World’ (ROW)), three sectors (energy goods (EG), industry (IND)
and services (SER)) and two final demand agents (households (FC HH) and government
4The WIOD database is available at http://www.wiod.org. We use data downloaded on the 17th of
April 2013.
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(GOV)). Additional information on the aggregation is given in the Appendix of this
paper. With regard to the specification of parameters, the model is calibrated to the
year 2003. We choose 2003 to avoid possible distortions from the economic crisis in
later years. The required Armington elasticities are taken from GTAP7 (Badri and
Walmsley, 2008; Hertel et al., 2007, 2008) and are mapped to the sectors we consider
prior to the implementation into the model. Consumption and the intermediate mix in
production are characterised by a Leontief function. In its initial setup and if not stated
otherwise, we use estimates from Koesler and Schymura (2015), henceforth abbreviated
as KS, to specify the flexibility of production with regard to different inputs. The
respective substitution elasticities are given in Table 4.3. But eventually OFDM is
applied to determine an adequate specification of the substitution elasticities σKL, σKLE
and σKLEM .
For the descriptive purpose of this paper, we undertake three different OFDM pro-
cesses. The first is limited to an investigation of the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labour in the energy sector (σEGKL). The second explores substitutability on
a more general basis and considers different values for σKL, σKLE and σKLEM for all
sectors on the basis of a OFDM process without starting values. The third repeats the
second process but this time takes estimates from KS as starting values.
For the reasons presented before, it is also not possible to use the time series data
provided in WIOD to derive the required covariance matrix. Therefore, we generate a
set of 250 pseudo observations by shocking the model with a series of different changes
in total factor productivity, respectively a uniform increase in the endowment of labour
and capital of households to be able to estimate the covariance matrix. Furthermore,
following the insights from the previous section, we use output variables for total final
demand, sectoral output as well as total factor and intermediate input in production to
compute ĈOV.
For the validation step in all three OFDM processes, we seek to replicate with the
model the economy of the year 2004. An that account, we first compute all changes
from 2003 to 2004 that we can observe in the WIOD dataset and subsequently apply
the changes to the model in the form of a series of simultaneous shocks. This involves
changes in household labour and capital endowments, intertemporal and interregional
saving or borrowing, the prevailing tax structure, and international transport margins.
As discussed before, our approach will clearly miss some changes that have occurred
during this period. But given the comprehensive coverage of WIOD we hope to limit
the number of omitted variables to a minimum.
4.4.1 Factor substitutability in the energy sector
In the first of three applications of OFDM, we seek to determine σKL for the sector
producing the energy good (EG) in both regions EUR and ROW. On that account, we
generate a portfolio of 250 different specifications of σEG,EURKL and σ
EG,ROW
KL that are
to be tested. Thereby we arbitrary draw parameter values from a distribution of the
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Figure 4.6: Standardised goodness-of-fit criteria of OFDM for σKL of the energy sector
(EG) in Europe (EUR) and ’Rest of the world’ (ROW) [axes give parameter values, color
gives value of r2Standard]
form N (1, 1), whereas we repeat the draw if values smaller than zero or bigger than ten
occur.5
The results of applying the parameter setups in the validation of is presented in
Figure 4.6. To ease the presentation, we standardised the goodness-of-fit measure using:
r2Standard =
|r2|
|r2MAX |
, (4.7)
such that 0 ≤ r2Standard ≤ 1. Thus parameter specifications featuring a r2Standard of zero
achieve a perfect fit and a r2Standard value of one indicates that the parameter setup in
question is the worst of all tested specifications. Although no clear locus with adequate
parameter values can be identified in Figure 4.6, the OFDM clearly suggest that low
values for σEG,ROWKL are better than high values. The parameter values featuring the
smallest r2Standard are σ
EG,EUR
KL = 2.76 and σ
EG,ROW
KL = 0.03. But given the big range of
σEG,EURKL with relatively similar low r
2
Standard values, the factual best result for σ
EG,EUR
KL
should not be overrated.
4.4.2 General input substitutability in production
For the next application we broaden the scope of the OFDM process and consider differ-
ent values for σKL as well as σKLE and σKLEM for all sectors. We once more generate a
portfolio of 250 parameter setup using the aforementioned distribution and constraints.
Thereby all 18 parameters are iterated simultaneously.
Figure 4.7 presents the result of this OFDM application for the Basic WIOD CGE
Model. From the different graphs it becomes clear that for all sectors and elasticities,
some parameter specification are better suited than others to replicate the 2004 situa-
tion. But in this bigger application, the graphs are not as informative in our previous
5The CES functional form used in the model requires all elasticities to be weakly positive and as in
the context of CGE models a substitution elasticity of ten already implies a very high substitutability,
we do not consider values bigger than ten.
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Figure 4.7: Standardised goodness-of-fit criteria of OFDM for σKL, σKLE and σKLEM
when applied to Basic WIOD CGE Model [axes give parameter values, color gives value
of r2]
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Table 4.2: Results of OFDM for σKL, σKLE and σKLEM when applied to Basic WIOD
CGE Model
ROW EUR
EG IND SER EG IND SER
σKL 0.12 6.82 0.31 3.62 4.54 5.33
σKLE 4.25 5.92 4.06 8.37 0.49 0.60
σKLEM 0.83 4.10 4.07 0.97 1.77 1.79
applications and in most cases we cannot identify a parameter area around which the
fit is better than elsewhere. Only for σKL in Graphs 4.7a-c we can identify patterns. It
suggest that for in EG and SER lower values seem to fit better for σKL, while in IND
higher values seem more appropriate. The reason for the graphical ambiguity is that
because all 18 values for σKL, σKLE and σKLEM are iterated simultaneously, even pa-
rameter settings that seem similar in one of the graphs potentially feature very different
values for the other 16 parameter values. The graphical interpretation of the results
is therefore limited. Still, from looking at the numerical values of r2Standard we can de-
rive the parameter setup which provides the best model fit. The respective values for
σKL, σKLE and σKLEM are given in Table 4.2. Note also that compared to the previous
analysis the overall goodness-of-fit tends to be better which results in lower r2Standard
values. The reason for this is straightforward, including more parameters in the OFDM
process increases the degrees of freedom and therewith the possibilities to adjust the
model so that it can eventually generate a good fit.
4.4.3 General input substitutability in production with starting values
For the third application of OFDM, we build a portfolio of 250 different parameter
specifications for σKL, σKLE and σKLEM on the basis of the estimates and standard
deviations provided by KS. That is we use their estimates as initial values and iterate
the parameters around these starting points assuming a normal distribution with the
standard deviation presented also in their study.6 Again we apply the constraints for
parameter values smaller than zero and higher than ten and, as before, repeat the draw
in such a case. As this paper uses of a different aggregation than KS, we aggregate their
estimates and standard deviations on the basis of the following equations:
σAggregate =
∑
i
(αiσi) , (4.8)
6KS do not provide a substitution elasticity between capital and labour for the Coke Refined
Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel (CPN) sector, here we assume that this elasticity is equal to the corre-
sponding elasticity for the chemical and chemical products sector (0.24). For estimates that equal +Inf
we take an elasticity value of 10. Furthermore, for elasticities were no standard deviation is provided or
were it is bigger than 10 we assume that it is equal to 2.5.
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and
V AR (σAggregate) =
∑
i
(
α2iV AR (σi)
)
, (4.9)
where αi is the relative sector size in the aggregate and the later assumes that the
elasticities between sectors are not correlated. Note that although KS reject variations
across regions and over time for the substitution elasticities they estimate, here changes
in the sector share may lead to elasticities that vary across regions and over time. The
estimates we eventually use as starting values and the related standard deviations are
given in Table 4.3 and correspond to the aggregated 2004 values for Europe. Note also
that here we iterate σKL, σKLE and σKLEM again simultaneously for the generation of
the different parameter setups.
As described before, the graphical interpretation of the results of the OFDM process
applied here is only of limited value. Therefore we move directly to the presentation
of the parameter setup featuring the best model fit. The corresponding values are
given in Table 4.3 together with the starting values and standard deviations from KS.
Compared to KS in particular the values for EG and SER in ROW seem to be higher.
The other parameters are rather stable with only few minor adjustments. But it must be
noted that of course the standard deviation attached to the original estimate critically
influence the potential for updating the parameter values. This is also the reason why
the OFDM process with starting values results in an overall less good fit relative to a
OFDM process without starting values. Again this is due to the fact that if the tested
parameter values are not restrained because of low standard deviations, the likelihood
that a fitting parameter setup is included in the investigated portfolio is higher and thus
the overall model fit is potentially better.
Ultimately, the availability of a set of suitable elasticity values from the literature
raises the question why a OFDM process should be applied in the first place. There are
two reasons for this. For one thing, to be able to use parameter values from the literature
these should ideally have been estimated specifically for the use in the underlying model
or at least build on the same theoretical structure. Otherwise this can result in a
misspecification of the model (Browning et al., 1999). Unfortunately, although this is
the case for the estimates from KS which have been estimate using the same dataset and
functional form as the Basic WIOD CGE Model, this favourable situation is unlikely
to apply for most models and parameters. What is more, estimates must always be
associated with some degree of uncertainty. Directly applying estimates in a model
neglects that they are basically also a - admittedly well informed and elaborated - ’best
guess’. Modellers should be aware of these issues and if possible take measures that
account for the limitations of estimates form the literature. Applying OFDM allows
this.
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Table 4.3: Results of OFDM for σKL, σKLE and σKLEM when applied to Basic WIOD
CGE Model using estimated starting values from KS, standard deviations are given in
parentheses
ROW EUR
EG IND SER EG IND SER
σKL 3.59 0.38 1.24 5.13 0.35 1.21
σKLE 3.83 0.44 0.25 3.37 0.39 0.26
σKLEM 0.52 0.61 1.60 0.52 0.71 1.37
σKSKL 3.44 (0.61) 0.35 (0.02) 0.82 (0.09) 5.75 (0.93) 0.34 (0.02) 1.17 (0.12)
σKSKLE 2.85 (1.34) 0.43 (0.03) 0.29 (0.04) 3.30 (0.59) 0.40 (0.02) 0.27 (0.03)
σKSKLEM 0.41 (0.01) 0.59 (0.19) 1.95 (0.55) 0.53 (0.01) 0.58 (0.14) 1.47 (0.27)
4.5 Summary and conclusion
This paper is devoted to the enhancement of CGE modelling and presents OFDM as
an alternative method to the specification of parameter values in CGE models. We first
provide some background information on OFDM and outline how it has been used in
climate science to detect distortions in the climate system and to specify climate models.
Next we illustrate how the process of OFDM can be applied within a CGE framework and
apply it to a stylised CGE model with the aim of demonstrating OFDM and exploring
its potential in a CGE context. We show that OFDM is capable of identifying the ’true’
parameter values for substitution elasticities as well as growth rates of endowments
respectively factor productivity. Furthermore, our results suggest that the process can
be applied using a range of different types of shocks such as changes in endowments or
taxes. Finally we apply the OFDM approach to a full scale CGE model and derive a set
of substitution elasticities for the Basic WIOD CGE Model.
Overall, using OFDM to specify parameters in CGE models allows to secure three
main benefits: 1) OFDM employs a structured optimisation procedure and does not
require modellers to update the model specification on the basis of their intuition as
is the case for most other validation exercises or sensitivity analyses. 2) It enables
modellers to account the uncertainty that is associated with parameter estimates from
the literature. 3) OFDM is versatile and can be used to identify adequate parameter
specifications for a range of different parameters such as elasticities or growth rates.
There remain some limitations however. In its process, OFDM involves model valida-
tion and because of the difficulty to account for all changes that take place over a certain
period of time, the results might be somewhat distorted. The issue might however be
alleviated by using datasets such as WIOD which provide comprehensive and consistent
information on changes throughout economies. In addition, OFDM requires informa-
tion on the relationship between model output in the form of a covariance matrix, this
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information might also prove hard to provide, in particular when many of the model
output variables are to be used in the OFDM process. Furthermore, the choice of which
parameter values are to be included in OFDM process and the question within which
range these should be tested confronts modellers with a tradeoff. On the one hand,
exploring a wide range of parameters and values increases the likelihood of achieving
better results in the validation exercise and potentially provides values which are highly
suitable according to the goodness-of-fit criteria of OFDM. Using additional information
on parameter values from estimates found in the literature on the other hand, decreases
the parameter space and may result in a less good model model fit. This implies that
the process provides parameter values that are less adequate according to the OFDM
criteria, but allows to include information from previous studies in the analysis.
With regard to future research, one obvious next step would be to apply the OFDM
approach to a full scale CGE model and to use the resulting parameter specification
in a CGE analysis. This would help overcome some of the critique CGE models are
frequently confronted with and eventually will make CGE simulations more reliable.
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Chapter 5
Catching the rebound:
Economy-wide implications of an
efficiency shock in the provision of
transport services by households
Abstract
We investigate the rebound effect of a 10% energy efficiency improvement in the pro-
vision of private transport services by German households. In the process, we take
into account that household behaviour may be influenced by habits, build on a detailed
representation of the provision of private transport services, and disentangle the direct
and indirect rebound effect. Our analysis shows that rebound has the potential to sig-
nificantly reduce the expected energy savings of an energy efficiency improvement at
households. In particular if households have a flexible demand structure, rebound can
erode large parts of efficiency increases. Household habits have an initial detrimental
effect on rebound. They limit the ability of households to adapt to changes in the pre-
vailing price and income system and therewith temporally block parts of the channels
that lead to rebound. In the long run, however, if habits are formed on the basis of
historic consumption, habits do not affect rebound. In isolation, the direct and indirect
rebound effect of the efficiency shock are positive, but direct rebound is much stronger.
This chapter is based on the following paper:
Koesler, Simon (2013), Catching the Rebound: Economy-wide Implications of an Ef-
ficiency Shock in the Provision of Transport Services by Households, ZEW Discussion
Paper No. 13-082, Mannheim, Germany.
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5.1 Introduction
Efficiency improvements - in particular in the field of energy - are generally seen as
one of the major steps towards sustainability. But if consumers and/or firms react to
the change in efficiency by adopting their behaviour and choices, the actual benefits
of an efficiency improvement can in reality be much lower as originally expected. In
the context of energy efficiency improvements, this phenomenon is commonly termed
as ’rebound’. It refers to a situation where consumers and firms take advantage of the
efficiency improvement and eventually increase their demand for energy (c.f. van den
Bergh, 2011).
That rebound may be an issue has been noted as early as the 19th century, when
Jevons (1866) described that the augmented efficiency of coal-fired steam engines will
increase the use of coal. He reasoned that the increased productivity makes the technol-
ogy more competitive. As a result, the use of steam engines becomes more popular and
therewith the demand for its main input - coal - increases. Since then, a vast stream
of literature has emerged discussing this problem. A portfolio of papers on the rebound
can, for example, be found in the special issue edited by Schipper (2000). Other articles
providing an excellent overview include inter alia Sorrell (2007), Sorrell et al. (2009),
van den Bergh (2011) and Turner (2013). But putting a number to the rebound ef-
fect is not straightforward and depends crucially, on the context one investigates. As a
consequence, a wide range of different rebound estimates exist and presenting a selec-
tion would most likely draw a biased picture. Nevertheless, most studies indicate that
rebound is not a negligible side effect (e.g. Sorrell, 2007; Sorrell et al., 2009; Frondel
et al., 2012). Some researchers, however, do argue that the rebound effect is overplayed
(e.g. Gillingham et al., 2013) and only marginally affects the benefits of efficiency im-
provements, although such critique is quickly rejected by others (e.g. Frondel and Vance,
2013). Some of the controversy around the rebound effect may steam from unclear ter-
minology and a lack of solid analytical foundation in different studies (Turner, 2013).
Thus, the economic evaluation of the rebound effect should be accompanied by a clear
definition of what is under investigation and build on a sound formal foundation. What
is more, much research on the rebound phenomenon has focused on direct rebound or
price effects impacting the user whose efficiency has increased, thereby neglecting the
potential of other channels such as income effects (impacting direct and indirect or re-
spending rebound) or spillover effects to other – originally not affected – parts of the
economy.
The literature on the economy-wide implications of an efficiency shock has so far
focused on efficiency improvements on the production side. To our limited knowledge,
studies on the economy-wide effects of an efficiency improvement on the household level
remain the exception. The paper by Lecca et al. (2014) is such an exception. They pro-
vide inter alia a clear approach of how to measure rebound both at the economy-wide
level as well as on the household level. With this paper, we extend the discussion of
economy-wide rebound effects and continue the analysis of the implications of an effi-
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ciency improvement at households. Specifically, we investigate the economy-wide effects
of augmented energy efficiency in the provision of private transport services by German
households. Note, in line with the existing rebound literature we focus on changes in
the relative price system and concentrate on effects after the efficiency improvement has
taken place. Hence our study is no full policy analysis and does in particular consider
the costs of the efficiency improvement as sunk costs.
To have a clear understanding of the underlying effects, we first formally illustrate
through which channels rebound emerges on the basis of a simple stylised example. Sub-
sequently, we evaluate the effects of a 10% energy efficiency improvement in the provision
of private transport services by German households by means of a more comprehensive
computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis. Thereby, we take into account that,
unlike firms, the behaviour of households may be governed by consumer habits. Con-
sumption persistence is an important aspect in this regard, because it will at first limit
the potential of households to react to an efficiency shock and potentially the impli-
cations of the efficiency change will only take place later in time. In this paper, we
explicitly focus on an efficiency improvement on the demand side of households and do
not consider the possibility that the efficiency improvement itself may trigger additional
labour or capital supply by households. Therewith we rule out supply side effects which
would lead to general productivity-led growth (c.f. Turner, 2013). Moreover, we take up
the critique by Turner (2013) and provide a simple but thorough analytical framework
on the basis of which we can illustrate different effects that overall result in rebound.
Our results indicate that rebound is not an overplayed phenomenon. If anything, it
seems that in the context of energy efficiency improvements in households, rebound is
an important issue. In our setup rebound amounts to up to 56%, that is more than half
of the expected energy savings are lost due to rebound. Because they temporally block
parts of the channels that lead to rebound, household habits have an initial detrimental
effect on rebound. When comparing price and income effects on the basis of a ceteris
paribus analysis, we can conclude that in isolation direct rebound is considerably larger
that indirect rebound. With regard to implications, our results suggest that policy
makers should be fully aware of the true potential of energy efficiency improvements as
these may may turn out to be significantly less effective than expected. In addition, the
time lag between the efficiency improvement and the change in behaviour is important
and should be taken into account when studying rebound. Otherwise, the rebound effect
may be underestimated.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We first give a formal illustration
of how rebound can arise in the context of an energy efficiency improvement at households
and present different rebound channels on the basis of a small stylised example. Next,
we apply the mechanism of the small theoretical model in a more general setting and
evaluate the different drivers of the rebound effect on the basis of a CGE model. Finally,
we summarise our results and conclude.
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5.2 Rebound in the context of households
Most of the literature on the economy-wide rebound effect focusses on efficiency im-
provements in production sectors. In this paper, we turn our attention to the rebound
effect and its channels in the context of households. But before we specifically investigate
the implications of a 10% efficiency shock in the provision of private transport services
by German households, we present the different effects that ought to be expected on
the basis of a simple illustrative example. Later, we generalise the setup and turn to
a more comprehensive setting, which nevertheless incorporates the main mechanisms of
the example presented in the following.
The example features one representative household, a set of n services used for final
consumption, and m intermediate commodities used by the households to produce the
utility-generating services they eventually consume. The distinction between services
and commodities is based on the idea that households do rarely actually consume com-
modities, such as cars and gasoline or light bulbs and electricity, but combine these to
form a service they enjoy such as mobility/transport services or light. The potentially
rebound-triggering efficiency increase eventually takes place on the level of the provision
of the services and makes a specific intermediate input more productive. All agents take
prices as given.
5.2.1 Household problem
Household utility is given by a Cobb-Douglas utility function encompassing n different
services. The same mechanisms and conclusion emerge when applying a more general
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function. But for the sake of clarity, we
limit ourself in this stylised example to a Cobb-Douglas utility function and generalise
at a later stage. In our analysis, we include a particularity of the household context,
namely habits. We model habits in the spirit of Pollak (1970) and von Weizsa¨cker
(1971) and include a habit formation process in the household problem by extending
the standard Cobb-Douglas utility function with a term that can be interpreted as some
form of necessary consumption. Necessary consumption results from the consumption
level in absolute terms in the previous period and thus relates the current consumption
decision to the past.1 Accordingly, household utility at time t is given by:
Ut(xi;t;xi;t−1) =
n∏
i=1
(xi;t − θixi;t−1)αi , with
n∑
i=1
αi = 1. (5.1)
1Here we assume that habits rest on consumption in absolute terms. That is if for example a household
has been on holiday for two weeks in the last year, he will also be inclined to go for two weeks on holiday
in this year. But in principle habits could also rely on consumption levels in value terms. In this case
the household would accept also only one week of vacation if prices have doubled. Whether habits build
on absolute or value terms depend not only on the type of household, but most likely also on the type of
good in question. Basic goods such as food are likely to be valued in absolute terms and luxury goods
such as sports cars rather in value terms. As our product portfolio cannot be separated in a meaningful
way into basic and luxury goods, we directly follow Pollak (1970) and other seminal papers considering
habits (e.g. Abel, 1990) and assume that habits rest on consumption in absolute terms.
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xi,t gives the amount of service i that is consumed by the household in period t and
αi is the corresponding expenditure share. The strength of the persistence of past
consumption or, in other words, the strength of the habit formation process is given by
θi’s. Note that for simplicity we limit the habit formation process to one period. But it
is straightforward that extending the range of habits has the same effect as increasing all
θis. Households have to obey a budget constraint of the form M =
∑n
i=1 (pxixi;t). We
assume that households have a fix income M which is not influenced by the efficiency
change. As described by Turner (2013), this ensures that the efficiency shock will not
trigger a productivity-led growth process and allows us to focus on demand side effects.
If households take past consumption as given, demand for service xi in period t by
households is given by:
xi;t =
M −∑nj=1 (pxjθjxj;t−1)
pxi
∑n
j=1
(
αj
αi
) + θixi;t−1. (5.2)
5.2.2 Provision of services
The provision of the service xi by households is characterised by a CES function with
input-specific efficiency:
xi(zj) =
 m∑
j=1
(βj;i (γj;izj)
ρi)
 1ρi , (5.3)
zj are commodities required to produce the service xi, γj;i the corresponding level of
input efficiency which is initially assumed to equal one, βj;i the respective input share
and ρi ≤ 1 a parameter defining the substitutability between intermediate inputs which
is related to the respective elasticity of substitution through ρi =
σi−1
σi
. Note that for
the generation of xi we have omitted the time indices as production always refers to the
current period t. Note also that in order to be able to focus on the rebound effect, we
assume that commodities required to generate the services come from a sufficiently large
market and are supplied to households at a demand-independent price of pzj . Demand
for a commodity j for the generation of service xi is given by:
zj;i(xi) =
(
γρij;iβj;i
pzj
) 1
1−ρi
 m∑
j=1
((
γρij;iβj;i
) 1
1−ρi (pzj)
ρi
ρi−1
)− 1ρi .xi. (5.4)
Combining Equation 5.2 with Equation 5.4 provides the amount of commodity input
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zj;t that is required to fulfill the demand of the household for xi;t at time t:
fzj;i;t =
(
γρij;iβj;i
pzj
) 1
1−ρi
 m∑
j=1
((
γρij;iβj;i
) 1
1−ρi (pzj)
ρi
ρi−1
)− 1ρi
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
M −∑nl=1 (pxlθlxl;t−1)
pxi
∑n
l=1
(
αl
αi
)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
+ θixi;t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
 .
(5.5)
fzj;i;t can be decomposed in three main elements: the intermediate intensity of a service
A, the household demand for a service in the current period B and the household demand
for a service resulting from the habit formation process C.
5.2.3 Rebound effect
The rebound effect is generally understood as an increase in the use of an intermediate
input of a product or service triggered by an amelioration of the input-specific efficiency
of the intermediate in question. While in principle rebound is a universal concept and
can be applied to any input of a production process, it is mainly studied in the context
of energy and environmental policy as it makes the net effect of any increase in energy
efficiency ambiguous and may undermine such policies (cf. Sorrell and Dimitropoulos,
2008; van den Bergh, 2011). For the sake of generality, we take a broader perspective
on the rebound in this section and will only later turn our attention to energy as an
input into the production of private transport services. In our small stylised example,
the rebound effect boils down to a change in the amount of intermediate commodities
zj∗ employed in the provision of services as a consequence of a change in the efficiency
γj∗ .
The rebound effect is frequently divided into three separate effects (e.g. Sorrell and
Dimitropoulos, 2008), the direct rebound, the indirect rebound or income effect and
the economy-wide rebound effect. Although we acknowledge that such a categorisation
of the rebound effect may be limited (Turner, 2013), for the illustrative purpose of this
section, we adhere to the approach of dividing the rebound effect into the direct, indirect
and economy-wide effects.
5.2.3.1 Direct Rebound
The direct rebound effect emerges from the fact that efficiency improvements in the
provision of a product or service will lead to a decrease in the effective price of that
product or service. Ceteris paribus, this will lead to an increase in the demand for
that product or service and thus a higher demand for the intermediates necessary to
meet the additional demand. Following others (e.g. Berkhout et al., 2000; Sorrell and
Dimitropoulos, 2008), we define the direct rebound effect as the efficiency elasticity of
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demand for service ηServicei∗;t and build on the fact that the efficiency elasticity of demand
for the services is equal to the efficiency elasticity of demand for the input commodity
ηCommodityi∗;t plus one
(
ηServicei∗;t = η
Commodity
j∗;i∗;t + 1
)
. The direct rebound RDirectj∗;i∗;t with regard
to the service i∗ resulting from an efficiency increase in use of the intermediate commodity
j∗ at time t can thus be computed as:
RDirectj∗;i∗;t = η
Service
i∗;t = η
Commodity
j∗;i∗;t + 1 =
∂fzj∗;i∗;t
∂γj∗;i∗
γj∗;i∗
fzj∗;i∗;t
+ 1. (5.6)
The direct rebound originates from each of the three main components of the demand
for commodities: the intermediate intensity A and the household demands for the service
B and C. It can be decomposed to:
RDirectj∗;i∗;t =
∂A
∂γj∗;i∗;t
(
γj∗;i∗;tB
AB +AC
+
γj∗;i∗;tC
AB +AC
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
input change due to change of input intensity
+
∂B
∂γj∗;i∗;t
γj∗;i∗;t
B + C︸ ︷︷ ︸
input change due to change in current demand
+
∂C
∂γj∗;i∗;t
γj∗;i∗;t
B + C︸ ︷︷ ︸
input change due to change in demand due to habit
(5.7)
The first term is the input change due to change of input intensity, the second is the
input change related to a change of current consumption decision and the third term is
the input change attributable to the habit formation process.
In contrast to many other studies, we take into account that household demand can
feature rigidities and thus the rebound effect can also be expected to depend on how fast
household demand changes. In our context, which includes a habit formation process
over two periods, the rebound effect is thus time specific and can be expected to vary
between the period of the actual efficiency shock and the subsequent periods. The overall
direct rebound effect must be evaluated by taking into account the changes of fzj∗;i∗;t
over the period of the efficiency change s and all subsequent periods s+1, s+2, . . . . But
as we limit ourselves to the direct rebound and for the time being abstract from income
and general equilibrium effects, we can focus on the period of the efficiency shock and
the period directly afterwards. Accordingly, in the following we will first determine the
rebound at period s and then at s+ 1.
5.2.3.1.1 Rebound in t=s:
Since demand arising from habits is based on the previous period and thus will not
instantly react to a efficiency increase in period s, or more formally ∂C∂γj;s = 0, the
rebound in s is only driven by the change in input intensity and change in current
demand. Thus:
RDirectj∗;i∗;s =
∂A
∂γj∗;i∗;s
(
γj∗;i∗;sB
AB +AC
+
γj∗;i∗;sC
AB +AC
)
+
∂B
∂γj∗;i∗;s
γj∗;i∗;s
B + C
. (5.8)
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The change in input intensity is governed by the same mechanism as for input-
augmenting / input-biased technical change, which is illustrated in Acemoglu (2002).
If σi∗ < 1, producers of the service find it difficult to substitute in favour of the input
experiencing a higher efficiency and the corresponding input intensity falls after the
efficiency shock. If, however, input substitutability is rather high and σi∗ > 1, producers
will take advantage of the efficiency increase by using more of the respective input in
relative terms and the input intensity rises. Since
(
γj∗;i∗;tB
AB+AC +
γj∗;i∗;tC
AB+AC
)
≥ 0 holds for all
plausible parameter specifications, this implies that the rebound from an input change
associated with a change of input intensity is negative if σi∗ < 1, zero if σi∗ = 0 (this
implies a Cobb-Douglas production function in which input intensities are constant) and
positive if σi∗ > 1.
With regard to changes in current demand, following the logic that ∂pxi∗∂γj∗;i∗;s
≤ 0 must
hold as otherwise the efficiency improvement would be discarded, ∂B∂γj∗;i∗;s
≥ 0 and current
demand will increase. In combination with the fact that for all possible parameter values
γj∗;i∗;t
B+C ≥ 0, there is a positive rebound arising from a change in current demand.
But due to the ambiguity with regard to the effect arising from the input inten-
sity, the total direct rebound effect in period s remains unclear and depends on the
parameterisation of the model, in particular with regard to the definition of σi∗ .
5.2.3.1.2 Rebound in t=s+1:
Putting any general equilibrium effects aside, in the period following the efficiency shock
s+1, there are no further adjustments attributable to the change in efficiency with regard
to input intensity and current demand or formally ∂A∂γj∗;i∗;s+1
= 0 and ∂B∂γj∗;i∗;s+1
= 0.
Consequently, the direct rebound in period s+ 1 reduces to:
RDirectj∗;i∗;s+1 =
∂C
∂γj∗;i∗;s+1
γj∗;i∗;s+1
B + C
. (5.9)
Following the same logic as for the rebound effect arising from additional current demand.
The rebound from a change in demand due to the habit of consuming more is positive
since
γj∗;i∗;t
B+C ≥ 0 and ∂C∂γj∗;i∗;s+1 ≥ 0.
5.2.3.1.3 Overall direct rebound:
Table 5.1 gives an overview of the different direct rebound channels in this simple illus-
trative example. As expected, if due to habits, households do not instantaneously adjust
their consumption decision in face of a efficiency shock, the direct rebound effect is time
dependent. In the period of the efficiency change, only two of the three possible direct
rebound channels are active and the effect is reduced compared to a situation without a
habit formation process. In the subsequent period, the remaining direct rebound channel
is open and can add to the overall effect. Although the other channels are now closed.
From a long-run perspective, all direct rebound channels are active and the overall effect
is the same as in a situation without demand-side rigidity because of habits. However,
given the uncertainty of the direction of the effect from the change in the input intensity,
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Table 5.1: Overview of direct rebound effects
Period Rebound Channel Effect on Input and Rebound
t=s Input intensity negative if σi∗ < 1;
neutral if σi∗ = 1;
positive if σi∗ > 1
Current demand positive
Demand from habits neutral
t=s+1 Input intensity neutral
Current demand neutral
Demand from habits positive
overall Input intensity negative if σi∗ < 1;
neutral if σi∗ = 1;
positive if σi∗ > 1
Current demand positive
Demand from habits positive
the overall rebound effect remains ambiguous at first. Only in the case of σi∗ > 1, we can
be sure that in total there is a positive direct rebound from an efficiency improvement.
5.2.3.2 Indirect Rebound
The indirect rebound effect or income effect as it is also termed occasionally, builds on
the logic that a decrease in the effective price of a product or service resulting from the
more efficient provision of the product or service, will also relax the budget constraint
of consumers. That is, if not all of the cost savings are used up by the direct rebound.
This enables consumers to demand more of other products or services and may again
lead to an increase in intermediate demand which can be interpreted as rebound (e.g.
Sorrell and Dimitropoulos, 2008). Thereby the amount of intermediates embodied in
the additional consumption of other products or services is crucial. For a ceteris paribus
analysis, it is thereby irrelevant what initially triggered the relaxation of the budget
constraint and the demand shock associated to the indirect rebound is thus equivalent
to a general income increase experienced by the consumer. Accordingly, we define the
indirect rebound effect of an efficiency change in the provision of service i∗ related to the
intermediate input j∗ as the change in the embodied intermediate j∗ resulting from a
change of the consumption of other services following a general change in the budget M
in relation to the expected change in intermediate consumption of j∗ due to the efficiency
gain:
RIndirectj∗;i∗;t =
∑m
i=1;i 6=i∗
(
∂xi;t
∂M
M
xi;t
∆Mfzj∗;i;t
)
(∆γj∗;i∗)zj∗;i∗;t
. (5.10)
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The nominator is based on Equation 5.5, which ultimately represents the intermediate
j inputs embodied in service i. Note that in our model
∂xi;t
∂M
M
xi;t
= 1 as we build on
a CES framework for the utility function. The denominator features the amount of
intermediates j∗ that one would expect to be saved in the consequence of the productivity
increase on the basis of technical deliberations.
The interpretation of Equation 5.10 is straightforward. All components of RIndirectj∗;i∗;t
are positive, thus the budget increase leads to an increase in the use of intermediates
and opens an additional channel for the rebound effect. Similar to the direct rebound
effect and resulting from the consideration of household habits, the indirect effect is
time dependent. As
∂fzj;i;t
∂θi
≥ 0, habits have an initial depressing effect on the indirect
rebound effect, but in the long run consumption persistence has no effect on the indirect
rebound.
5.2.3.3 Economy-wide rebound
As presented above, a change in the efficiency leads to an adjustment of prices and
available income. But so far, we have limited ourself to a ceteris paribus analysis of
the efficiency change. In a more general setting, where prices and quantities are free to
adjust, the change in prices and demand initiated by the efficiency shock will lead to
a series of secondary adjustments of prices and quantities beyond the specific area of
efficiency change throughout the economy. An example for such a processes would be an
increase in the demand of energy of firms if the efficiency improvement in the provision
of private services reduces the demand for energy of households and therewith has a
lowering effect on general energy prices. Such adjustments are commonly termed as the
economy-wide rebound effect as they may also result in an increase in the demand of
intermediates and may counter the benefits of the efficiency change.
Since the consecutive adjustment of all prices and quantities can no longer be il-
lustrated in a meaningful manner, an evaluation of the economy-wide rebound effect is
beyond the scope of our stylised example. For such an analysis, a general equilibrium
framework is well suited. For this reason, we now turn to a general equilibrium analysis
of the rebound. At this point, we also become more specific with regard to our evalua-
tion of the rebound effect and study the economy-wide implications of an increase in the
efficiency of energy in the provision of transport services by households in the presence
of consumer habits on the basis of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis.
5.3 CGE analysis
5.3.1 Model
After having given a comprehensive formal overview of the rebound effect in the context
of households, we now explore the rebound effect in a more general setting. On that
account, we include the main elements of the stylised example of the previous section
in a general equilibrium model. This relates mainly to the utility function with habits
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and the idea that households are responsible for the provision of certain services such as
transportation. Although in order to have a good representation of household behaviour,
we implement a somewhat more elaborated nesting structure for household utility and
the provision of transport services. Though the mechanisms nevertheless remain the
same. We build on a basic version of the WIOD CGE model (Koesler and Pothen,
2013), which is a static (in the sense that there is no investment decision and a fix factor
supply), multi-region, multi-sector CGE model. Details on the general setup of the basic
CGE model are presented in Chapter 2 and Annex A.1. In the following we present the
changes we made to the basic model for the analysis in this paper.
Y(i,r)
ρKLEM(i,r)
A(neg,r)
ρKLE(i,r)
A(eg,r)
ρKL(i,r)
K(r) L(r)X
Figure 5.1: Structure of KLEM production function
As we are interested in the effects of a change in the efficiency of the generation of
transport services at the households, we extend original structure of household demand
in the basic WIOD CGE model with regard to three aspects. First, we extend the basic
utility function to feature a distinction between transport services and non-transport
consumption. Accordingly, the utility of the representative agent is given by:
U(r) =
(
αUtrns(r)
(
TRNstotal(r)
)ρUtrnsme
+ αUme(r)
(
ME(r)
)ρUtrnsme) 1ρUtrnsme
, (5.11)
where
ME(r) =
(
αUm(r)
(
M total(r)
)ρUme
+ αUe(r)
(
Etotal(r)
)ρUme) 1ρUme
, (5.12)
and
TRNstotal(r) =TRNs(t;r) − θUtrnsTRNs(t−1;r),
M total(r) =M(t;r) − θUmM(t−1;r),
Etotal(r) =E(t;r) − θUeE(t−1;r).
(5.13)
Thus, utility is a CES aggregate where non-transport material M(t;r) and energy E(t;r)
are combined on the bottom level and transport services TRNs(t;r) enters at the top
level. Note, whenever no ambiguity arises with respect to the underlying time period, we
omit the t index when we relate variables to the present period t. Following the notation
of the theoretical model presented before, α’s are input shares and θ’s determine the
degree of habit persistence. Substitutability between different types of consumption is
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given by the different ρ’s which relate to the respective substitution elasticity through
σ = 11+ρ . Figure 5.2 illustrates the utility function used in the general equilibrium
analysis.
U(r)
ρUmetrns
TRNstotal(r)
ρUme
M total(r) E
total
(r)
Figure 5.2: Structure of the utility function of households
Secondly, we include in the standard utility function a habit formation process sim-
ilar to the one described in Section 5.2.1. If household have habits, they adjust only
a share of their consumption bundle to the current situation and the other share is
determined by their habits. Households must always consume at least θUeE(t−1;r) of
energy, θUtrnsTRNs(t−1;r) of transport services, and θUmM(t−1;r) of non-transport ma-
terial consumed in the previous period. Household habits are formed on the basis of
the consumption bundle of the previous period and thus a change in a consumption
decision will be quickly incorporated in household habits. The direct interdependence
between current consumption and habits results in an adaptation process where current
consumption and habits are adjusted period for period until a situation is reached where
current consumption equals household habits. As was the case in the previous section, we
therefore distinguish between a situation where the adaptation process has just started
and habits have not been updated yet (here referred to as short-term) and a situation
where the process is completed (here long-term) when illustrating the implications of
consumption persistence.
Thirdly, we include a submodule describing the generation of transport services at
the representative household TRNs(t;r). We apply a similar formulation as in the MIT
EPPA CGE model Paltsev et al. (2004) or Abrell (2010) and assume that households
provide TRNs(t;r) on the basis of a two-level nested CES production function of the
form:
TRNs(r) =
(
αTRNpro(r)
(
TRNpro(r)
)ρTRNpropriv
+ αTRNpriv(r)
(
TRNpriv(r)
)ρTRNpropriv) 1ρTRNpropriv , (5.14)
where
TRNpriv(r) =
(
αTRNe(r)
(
γTRNe(r) E(r)
)ρTRNma
+ αTRNma(r)
(
TRNma(r)
)ρTRNetrnma) 1ρTRNetrnma
.
(5.15)
On the bottom level, energy E(r) used for private transport activities is paired with
transport material TRNma(r) to form private transport services TRNpriv(r). On the
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top level, private transport services are combined with transportation services supplied
by professionals, such as airlines or coach companies TRNpro(r). Again, α’s are input
shares and the degree of substitutability is given by the different ρ’s. The level of energy
efficiency is described by γTRNe(r) , whereas in the benchmark γ
TRNe
(r) is normalised to one.
The overall structure of the production of transport services is given in Figure 5.3.
Although again the nesting structure is slightly more complex, it nevertheless builds on
the same concept as the illustrative example from the previous section.
TRNs(r)
ρTRNpropriv
TRNpro(r) ρTRNetrnma
E(r) TRNma(r)
Figure 5.3: Structure of the provision of transport services
Furthermore, households are endowed with a fixed amount of capital and labour.
Thus, as in our stylised example, factor supply and therewith the main income source
of households is independent of the efficiency shock and enables us to focus on demand
side effects. Capital and labour is mobile across sectors within regions but not across
regions.
5.3.2 Calibration, aggregation, key parameters and scenario definition
With regard to the general economic structure and energy use, the model is calibrated
to 2009 WIOD data (Timmer et al., 2012; Dietzenbacher et al., 2013). Substitution
elasticities for production are taken from Koesler and Schymura (2015). We assume for
the Armington elasticities of substitution between imports of different regions σMvsM and
between the import aggregate and domestic products σLvsM that σMvsM = σLvsM = 5.2
Originally, the WIOD dataset covers 40 regions and 35 sectors. But to be able to
provide more pertinent, results we aggregate the extensive WIOD data to two regions
and 19 sectors. Although our model includes the two regions Germany (GER) and
Rest of the World (ROW), for our analysis, we focus on the effects within Germany and
abstract from interregional effects. The setup of the sectoral aggregation has been chosen
in particular such that it allows to explicitly model the provision of transport services
to the households and to allow drawing conclusions regarding energy demand. This
includes in particular the sectors providing professional transportation (ATRN, ITRN,
WTRN), energy (ENER), and transport material (STRN, TREQ). A detailed overview
of the regions and sectors is given in Tables C.1 and C.2 in the Appendix.
2To check for sensitivity with regard to Armington elasticities, we also match Armington elasticites
from GTAP7 (Badri and Walmsley, 2008) to our dataset and evaluate the rebound. Albeit this requires
a somewhat arbitrary match of WIOD sectors to GTAP7 sectors, there are no significant changes and
our results seem to be robust to this regard.
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Besides having to know the share of household energy consumption relative to the
economy-wide energy consumption for our analysis, we also require information on how
much energy households use for private transport services. But while WIOD supplies
detailed information on what type of energy households consume, it does not include
information on the underlying purpose of household energy consumption. By making
use of the facts that in Germany (bio-) diesel and (bio-) gasoline brought by households
is used exclusively for transportation and that so far alternative propulsion technologies
such as electric or gas powered cars are not wide-spread (cf. Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt,
2011, 2012), we can derive the necessary information on the basis of the data reported
in the energy use tables of WIOD. By these means, we conclude that household energy
consumption accounts for 39.3% of total energy demand in Germany and households
use 38.2% of this energy for the provision of private transport services which in turn
corresponds to 15.0% of total German energy use.
With respect to our research question, there are a set of crucial parameters. These
relate mainly to the degree of demand persistence respectively the strength of the habit,
the substitution possibilities between transport services and non transport related con-
sumption and the possibility to substitute energy with transport material in the gener-
ation of private transportation services. To account for sensitivity of the model results
with regard to these key parameters, we run the simulations for a set of different sce-
narios. There are two main differences between scenarios. First, we distinguish between
model runs with three different levels of demand persistence (θNP = 0, θMP = 0.5 and
θHP = 0.9) to account for variation in degree by which households demand is driven
by habits. Note that although in reality θ is likely to vary for different households and
goods, for this analysis, we focus on a case where household habits are homogenous
for all services and consumer goods, i.e. θUtrns = θUm = θUe.3 Secondly, to give an
indication of the range of the implications of the efficiency shock in question, we run a
set of simulations with a ridged demand structure and an inflexible provision of private
transport services. In this setting, we assume that households do not substitute between
other consumer goods and transport services as well as between professional and private
transportation (σUmetrnsMIN = 0, σ
TRNpropriv
MIN = 0 and σ
TRNetrnma
MIN = 0) and that energy
and transport material cannot be substituted when providing private transport services
(σTRNemaMIN = 0). These scenarios are supposed to provide us with rather conservative
estimations of the effects. We also run a set of simulations with a more flexible demand
structure. There, we assume that households adjust there consumption in such a way
that the expenditure shares with regard to transportation services and other consump-
tion and between private and professional transport services are constant (σUmetrnsFLEX = 1
and σTRNproprivFLEX = 1). Moreover, we assume that the generation of private transport
services by households is characterised by a CES function featuring an elasticity of sub-
3It is to be expected that the level of demand persistence again depends not only of the type of
household, but also on whether the habit relates to basic or luxury goods, whereas the former will
feature higher levels of persistence. Moreover, the durability of a good will play an important role in this
context. Although, due to the static nature of our analysis, we abstract from this aspect in our study.
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stitution of σTRNetrnmaFLEX = 0.42. This value corresponds to the substitution elasticity
between value added and energy for the sector providing inland transportation given in
Koesler and Schymura (2015). An overview of the scenarios is given in Table C.3 in the
Appendix of this paper.
5.3.3 Simulation results
In the following, we present the simulation results regarding the economy-wide impli-
cations of a costless and permanent energy efficiency shock of 10% in the generation
of private transport services by households in Germany. The efficiency improvement is
applied by updating γTRNescen(GER) such that γ
TRNe
scen(GER) = 1.1. We begin with a situation
where household demand features no persistence (NP-MIN and NP-FLEX). Later, we
investigate how habits affect the results (MP-MIN, MP-FLEX, HP-MIN and HP-FLEX).
Finally, in order to be able to pin down the magnitude of different rebound effects, we de-
compose the overall rebound observed in scenario NP-FLEX into the direct and indirect
rebound effect.
5.3.3.1 Implications without habits
A brief overview of the effects of the efficiency improvement in a setting without habits
is given in Table 5.2. Naturally, the effects of the efficiency shock originate from the
generation of transport services by households. As energy becomes more effective, input
cost are reduced and the costs for one unit of transport services falls by 1.5% in the
NP scenarios. Consequently, the demand of households for transport services and thus
also its production increases by about 1.5% in the NP-FLEX scenario where household
demand is flexible with regard to expenses for different consumption goods, but only
increases slightly by +0.1% in the less flexible NP-MIN scenario. As the demand for
professional transport (air, inland and water) remains at its original level, any increase
in transport demand can be attributed to an increased demand in private transportation
services. Resulting from the increased provision of transport services, the demand for
transport material (TREQ and STRN) and effective energy used for private transport
should increase.4 In fact, in scenario NP-FLEX, demand for transport material (TREQ
and STRN) increases slightly by 1.1% while the demand for energy increases by 5.3%
in efficiency terms or decreases by 4.3% in natural units. Most of the change regarding
energy inputs in the provision of private transport services can thereby be related to
the the first and second term on the right hand side of Equation 5.7 from the stylised
example presented in the previews section, meaning to changes in input intensity and
current demand. Moreover, since the transport material intensity of transport services
falls, at least a share of the energy increase must thereby be attributed to a change in
4Note, in the context of changes in efficiency it is necessary to distinguish between ‘natural’ and
‘efficiency’ units. For example, assuming all other things remain unchanged, a 10% efficiency increase of
an input will result in a 10% decrease of the input usage measured in ‘natural’ units, but input usage in
‘efficiency’ units will remain constant.
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input intensity. In deed, the divergent development of transport material and energy
inputs in scenario NP-FLEX, where 0 ≤ σTRNetrnma ≤ 1, can fully be attributed to
the fact that households substitute transport material with comparatively cheap energy.
Of course, as transport material and energy cannot be substituted and the demand for
transport remains unchanged, there is no such rebound channel in in scenario NP-MIN
and no change in intensities takes place.
Total household consumption increases only marginally by about 0.15% in NP-FLEX
and about 0.14% in NP-MIN. As argued before, parts of this increase can be attributed
to the fact that a reduction in prices for private transport services generates additional
household demand. The other part can be related to the effect which was described
in the stylised example by Equation 5.10. As households need to spend less on energy
input, they can consume more. This includes energy as well as other goods and services.
All this should in general have a positive effect on all sectoral outputs. In NP-FLEX and
to a lesser extent in NP-MIN the sectors related to transport do indeed benefit from the
additional demand for private transport services and expand their production by up to
0.61%. However, the overall output of non-transport sectors does slightly decrease. The
reason for this are general equilibrium effects and crowding-out. The additional demand
by households and transport related sectors puts positive pressure on prices and increases
input costs of all sectors. Sectors that cannot secure much extra demand must therefore
limit their production. With a reduction of 0.69% in the NP-FLEX scenario and 1.42%
in the NP-MIN case, the sector reducing its output most is the energy supplying sector
ENER. Here the crowding-out is complemented by a drop in demand because of the
energy efficiency improvement.
In terms of demand for energy (all measured in ‘natural’ units), we observe an
economy-wide decrease of energy use in Germany of 0.8% in scenario NP-FLEX and
of 1.6% in NP-MIN. German household demand for energy reduces by 1.7% (NP-FLEX)
and 3.4% (NP-MIN) respectively. Energy used for transportation decreases by 4.4%
(NP-FLEX) and 9.0% (NP-MIN). Since the possibilities to substitute towards energy
are limited in the NP-MIN scenario, this once more illustrates that energy savings are
eroded by an important share by substitution effects. The changes in energy use leads
us to the main point of interest, the rebound effect. Building on the work of Lecca et al.
(2014), we measure rebound on the basis of the relationship between changes in the use
of energy measured in ‘natural’ units and the relative size of the efficiency increase:
Rs =
1 + ∆Es(
Eu
Es
)
∆γ
 100%, (5.16)
This rebound measure includes direct, indirect as well as economy-wide effects. In
a general equilibrium setting which simultaneously incorporates different supply- and
demand side processes, rebound can be evaluated for different scopes or perspectives. In
Equation (5.16) s is the scope and u the activity where the efficiency change takes place.
Accordingly, Es respectively Eu is energy use, ∆Es is the change in energy use within
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the scope s (all three are measured in ‘natural’ units) and ∆γ is the change in efficiency
taking place in activity u. In this analysis, we consider three scopes and compute the
rebound for the provision of transport services RTRNS , household consumption RC and
the economy as a whole RE . If households are flexible with regard to their preferred
consumption bundle (NP-FLEX), 56.2% of the energy efficiency improvement in the
provision of transport services is lost because of rebound. Because of the absence of
substitution effects when households are less flexible, the loss is much lower and amounts
only to 10.4% in the NP-MIN scenario. The rebound on the level of total household
consumption is 56.2% in the NP-FLEX scenario and again reduces to 12.6% in the
NP-MIN scenario. The increase of the rebound effect when changing from a transport
service perspective to a more comprehensive household perspective can be explained by
the additional energy consumption by households thanks to lower costs for the provision
of transport services when these services become more energy efficient. Broadening the
scope of the rebound to an economy-wide perspective, results in a rebound of 48.5%
(NP-FLEX) and −4.5% (NP-MIN) respectively. When taking a more comprehensive
perspective, the energy savings from the energy efficiency improvement are reinforced
by the reduction of sectoral output in particular in energy intensive sectors such as
ENER, ATRN, ONME and META. As a consequence rebound is reduced. This is in
line with the findings of Lecca et al. (2014) who postulate that the rebound effect on the
economy level should be smaller than the rebound on the household level if total energy
consumption decreases. As a matter of fact, in scenario NP-MIN, the total German
energy demand decreases so strong that we can report a negative rebound effect. Thus,
in this special case, the usually counterproductive rebound channels eventually generate
an additional benefit.
5.3.3.2 Implications in the presence of habits
As previously illustrated formally, consumer habits can have an initial negative effect
on rebound triggered from an energy efficiency improvement. Table 5.2 also provides
an overview of key effects of a 10% energy efficiency increase in the provision of private
transportation in the presence of consumer habits. If households feature a rigid demand
structure with regard to substitution between different goods (MP-MIN, HP-MIN), there
is no difference between a situation with or without habits. The reason for this is
straightforward. If households do not change the nature of their demand, there is no
need to update the consumption bundle they are already used to, and thus there is no
effect of habits.
If households are ready to substitute but are bound by habits (MP-FLEX, HP-
FLEX), household energy demand for the provision of transportation services initially
declines by 5.0% (MP-FLEX) and 5.6% (HP-FLEX), respectively. Total household en-
ergy demand reduces by 1.9% (MP-FLEX) and 2.1% (HP-FLEX), while economy-wide
energy use decreases by only 0.9% (MP-FLEX) and 1.0% (HP-FLEX). Again, all changes
are measured in ’natural’ units. Compared to a situation without habits (NP-FLEX)
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there is thus a stronger decline of energy use at each level. The effect is stronger the
higher the persistency level θ. As the provision of transport services itself is not con-
straint by habits, and thus input substitution can still take place, the increased decline
can be attributed to the comparatively limited change in demand for transport services.
In the presence of habits, households refrain from taking advantage of the cost decrease
the efficiency improvement implies and demand for transport services does only rise by
0.8% (MP-FLEX) and 0.3% (HP-FLEX) compared to an increase of 1.5% in a situation
where habits are no issue (NP-FLEX). This also implies that the general equilibrium
effects through which other sectors where affected by the efficiency shock are now also
weakened. Output in the transport material sectors for example is now only expanded
by up to 0.2% in comparison to 0.6% in the NP-FLEX scenario. An exception is the
energy sector ENER, which reduces its output more strongly by 0.8% (MP-FLEX) re-
spectively 0.9% (HP-FLEX). This is mainly because additional demand for transport
services is constrained by habits.
In terms of rebound, this results in the predicted initial reduction of the rebound
effect for scenario MP-FLEX and HP-FLEX compared to NP-FLEX. Rebound at the
transport service level amounts to 49.7% (MP-FLEX) respectively 44.5% (HP-FLEX),
at the household level to 50.8% (MP-FLEX) and 41.0% (HP-FLEX) and 34.9% (MP-
FLEX) respectively 46.5% (HP-FLEX) at the economy-wide level. Again the differences
of between the rebound for different scopes can be explained by additional household
energy demand and negative effects on the output of non-transport sectors. But the
effect of habits on the rebound is limited to the short run. In the long run, when
households have had the chance to truly update their consumption bundle to the new
situation, energy demand and correspondingly the rebound effect would have returned
to those values emerging from a situation without consumption persistence (NP-FLEX).
The effect of habit is only permanent if household consumption is fully determined by
habits. Obviously, in such a situation households would never react to the efficiency
improvement with a change of their consumption bundle.
5.3.3.3 Decomposing the rebound
In order to shed more light on the strength of different rebound channels, we disentangle
the rebound observed in scenario NP-FLEX into the direct and indirect rebound effect.
Thereby, we build on the respective definitions elaborated in the section presenting the
stylised model of the previous section which are formalised in Equations 5.6 and 5.10.
In the process, we use numerical approximations of the required partial derivatives and
for parameterisation turn to the same data we use in the CGE model. It must be noted
however, that this approach relies on a ceteris paribus analysis and only holds at the
margin. As a consequence, the direct and indirect rebound are isolated effects and are
not additive in forming an overall demand side effect. Thus RTotal ≡ RDirect +RIndirect +
REquilibrium does not apply in this setup.
In a situation without consumer habits and where household demand is flexible with
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regard to expenses for different consumption goods (NP-FLEX), the direct rebound of
a 10% increase of energy efficiency in the provision of private transport in Germany
amounts to 64.7%. This implies that in isolation, the direct rebound effect would erode
a large part of the energy efficiency shock. At first, such a high estimate for the direct
rebound seems to be at odds with other estimates that can be found in the literature,
which, according to a comprehensive review by Sorrell et al. (2009), range from 10% to
30%. But considering that, in particular in Germany and in the context of transporta-
tion, the direct rebound appears to be higher and amounts to something around 60%
(Frondel et al., 2008, 2012), our estimate nevertheless seems plausible.
Based on our definition as outlined in 5.10, the indirect rebound resulting from
a 10% efficiency increase of transport energy in Germany is 19.9% in the NP-FLEX
scenario. So while the indirect rebound does reduce the expected savings of an energy
efficiency measure, in isolation, this channel is weaker than the price effect leading to
direct rebound. To our humble knowledge, there exist only few estimates of the indirect
rebound and often the underlying definition varies. The lack of estimates makes it
difficult to contrast our finding with the literature. The only study we found that
matches roughly our definition is Sorrell (2007), who reports an indirect rebound of
11%. This estimate is clearly smaller than ours, but still it seems to be within range.
5.4 Summary and conclusion
In this paper, we turn our attention to the rebound effect of an efficiency improvement
at households and investigate the implications of an efficiency change in the provision
of private services by households. In the process, we take into account that household
behaviour may be influenced by habits and build on a detailed representation of the
provision of private transport services. To have a clear understanding of the underlying
effects, we first formally illustrate through which channels the rebound effect emerges
on the basis of a simple stylised example. Subsequently, we evaluate the effects of a 10%
energy efficiency improvement in the provision of private transport services by German
households by means of a more comprehensive CGE analysis.
Our analysis shows that rebound has the potential to significantly reduce the ex-
pected energy savings of an energy efficiency improvement at households. Particularly
if households have a flexible demand structure, rebound can erode large parts of effi-
ciency increases and in our setting rebound amounts to up to 56%. As is to be expected,
household habits have an initial detrimental effect on rebound. They limit the ability of
households to adapt to changes in the prevailing price and income system and therewith
temporally block parts of the channels that lead to rebound. In the long run however, if
habits are formed on the basis of historic consumption and household behaviour is not
totally driven by habits, they do not affect rebound. In isolation and on the basis of a
ceteris paribus analysis, the direct rebound effect of the 10% efficiency improvement can
amount up to 64.7% and the indirect rebound to 19.9%.
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On the basis of our study, we cannot concur with the statement of Gillingham et al.
(2013) that the rebound is overplayed. On the contrary, in the context of energy efficiency
improvements in households, rebound is crucial. Although, in our study, we concentrate
on an ad-hoc efficiency improvement, this is also an important finding for policy makers.
Efficiency improvements are often believed to be vital to achieve sustainability and policy
makers are frequently tempted to prescribe energy efficiency improvements by regulatory
law (e.g. EU, 2009). But when discussing such measures, policy makers should be fully
aware of the associated rebound potential. This is not to say that compulsory efficiency
improvements cannot be beneficial, but the rebound effect puts the effectiveness of such
measures to a real test. The results of our study point also to another aspect of the
rebound that policy makers should take into account. In the presence of consumer
habits, rebound can take some time until its full extent manifests itself. Consequently, an
evaluation of energy efficiency measures should always allow for sufficient amount of time
so that households can adopt their behaviour to the new situation. The longer habits
take to be formed, the longer the time span should be that passes before the rebound
effect can be assessed properly. Otherwise, the rebound effect will be underestimated.
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Chapter 6
Beyond national economy-wide
rebound effects: A CGE analysis
incorporating international
spillover effects
Abstract
In this chapter we proposes that the national focus of energy ‘rebound’ studies should
be extended to an international context. The potential for energy efficiency improve-
ments in one nation to impact energy use in others means that national targets and
actions cannot be considered independently. We develop a general equilibrium analysis
of increased efficiency in productive energy use, identifying a range of channels through
which spillover effects may be transmitted as a result of trade in goods and services.
The results show that energy efficiency in one nation does impact energy use in others.
However, the sectoral and spatial distribution of positive and negative effects depends
on the nature of the efficiency improvement and factor supply conditions. In partic-
ular, changes in relative competitiveness and energy supply conditions act to dampen
economy-wide rebound as the boundaries of the economy are expanded.
This chapter is based on the following paper:
Koesler, Simon, Kim Swales and Karen Turner (2014), Beyond National Economy-wide
Rebound Effects. An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis Incorporating International
Spillover Effects, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 14-025, Mannheim, Germany.
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6.1 Introduction
Existing research on the phenomenon of economy-wide rebound effects from increased
energy efficiency have identified the importance of trade effects determining the nature
and magnitude of economy-wide rebound effects in national economies where efficiency
improvements have occurred (e.g. Hanley et al., 2009; van den Bergh, 2011). How-
ever, the issue of potential spillover effects on energy demand (and supply) from energy
efficiency improvements in one region/nation on others have generally been neglected
(Madlener and Alcott, 2009; Sorrell, 2009; van den Bergh, 2011; Turner, 2013). This
paper considers how the concept and consideration of economy-wide or ’macro-level’
rebound may be extended to consider the impacts of increased energy efficiency in one
country on energy use in others. While basic theoretical contributions on the issue of
‘global rebound’ have been made (e.g. Wei, 2010) and some applied studies have been
conducted (e.g. Barker et al., 2009), there exist no applied macro-level rebound studies
to date that attempt to fully consider and identify the types of channels through which
energy efficiency increases in one region/nation may impact energy demand and supply
conditions in others. This is an important knowledge gap, particularly given the global
nature of energy-related climate change and the context of supra-national policy targets
such as the EU 20-20-20 framework. The potential for energy efficiency policy actions
taken in one country to impact energy use (and related emissions) in others implies
that target setting and implementation decisions in different member states may not be
regarded as independent.
Rebound occurs when improvements in energy efficiency stimulate the direct and
derived demand for energy in production and/or final consumption. It is triggered by
the fact that an increase in the efficiency in the use of energy acts to reduce the implicit
price of energy by increasing the effective energy services gained from each physical
unit of energy used (e.g. Jevons, 1866; Sorrell and Dimitropoulos, 2008; Turner, 2013).
Moreover, economic impacts in general and rebound pressure in particular will spread to
the wider economy through a series of price and income effects. So called ‘economy-wide
rebound’ studies have generally been conducted in the context of improved efficiency
in industrial energy use within individual national or regional economies, and most
commonly using multi-sector computable general equilibrium, CGE, models (reviewed
in Sorrell (2007), with more recent studies including Anson and Turner (2009) and Turner
and Hanley (2010)).
The aim of this paper is to add to this literature by extending the spatial focus
of the economy-wide rebound effect. In Section 6.2 we consider the type of channels
through which an efficiency improvement in productive energy use (i.e. within indus-
tries/production sectors rather than the household final consumption sector)1 in one
region/nation may spillover to impact energy demand and supply conditions in direct
1Lecca et al. (2014) show that the economy-wide impacts of increased efficiency in household energy
use through the Competitiveness Channel in particular (but not solely) are likely to be very different
from those in the case of productive energy use considered here.
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and indirect trade partners. We also derive the analytical specification through which
economy-wide rebound may be quantified for different levels of production activity and
final consumption in different spatial settings. In Section 6.3, we provide an overview
of an international CGE framework, based on the type of specification commonly used
to consider issues of pollution leakage resulting from implementation of environmental
policies (e.g. Babiker, 2005; Bo¨hringer and Lo¨schel, 2006; Lo¨schel and Otto, 2009; El-
liot et al., 2010). In Section 6.4, we explain how efficiency improvements in productive
energy use are simulated in this framework before presenting results of illustrative case
studies for first a general energy efficiency improvement in German production (Section
6.5), then a shock targeted specifically in German manufacturing (Section 6.6), and how
these shocks transmit to the wider EU and global economies. Conclusions and recom-
mendations for future research are drawn in Section 6.7. Note, in line with the existing
rebound literature we focus on changes in the relative price system and concentrate on
effects after the efficiency improvement has taken place. Hence our study is no full policy
analysis and does in particular consider the costs of the efficiency improvement as sunk
costs.
6.2 Extending the boundaries of the economy-wide rebound
effect
6.2.1 Potential nature of international trade spillover effects affecting
rebound at a supra-national level
Individual regions and nations are linked by goods and factor markets. Consequently,
the impacts of economic disturbances and policy interventions in one region/nation may
spillover to affect activity in others. The focus of this paper is to consider how analyses
of economy-wide rebound effects from increased efficiency in industrial energy use in a
given nation may be impacted if the boundaries of ‘the economy’ are extended. We take
a first step in doing so by focussing attention on potential spillover effects resulting from
trade in goods and services. Three broad channels are identified:
6.2.1.1 General demand channels
When technical efficiency increases in productive energy use this equates to a positive
supply-side shock in the nation where the improvement takes place. The most basic
impact will be a general expansion in activity on both the production and final con-
sumption sides of the domestic economy. Where producers and final consumers use a
combination of domestic and imported goods and services, positive income and multi-
plier effects will stimulate both foreign and domestic production, allowing the benefits
of the expansion to spread to the wider global economy. This would underlie concerns
that rebound in energy use will grow as the boundaries under consideration expand.
However, the source of this expansion is reduced costs of production and therefore
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output prices in the domestic sector(s) where the efficiency improvement occurs, and
in any downstream sectors (foreign or domestic) that (directly or indirectly) use the
outputs of the targeted sector as intermediate inputs to production. Thus, the nature of
the demand expansion will not simply depend on the nature of domestic and international
supply chain linkages but also on changes in relative prices. Moreover, where there are
any constraints in factor supply conditions in different regions, there will be opposing
upward pressure on prices, which will in turn put downward pressure on economy-wide
rebound. On the other hand, where factor returns increase this equates to additional
income effects from increased domestic and/or foreign household consumption demands.
Thus, a mix of positive and negative pressures on rebound in global energy use will come
into play.
6.2.1.2 Competitiveness channel
Another important channel for international spillover effects emerges from the discus-
sion above. First, an increase in the input efficiency of a particular sector results in
a comparative advantage of this sector relative to its counterparts in other regions,
with the benefits spreading to other domestic sectors that use the targeted sector’s out-
puts as intermediate inputs. Thus, there is pressure for production, particularly in the
targeted activity, to increase in the region where the productivity improvements take
place. While this is part of the process that causes rebound in local energy demand,
any consequent contraction in external production will reduce foreign energy demand
and economy-wide rebound viewed from a multiregional perspective. Interestingly, this
competitiveness channel could be argued to build on the same mechanism as that in the
context of carbon leakage, where production is shifted abroad as a result of higher pro-
duction costs resulting from environmental policies, but acting in the opposite direction
by shifting production to the region where the policy action occurs (see Bo¨hringer et al.
(2012)).
6.2.1.3 Energy market channel
Earlier work reported in Turner 2009b; 2013 highlights another ‘negative rebound’ chan-
nel that will also apply in the context of international spillover effects from increased
efficiency in productive energy use (but would also apply in the case of increased energy
efficiency in final consumption activity – see Lecca et al. (2014)). This is the impact of
changing demands on energy supply sectors. Initially, any increase in energy efficiency
leads to a decrease in energy demand. Three basic types of effects may result.
First, any reduction in energy demand will ultimately reduce the overall amount of
produced energy. Because energy supplying sectors, particularly those that are reliant on
non-renewable energy sources and technologies, are generally relative energy intensive,
this by itself will curb energy use (both directly and upstream). This is what Turner
(2009b) describes as negative rebound pressure from negative multiplier effects (where,
for example, increased efficiency in the use of electricity generated from non-renewable
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sources depresses coal and gas production). However, this will not be limited to domestic
energy supply in the nation where the efficiency improvement takes place. Given the
high level of integration in international energy markets negative multiplier effects are
likely to spillover to external energy supply chain. Whether this has the potential to
decrease local or foreign rebound depends thereby crucially of the location of the main
energy supply of sector and wider economy where the efficiency improvement takes place.
If a large share of the affected energy use is imported, the reduction of energy demand
will have a depressing effect on foreign rather than domestic rebound.
Second, the initial decrease in energy demand as efficiency improves will generate
downward pressure on domestic and – if energy markets are sufficiently integrated – also
external energy prices. Where energy prices are depressed, this will trigger additional
energy demand and put upward pressure on rebound in the respective regions. Again,
note that this mechanism is very similar to the energy market channel provoking carbon
leakage in highly integrated energy markets (see Bo¨hringer et al., 2012), though, again,
the shock triggering the drop in local energy demand is different.
Third, Turner (2009a) identifies another potential impact on energy supply conditions
where prices and/or revenues enjoyed by energy suppliers are negatively affected by a
net reduction in energy demand following from an efficiency improvement. This is that
where factor returns fall, particularly returns to capital in what tend to be relatively
capital-intensive production processes, this will affect the availability of capital to and
the incentive to invest in energy supply capacity. If energy supply conditions tighten,
and in order to restore equilibrium in capital markets, market prices for energy will have
to rise, which will act to offset positive demand pressure driving rebound.
Overall, the nature and importance of impacts on energy supply, demand and re-
bound through these different channels in different regions will vary depending on the
structure of the existing trade linkages in different energy and non-energy goods and ser-
vices between regions that have and have not directly benefited from increased energy
efficiency. In Section 6.3 we outline an international computable general equilibrium
(CGE) modelling framework that is then used (Sections 6.4 to 6.6) to simulate a range
of illustrative scenarios that allow us to consider the different channels identified above
in an applied setting. First, in order to focus on the specific issue of rebound that is
stimulating current academic and policy debate regarding the effectiveness of energy effi-
ciency policies, we consider how the basic specification of economy-wide rebound should
be adjusted to consider spillover effects as the boundaries of the economy are expanded
from a national to a global level.
6.2.2 Quantifying rebound in a multi-regional setting
Here we build on the economy-wide rebound specifications derived in Lecca et al. (2014)
to consider the general equilibrium rebound effects of a proportionate improvement in the
efficiency with which energy is used in a single production sector. Own-sector rebound
in the targeted sector i, Ri, (incorporating general equilibrium feedback effects on sector
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i energy use in addition to direct and indirect rebound effects and reported in percentage
terms) is measured as:
Ri =
(
1 +
E˙i
γ
)
× 100, (6.1)
where E˙i is the change in energy use in sector i after all agents have adjusted their
behaviour in consequence of the technical energy efficiency improvement γ > 0, both
given in percentage terms. To reiterate, this is not direct rebound; rather it is the
rebound calculated incorporating the change in energy use in sector i with all general
equilibrium effects of the efficiency improvement taken into account.
The first step in considering the own-country economy-wide rebound effect is to
consider the impact of the proportionate energy efficiency improvement in the target
sector i on total energy use in the aggregate production side of the economy (all i =
1, . . . , N sectors), Ep. The own-country total production rebound formulation, Rp (in
percentage terms), is given as:
Rp =
(
1 +
E˙p
αγ
)
× 100, (6.2)
where α is the initial (base/reference year) share of sector i energy use in total energy
use in production (across all i = 1, . . . , N sectors) in the domestic economy (which we
label d below). The term
E˙p
αγ can be expressed as:
E˙p
αγ
=
δEp
αEi
=
δEi + δE
−i
p
γEi
=
E˙i
γ
+
δE−ip
γEi
, (6.3)
where δ represents absolute change and the −i superscript indicates all production ex-
cluding sector i. Substituting Equation (6.3) into Equation (6.2) and using Equation
(6.1) gives:
Rp = Ri +
(
δE−1p
γEi
)
× 100. (6.4)
This shows that the total (own-country) rebound in productive energy use will be
greater than the own-sector rebound if there is a net increase in aggregate energy use
across all other production sectors. On the other hand, if there is a net decrease in total
energy use across all other domestic production sectors, then total rebound in production
will be lower than own-sector rebound.
Using a similar procedure (which is outlined in the Appendix to this chapter), we
can show that the full economy-wide rebound effect in the domestic economy, Rd, can
be expressed as:
Rd = Rp +
(
δEc
γEi
)
× 100, (6.5)
where the c subscript indicates ’consumption’ (households).This shows that the total
economy-wide rebound in the home country, d, will be larger (smaller) than rebound
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in the aggregate production sector if there is a net increase (decrease) in energy use in
household final consumption.
Here we are also interested in international spillover effects of the energy efficiency
improvement on energy use in other countries. Therefore, we define a global rebound
rebound effect, Rg, relating to the total impact on energy use in all countries resulting
from increased efficiency in the use of energy in sector i within the home economy, d.
Again, using a similar procedure, as given in detail in the Appendix to this chapter, this
can be expressed as:
Rg = Rd +
(
δE−dg
γEi
)
× 100, (6.6)
where represents global energy use outwith the domestic economy receiving the efficiency
shock. Again this shows that the total economy-wide global rebound will be greater
than the own-country rebound if there is a net increase in external aggregate energy use
following the efficiency improvement within country d. If there is a net decrease then
total global rebound will be lower than own-country rebound. Note that it is possible
to identify more than one region within the external global economy and disaggregate
the changes in global non-domestic energy use accordingly. We do this below in our case
study of increased efficiency in German industrial energy use by separately identifying
the change in energy use in the rest of the EU-27 and the rest of the world.
6.3 The global CGE modelling framework
To evaluate the economy-wide rebound effect and provide a first analysis of the interna-
tional spillover effects that come along with an energy efficiency increase, we make use of
a static, multi-region, multi-sector CGE model which has been developed along the lines
of the Basic WIOD CGE (Koesler and Pothen, 2013). The details on the general setup
of the model are presented in Chapter 2 and in Appendix A.1. To be able to asses the
role of factor markets on rebound, the basic model is extended to include a (admittedly
stylised) flexible labour and capital supply. The respective changes are presented in the
following.
Each region is represented by one aggregated representative agent who embraces
all households and governmental final demand in a region. The representative agent
maximizes his utility by purchasing bundles of consumption goods subject to a budget
constraint. The budget is determined by factor and tax income along with (intertemporal
and interregional) borrowing or saving. In the initial scenarios modelled we assume
that agents supply a fix amount of capital and labour. Then, to allow for a stylised
analysis of factor constraints, we relax this assumption and implement a simple flexible
factor supply within each region. Then labour is supplied on the basis of a simplified
consumption-leisure decision where we account for an stylised unemployment rate of
unemp(r) = 5% which in combination with the benchmark regional labour supply L0(r)
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Figure 6.1: Structure of utility function
gives the maximum amount of available labour in an economy Lmax(r) =
L0(r)
1−unemp(r) and
assume that the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is ect(r) = 2.0.
Moreover, the extended model implements capital supply functions featuring a stylised
price elasticity of eks(r) = 0.5. In all cases, capital and labour is mobile across sectors
within regions but not across regions. As in this paper we focus on spillovers from
trade in commodities, we abstract from interregional factor mobility and investment.
Consumption of representative agents C(r) is given as a Leontief composite of energy
Aeg,r and a non-energy Armington bundle Aneg,r.
2 Utility U(r) is characterised by a CES
function bundling consumption and whenever applicable leisure T(r). The structure of
the utility functions is given in Figure 6.1.
For our analysis, the model has been set to feature 28 regions (all EU27 member
states, and Rest of the World (ROW)) and to include eight sectors, two of which are
energy supply sectors, (Electricity and Gas (E) and Coke Refined Petroleum and Nu-
clear Fuel (CPN)), along with six others, (Services (SER), Transport (TRN), Construc-
tion (CON), Manufacturing (MAN), Food, Beverages and Tobacco (FOB), and Primary
Goods (PRI)). However, in the interest of clarity, we aggregate the results of all EU mem-
ber states apart of Germany to a new region ‘Rest of EU’ (REU) and limit ourselves
to the regions GER, REU and ROW when reporting the results of the simulations. A
detailed overview of the regions and sectors covered in our analysis is given the Appendix
(Tables D.2 and D.1).
Regarding the basic economic structure, the model builds on data from the World
Input-Output Database (WIOD) (Timmer et al., 2012; Dietzenbacher et al., 2013) and is
calibrated to the year 2009.3 The required Armington elasticities are taken from GTAP7
(Badri and Walmsley, 2008; Hertel et al., 2007, 2008) and are mapped to the sectors
we consider prior to the implementation into the model. For substitution elasticities
2We are aware that modelling consumption on the basis of a Leontief function is not the only pos-
sible option and implies that representative agents cannot substitute between different commodities.
Although this approach has recently been endorsed by Herrendorf et al. (2013), we nevertheless present
the implications for household energy consumption and the rebound effect for different assumptions re-
garding the substitutability of consumption goods in Tables A.4 and A. 5 in the Appendix and discuss
them in Section 6.5 below. However, we maintain the Leontief specification as a conservative assumption
in the main simulation results.
3The WIOD database is available at http://www.wiod.org. We use data downloaded on the 17th of
April 2013.
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determining the flexibility of production with regard to inputs, we turn to estimates
from Koesler and Schymura (2015).4
6.4 Scenario design for CGE analysis
6.4.1 Simulation strategy
We follow the standard approach adopted in CGE studies of economy-wide rebound by
examining the effects of a positive exogenous energy efficiency shock first in all production
sectors then limit it to a single production sector.5 This involves applying a single shock
in the form a step increase in energy-augmenting technological progress to one or more
sectors of a case study economy within a global modelling framework, and contrasting
the resulting new equilibrium to the benchmark situation (without efficiency changes).
This approach thus implements a ceteris paribus analysis and allows us to attribute all
changes to the efficiency shock.
The energy efficiency shock is applied to the second nest of the production function
of sectors which has the form:
CESKLEMKLE(i,r) =
ηKLEKL (CESKLEKL(i,r))ρKLE(i,r) + γEnergy(i,r) ηKLEE(i,r)
min
eg
(
A(eg,r)
ηE(eg,r)
)ρKLE
(i,r)

1
ρKLE
(i,r)
,
(6.7)
where, η are input shares, ρ are substitution parameters and γEnergy indicates the level
of energy efficiency which is normalised to be one in the benchmark.
In this paper we consider four scenarios. All involve an illustrative exogenous per-
manent increase in the (technical) energy efficiency of 10%.6 The first scenario is char-
acterised by an improvement in energy efficiency at all eight German production sectors(
γEnergy(i,GER) = 1.1
)
in Equation 6.7. In this initial simulation national supplies of capi-
tal and labour are fixed to the benchmark level but mobile across sectors. Applying a
general efficiency shock to the German economy has significant potential to affect trade
4Note, Koesler and Schymura (2015) do not provide substitution elasticities between capital and
labour for the Electricity and Gas sector (E). We assume that this elasticity is equal to the correspond-
ing elasticity in the manufacturing sector (0.234). They also do not provide an adequate substitution
elasticity between value-added and energy for the Coke Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel (CPN)
sector, here we assume that this elasticity is equal to the corresponding elasticity for the chemical and
chemical products sector (0.717).
5In future work we aim to consider more sophisticated ways of simulating efficiency improvements
(e.g. as proposed by Fisher-Vanden and Ho (2010), in modelling a link with R&D activity). Here we
confine our attention to a simple exogenous step change, and compare to an unchanging baseline given
by the base year dataset, in order to isolate the rebound pressures and spillover channels being studied.
6On average the energy efficiency of the German industry has increased by about 1.6% per annum
(BMWi, 2013). In the process of our analysis, we also considered efficiency improvements of 5%, 20%
and 30%. But as the magnitude of the shock only affects the scale of the different effects and does not
change the underlying basic effects, we focus in here on reporting our findings for a medium term (ca. 5
years), mapping to an energy efficiency improvement of 10%.
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between regions. This scenario is therefore well-suited to study the international spillover
channels identified in Section 6.2.1. Because a flexible supply of factors can for itself
affect rebound and trade impacts (c.f. Hanley et al., 2009; Turner and Hanley, 2010), we
begin by assuming fixed capital and labour supply. Then in the second simulation we
examine the impact of even a partial relaxation of the factor supply constraint in two
simple ways. First, we partially relax the labour supply using the simple treatment ex-
plained in Section 6.3, where existing households respond to changing returns on labour
by substituting between labour and leisure. Second, as also noted in Section 6.3, we
permit excess capacity in capital supply that is released in response to increases in the
return to (price of) capital. The results of these first two simulations (Scenarios 1 and
2) are discussed in Section 6.5.
However, in practice efficiency improvements are likely to be targeted at specific
rather than all sectors. Moreover, in considering a universal efficiency improvement, im-
portant sectoral and inter-sectoral effects, such as changes in relative competitiveness,
may be masked. Therefore, in the third and fourth simulations we repeat the process
above with the same model assumptions as the first and second simulations (respec-
tively) but limit the implementation of the 10% energy efficiency improvement to the
German manufacturing (MAN) sector
(
γEnergy(MAN,GER) = 1.1
)
. The results of the latter
two simulations (Scenarios 3 and 4) are discussed in Section 6.6.
6.4.2 The case study of Germany (within the EU and global economies)
Efficiency improvements and the way they diffuse throughout the economy depend cru-
cially on the structure of the economies and in our context in particular their trade
structure is of key importance. An overview of some stylised facts about the German
economy and the German manufacturing sector are given in in the Appendix (Table
D.3). The respective figures relate to our aggregation scheme also illustrated in in the
Appendix (Tables D.2 and D.1).
In terms of the sector-specific focus on the simulations reported in Section 6.6, note
that, with a share of 26.73% of total production, MAN is one of Germany’s main sectors.
It accounts for 28.58% of energy use in German production and 16.57% of Germany’s
total energy consumption (see Table 1 below). Own-sector purchases dominate the
intermediate input demand of MAN, with the second most important being SER inputs.
However, all inputs may be sourced domestically or imported and non-domestic inputs
in German MAN are mainly sourced from the MAN and SER sectors in REU and ROW.
In terms of exports, the main customers of German MAN products are the intermediate
demand agents MAN and SER in REU and ROW.
In terms of reporting the various general equilibrium rebound effects explained in
Section 6.2.2, the energy use shares reported in Table 6.1 below inform the corresponding
parameters in the denominator of the rebound equations.
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Table 6.1: Energy shares for German rebound calculations - Source: Authors’ calcula-
tions based on WIOD
German Manufacturing German Production German Economy
Share of Energy Use in Ger-
man Production (α)
28.58% 100% NA
Share of Energy Use in Ger-
man Economy (β)
16.57% 57.99% 100%
Share of Energy Use in EU (ψ) 3.09% 10.81% 18.65%
Share of Energy Use World-
wide (χ)
0.84% 2.95% 5.09%
Table 6.2: Change in key macroeconomic indicators - Scenario 1: 10% increase in energy
efficiency in all German sectors fixed national labour and capital supply
Germany REU ROW
GDP (Expenditure Approach) 0.5159% -0.0050% -0.0024%
Exports -0.0873% -0.0168% -0.0021%
Imports -0.1503% -0.0108% -0.0001%
Household consumption 0.4948% 0.0005% -0.0003%
CPI 0.2079% 0.0048% 0.0000%
Price of capital 0.5998% -0.0069% -0.0009%
Price of labour 0.7173% 0.0094% 0.0001%
Price of energy (aggregate) -12698% -0.0082% -0.0006%
Household energy use 0.4948% 0.0005% -0.0003%
Industrial energy use -5.3403% -0.0600% -0.0036%
Total domestic energy use -2.8892% -0.0386% -0.0028%
6.5 Impacts of a 10% increase in energy-augmenting tech-
nological progress targeted at all German production
sectors (Scenarios 1 and 2)
6.5.1 Macro-level results (Scenario 1 - fixed regional labour and capital
supply)
In the first of our four scenarios, we study the effects of simulating a 10% energy efficiency
improvement in all German sectors
(
γEnergy(i,GER) = 1.1
)
. We begin with a situation where
total labour and capital supply is assumed fixed within all regions/nations but mobile
across sectors. Table 6.2 provides an overview of the main macro-level effects of the
efficiency improvement.
The comprehensive efficiency improvement can be interpreted as a general produc-
tivity increase in the German economy, putting downward pressure on output prices and
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Figure 6.2: Changes in sectoral prices, output and energy use in Germany - Scenario 1
upward pressure on export demand. However, two factors introduce opposing pressures
in this scenario. First, constrained factor supply at the national level dampens growth
and, as Table 6.2 shows, increases the price of capital (+0.60%) and labour (+0.72%).
This is sufficient to cause a net increase in price in the SER and CON sectors (which are
less energy-intensive). Second, the energy efficiency improvement causes a net reduction
in demand for energy, and the price of energy falls (-1.23%) along with output in the
two domestic energy supply sectors (E and CPN – see Figure 6.2).
As the German non-energy supply sectors generally become more competitive and
expand their production (this is most limited in the case of MAN, which is not partic-
ularly energy-intensive and thus does not benefit as much in terms of reduced costs of
production as efficiency improves), there is a net increase in German GDP of 0.52%.
However, this is largely as a result of increased domestic demand: despite an increase in
the consumer price index, the higher return on capital and labour facilitates an increase
in household consumption (+0.49%). While exports rise in the non-energy supply sec-
tors, reduced export demand for the output of the German energy supply sectors causes
a net reduction in German exports of -0.09% (though this is offset by a reduction in total
import demand of 0.15% as German production generally becomes more competitive so
that Germany’s trade surplus increases by 0.89% ). However, this reduction in export
demand to the German energy supply sectors is not due to a negative competitiveness
effect (the price of output falls in German E and CPN – Figure 6.2). Rather, this is
due to contraction in the global energy supply chain resulting from reduced energy de-
mand in all German production sectors (see discussion of REU and ROW results below).
Moreover, taken with the net reduction in total energy use across all production sectors
(given the general increase in productive energy efficiency), this is sufficient to elicit the
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Table 6.3: General equilibrium rebound effects - Scenario 1: 10% increase in energy
efficiency in all German sectors fixed national labour and capital supply
Own-country Own-country
production Rp total Rd EU Rg World Rg
Rebound [%] 46.60 50.18 47.28 46.58
Change [percentage points] 3.58 -2.90 -0.70
first key result concerning economy-wide rebound as the borders of the economy are
expanded. Table 6.3 shows that the proportionate rebound effect contracts as we move
from German to REU to ROW, which are calculated twice, first for REU, then for ROW
(with REU treated as domestic, i.e. within the REU economy).
6.5.2 Energy use (Scenario 1 - fixed regional labour and capital supply)
Let us consider the impacts on energy use in more detail. Table 6.2 shows that the
reduction in productive energy use as a direct result of increased in energy efficiency
across all sectors causes a drop in the overall price of energy in Germany (this all spills
over to negatively impact output prices in the REU and ROW energy supply sectors –
see below). This decrease in the market price of physical energy exacerbates the (direct)
positive rebound pressure (from the reduced cost of energy services extracted per physical
unit on energy). At the economy-wide level, positive rebound on the production-side
of the German economy is triggered by two distinct effects. First, as energy becomes
cheaper, firms opt for additional energy inputs and substitute energy for relatively more
expensive inputs in particular capital and labour. Second, the general expansion of
production and final demand increases the demand for all types of inputs, including
energy (the General Demand Channels identified in Section 6.2.1). However, the strength
and impact of these effects varies across sectors based on production technology and the
strength of the positive competitiveness effect. The most marked different is observed
in the domestic energy supply sectors, E and CPN, where the negative output effect
dominates. As a result, the positive rebound pressure in German productive energy use
is partly offset by the reduction in energy use in the contracted energy supply sectors (the
Energy Market Channel). The net impact is a reduction in total energy use in German
production of -5.34%, which generates the general equilibrium ‘own-country production’
rebound effect of 46.6% in Table 3 (calculated from Equation (6.2), where α = 1 given
that the efficiency improvement affects all German sectors, and our results show that
element
δEop
γEi
in the decomposition through Equations (6.4) and (6.4) is negative).
However, while productive energy use falls, Table 6.2 shows that energy use in the
German household sector increases in line with the general expansion of consumption
(note that this is proportionate due to the Leontief assumption between consumption
of energy and non-energy in the utility function – energy use may be expected to rise
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more if substitution were possible given the reduced price of energy).7 Thus, total
economy-wide general equilibrium rebound effect rises as household energy uses rises
where element δEcγEi is positive). This increase is from 46.6% (own-country production)
to 50.2% (full own-country economy-wide rebound) in the central case reported in the
second column of Table 3. This equates to a decrease in total German energy use of
just -2.89%. The net impact on the aggregate price of energy in German as a result of
reduced total demand is the drop of -1.27% reported above.
6.5.3 International spillover effects (Scenario 1 - fixed regional labour
and capital supply)
The economy-wide efficiency shock also has spillover effects in REU and ROW (with
results reported at aggregate level in Figures 6.3 and 6.4, but with EU members states
modelled separately in generating the results). The key result in terms of the general
equilibrium calculation of economy-wide rebound is the negative impact through the
Energy Market Channel and has already been mentioned in the context of the impact
on energy use in domestic German production. This reflects what Turner (2009b) refers
to as negative multiplier effects in energy supply, and which, triggered by the general
increase in German productive energy efficiency, equates to an intermediate demand
contraction in both domestic and external energy supply chain activity. Accordingly,
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show contractions in output and energy use (despite a small decrease
in price) in the REU and ROW energy supply sectors (E and CPN). This exacerbates
the negative rebound pressure accompanying the contraction in German energy supply
and exports and the economy-wide rebound reported in Table 3 falls from 50.18% to
47.28% in moving from a German to a European level, and reduces further to 46.58%
when taking a global perspective of the economy. However, the drop in rebound as
we expand the boundaries of the economy from German to EU to world levels is also
partly explained by a wider contraction in production activity in the latter two regions
resulting from reduced competitiveness relative to the more efficient German sectors,
with crowding out worsened by upward pressure on prices due to fixed factor supply.
Thus, the Competitiveness Channel also plays an important role here.
In terms of the wider impacts in REU and ROW, Table 6.2 shows that there is
a slight contraction in GDP in both regions, and that this is greater in REU where
7Indeed the summary results of the sensitivity analysis reported in Table D.4 in the Appendix show
that the economy-wide rebound effect grows at all levels as we increase substitutability from zero (in
the central Leontief case) up to one (Cobb-Douglas specification). Moreover, the change in moving from
the own-country production to total own-country rebound becomes larger (more positive), while the
contraction in economy-wide rebound as we expand the boundaries of the economy from Germany to
EU and then to the world economy becomes smaller (less negative). Table D.5 in the Appendix shows
that the increase in rebound effects with increased substitutability is much smaller when the magnitude
of the efficiency improvement is reduced (limited to the German manufacturing) in the results reported in
Section 6.6 below. We proceed in our discussion of results based on the somewhat conservative Leontief
assumption but note that the specification of the household energy use decision is worthy of future
investigation.
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trade linkages with Germany are stronger. What happens at the sectoral level in REU
and ROW depends on the relative importance of positive demand effects as the Ger-
man economy expands (both production activity and household final consumption) and
negative competitiveness effects where German prices fall. Moreover, this is set in the
context of fixed labour and capital supplies within each country/region. Table 6.2 shows
that the supply constraint causes a rise in the price of labour due to the demand effect
(which is sufficient to facilitate an expansion in household consumption in REU) but the
price/return on capital falls due to the negative relative competitiveness effect combined
with reduced energy supply activity. While some REU and ROW sectors do receive a net
boost, particularly MAN (due to the weakness of the positive competitiveness effect in
the German sector, multiplier effects from the overall expansion of German production
and the strength of the income effect as German household consumption rises). Overall,
however, Table 2 shows that there is a net crowding out of REU and ROW GDP as a
result of the general boost to German producers’ energy efficiency in the presence of the
supply constraint on labour and capital. This is accompanied by a more than propor-
tionate decrease in productive energy use in both regions due to the negative multiplier
effect in the relatively energy-intensive energy supply sectors (though this effect is much
more significant in REU, where energy supply linkages with Germany are stronger) are
a key element underlying the contracting economy-wide rebound results in Table 6.3.
6.5.4 Partial relaxation of labour and capital supply constraints (Sce-
nario 2)
In Scenario 2 the simulation above is repeated but with some stylised relaxation of
factor supply constraints. While we do not model investment and migration processes
as in other economy-wide rebound studies such as Hanley et al. (2009), as explained
in Section 6.3 we do allow the total labour and capital supplies in each nation/region
to adjust according to the currently prevailing capital and labour prices (i.e. assuming
some excess capacity in capital and labour that may now be accessed).
The key differences in results from making this one change are apparent in Table 6.4.
First, there is a markedly larger increase in German GDP as a result of the general energy
efficiency improvement in German production (+0.76% relative to +0.52% in Scenario 1
as reported in Table 6.2 above). There is also a lesser degree of crowding out of activity
as reflected by GDP in REU and ROW (though the magnitudes remain small). Thus,
positive pressure increases and negative pressures from increased factor supply prices
decrease within the General Demand Channels. With only partial relaxation of supply
constraints, Table 4 shows that the prices of labour and capital still rise in Germany
(but to a lesser extent than under Scenario 1). However, in REU and ROW there are
smaller decreases in the price of capital and larger increases in the price of labour. This
is due to the fact that, with a stronger German expansion, there is a greater indirect
demand shock in REU and ROW, but this still takes place in the presence of some
constraints on factor supply. While we do not report the equivalents of Figures 6.2
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Table 6.4: Change in key macroeconomic indicators - Scenario 2: 10% increase in energy
efficiency in all German sectors flexible national labour and capital supply
Germany REU ROW
GDP (Expenditure Approach) 0.7605% -0.0022% -0.0021%
Exports 0.1361% -0.0145% -0.0024%
Imports 0.0755% -0.0071% 0.0000%
Household consumption 0.7427% 0.0046% 0.0003%
CPI 0.1717% 0.0037% 0.0000%
Price of capital 0.5266% -0.0007% -0.0002%
Price of labour 0.6835% 0.0096% 0.0005%
Price of energy (aggregate) -1.3110% -0.0064% -0.0004%
Household energy use 0.7427% 0.0049% 0.0003%
Industrial energy use -5.1201% -0.0574% -0.0039%
Total domestic energy use -2.6574% -0.0353% -0.0028%
Table 6.5: General equilibrium rebound effects - Scenario 2: 10% increase in energy
efficiency in all German sectors flexible national labour and capital supply
Own-country Own-country
production Rp total Rd EU Rg World Rg
Rebound [%] 47.55 51.81 48.92 48.20
Change [percentage points] 4.26 -2.89 -0.72
to 6.4 for Scenario 2 here, we can report that the pattern of sectoral level changes
in prices, output and energy use are similar; however, positive competitiveness effects
from falling German output prices is larger and this now leads to the net increase in
German exports (+0.14%). The Competitiveness Channel still favours Germany but
positive income effects mean that the demand boost to REU and ROW is reflected in an
increase in total imports (+.0.08%). Thus, in contrast to Scenario 1, the (larger) boost
to Germany’s trade surplus (+1.08% relative to +0.89%) reflects an expansion rather
than a contraction in international trade activity.
However, while trade increases overall, the key result is still present in that production
in and trade between the energy supply sectors (E and CPN) in all regions is reduced as
a result of the energy efficiency improvement in German (but to a slightly lesser extent
than in Scenario 1). Thus, negative pressure from the Energy Market Channel is still
important, just to a lesser degree. At the sectoral level, the pattern of energy use changes
are similar but, again, slightly smaller (and the increase in household energy use is larger
at +0.74% relative to +0.49% in Scenario 1) so that general equilibrium rebound grows
at all levels in Table 6.5. Moreover, the upward pressure on energy use is exacerbated
by a slightly larger drop in the aggregate price of energy.
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Table 6.6: Change in key macroeconomic indicators - Scenario 3: 10% increase in energy
efficiency in German manufacturing fixed national labour and capital supply
Germany REU ROW
GDP (Expenditure Approach) 0.1332% -0.0006% 0.0002%
Exports 0.0254% -0.0079% -0.0041%
Imports 0.0322% -0.0070% -0.0047%
Household consumption 0.1453% 0.0003% -0.0004%
CPI 0.2309% 0.0034% 0.0000%
Price of capital 0.3255% 0.0088% -0.0007%
Price of labour 0.3696% 0.0077% 0.0000%
Price of energy (aggregate) 0.2440% 0.0078% 0.0001%
Household energy use 0.1453% 0.0004% -0.0004%
Industrial energy use -1.4965% -0.0067% -0.0031%
Total domestic energy use -0.8069% -0.0041% -0.0024%
6.6 Impacts of a 10% increase in energy-augmenting tech-
nological progress targeted at a single German produc-
tion sector, Manufacturing (Scenarios 3 and 4)
6.6.1 Economic impacts
In this section we consider the impacts of a more focussed energy efficiency improvement,
targeted at just one sector of the German economy, MAN. Given the more limited nature
of the positive supply-side shock in the German economy, we would expect to observe
a smaller expansion in GDP. Tables 6.6 and 6.7 (Scenarios 3 and 4 respectively) reflect
this, with a +0.13% increase in German GDP where labour and capital supplies are
fixed at the national level (Table 6.6, Scenario 3) growing to +0.22% where a slight
relaxation of constraints is possible with supply responding to changing returns (Table
6.7, Scenario 4).
With any extent of supply constraint, there is upward pressure on capital and labour
prices. This is shown in Tables 6.6 and 6.7 (declining but still present in the latter). This
means that the competitiveness of all sectors not directly benefiting from the efficiency
enhancement is likely to be negatively affected as they compete for the factors required
to facilitate the expansion of the targeted sector (in the case of downstream producers
this acts against the positive effects from lower priced intermediate inputs from MAN).
This is apparent in Table 6.8, where the price of output rises in all German sectors
except MAN (which itself only enjoys a small reduction in price due to the relatively
low energy intensity noted in the discussion of results in Section 6.5). In general, this
causes a reduction in output in all but the targeted MAN and the SER and CON sectors
within Germany. Exports rise in MAN and CON, but the latter, along with SER, is also
boosted as a result of increased intermediate demand from the targeted MAN sector.
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Table 6.7: Change in key macroeconomic indicators - Scenario 4: 10% increase in energy
efficiency in German manufacturing flexible national labour and capital supply
Germany REU ROW
GDP (Expenditure Approach) 0.2243% 0.0005% 0.0002%
Exports 0.1082% -0.0070% -0.0042%
Imports 0.1155% -0.0055% -0.0046%
Household consumption 0.2372% 0.0018% -0.0002%
CPI 0.2140% 0.0029% 0.0000%
Price of capital 0.2593% 0.0076% -0.0003%
Price of labour 0.3716% 0.0093% 0.0001%
Price of energy (aggregate) 0.2173% 0.0073% 0.0002%
Household energy use 0.2372% 0.0023% -0.0002%
Industrial energy use -1.4079% -0.0053% -0.0033%
Total domestic energy use -0.7169% -0.0026% -0.0025%
SER in particular benefits as the main intermediate supplier to MAN. However, note
that the energy intensity of both SER and CON rises as they substitute in favour of
energy in response to the larger rise in factor input prices. The German E and CPN
sectors, which suffer as result of the contraction in energy demand in MAN activity as
efficiency increases are further impacted by the rise in domestic capital and labour costs.
On the other hand, the smaller increase in REU and ROW factor costs, means that the
REU electricity and gas (E) sector at least is able to realise a net benefit as a result of
the General Demand Channels (offsetting negative effects through the Energy Market
Channel).
Similarly, while the REU and ROW MAN sectors are crowded out as a result of
the increased competitiveness of the German sector, other external sectors enjoy net
boosts (to varying degrees) as a result of both the indirect demand shock of the boost
to German activity and through substitution away from German production in favour
of now relatively cheaper imports. Table 6.8 illustrates that there is upward pressure on
REU and ROW prices due to the (smaller) increase in factor prices in these regions also,
but the relative price shift favours the external regions. However, given that the German
efficiency improvement is targeted in the MAN sector, the corresponding external sectors
suffer in the opposite manner (and to a greater extent given the positive boost to German
MAN rather than the purely supply constrained negative effect in the other German
sectors).
In terms of the balance of trade activity, under Scenario 3 (factor supply fixed at
national level) total German exports receive a net boost of +0.25%, but this is entirely
due to the increase in MAN and CON exports given the contraction in all other sectors.
On the other hand, imports are driven by both income and substitution effects and rise
by more (+0.32%) so that there is a net negative effect on Germany’s trade surplus.
All in all, under Scenario 4 (with some relaxation of factor supply), a similar pattern
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Table 6.8: Changes in sectoral price, output and energy use - Scenario 3: 10% increase
in energy efficiency in German manufacturing fix national labour and capital supply and
Scenario 4: 10% increase in energy efficiency in German manufacturing flexible national
labour and capital supply
Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Price Output Energy use Price Output Energy use
GER
E 0.2732% -0.9322% -0.9261% 0.2406% -0.8321% -0.8261%
SER 0.3186% 0.0675% 0.0612% 0.2966% 0.1559% 0.1523%
TRN 0.2820% -0.2761% -0.1814% 0.2675% -0.1969% -0.1036%
CON 0.2368% 0.1145% 0.0690% 0.2236% 0.2042% 0.1592%
MAN -0.0833% 0.4328% -43559% -0.0945% 0.5145% -42723%
CPN 0.1741% -0.7427% -0.7105% 0.1616% -0.6582% -0.6266%
FOB 0.2479% -0.5512% -0.5910% 0.2374% -0.4675% -0.5060%
PRI 0.2628% -0.6743% -0.6907% 0.2582% -0.5965% -0.6123%
REU
E 0.0065% 0.0073% 0.0053% 0.0058% 0.0067% 0.0050%
SER 0.0044% 0.0059% 0.0044% 0.0043% 0.0073% 0.0059%
TRN 0.0059% 0.0292% 0.0296% 0.0057% 0.0300% 0.0310%
CON 0.0026% 0.0032% 0.0018% 0.0025% 0.0050% 0.0036%
MAN -0.0003% -0.0719% -0.0780% -0.0010% -0.0723% -0.0780%
CPN 0.0057% -0.0172% -0.0247% 0.0054% -0.0121% -0.0185%
FOB 0.0059% 0.0872% 0.0842% 0.0055% 0.0895% 0.0863%
PRI 0.0062% 0.0403% 0.0395% 0.0059% 0.0462% 0.0461%
ROW
E 0.0000% -0.0008% -0.0010% 0.0001% -0.0012% -0.0015%
SER 0.0002% 0.0014% 0.0019% 0.0003% 0.0016% 0.0021%
TRN 0.0005% 0.0087% 0.0085% 0.0005% 0.0088% 0.0087%
CON 0.0000% 0.0002% 0.0001% 0.0000% 0.0004% 0.0002%
MAN -0.0004% -0.0183% -0.0194% -0.0005% -0.0191% -0.0202%
CPN 0.0001% 0.0003% -0.0002% 0.0002% 0.0004% 0.0000%
FOB 0.0005% 0.0113% 0.0115% 0.0005% 0.0116% 0.0117%
PRI 0.0001% 0.0027% 0.0025% 0.0002% 0.0033% 0.0031%
108
Table 6.9: General equilibrium rebound effects - Scenario 3: 10% increase in energy
efficiency in German manufacturing fix national labour and capital supply and Scenario
4: 10% increase in energy efficiency in German manufacturing flexible national labour
and capital supply
Own- Own-country Own-country
sector Ri production Rp total Rd EU Rg World Rg
Scenario 3
Rebound [%] 56.44 47.63 51.31 50.22 48.11
Change [percentage points] -8.81 3.68 -1.09 -2.11
Scenario 4
Rebound [%] 57.28 50.73 56.74 56.05 53.88
Change [percentage points] -6.55 6.01 -0.69 -2.17
of results emerges as observed under Scenario 3. However, with a more flexible factor
supply, the growth effect is stronger and for example GDP increases by 0.22% in Scenario
4, almost twice the 0.13% rise in Scenario 3. Nonetheless, the stronger overall expansion
of German production means that, despite the additional factor supply, only the price
of capital decreases. Labour is in Scenario 4 even scarcer than in Scenario 3, indicating
that eventually capital will be the limiting factor here.
6.6.2 Energy use and rebound
In terms of energy use, the expected energy saving (with no rebound) will be smaller in
Scenarios 3 and 4 relative to Scenarios 1 and 2 as a result of the more limited energy
efficiency improvement. This is why the α parameter is introduced to the calculation
of equation (2) and an additional ‘own-sector’ general equilibrium rebound effect is in-
troduced in Table 6.9. Remember that this is not limited to the direct rebound effect;
rather it reflects the total change in MAN energy use taking into account the full ex-
pansionary process and how this acts to further boost the sector’s activity level. This
is now less energy intensive: Figure 6 shows that output rises but with a reduction in
energy use that is less than half the proportionate size the 10% efficiency, reflecting the
54.4% own-sector rebound for Scenario 3, growing to 57.3% in Scenario 4 where the
factor supply constraint is partially relaxed.
The changes in total energy use in each region in Tables 6.6 and 6.7 follow a similar
pattern to that observed for Scenarios 1 and 2 (Tables 6.2 and 6.4), though these map
to slightly larger proportionate rebound effects in Table 6.9. Note that this is despite
increased prices in the domestic and foreign energy sectors (Table 6.8), which translates
to an increase in the aggregate energy price in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. In Scenarios 1 and 2 the
aggregate price of energy was reduced in all regions. When the efficiency improvement
is limited to German MAN falling energy market prices is lost as a source of upward
pressure on rebound but replaced by the greater proportionate increase in activity levels
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that is possible even in the presence of factor supply constraints and crowding out of
German sectors where efficiency doesn’t improve.
In terms of the qualitative pattern of increases and decreases in moving from own-
country production to total rebound, and then to EU and global levels, while the results
in Table 6.9 (Scenarios 3 and 4) follow the same pattern as what is observed in Tables
6.3 and 6.5 (Scenarios 1 and 2), the underlying composition of effects is different. First,
given that the energy efficiency improvement in Scenarios 3 and 4 is not targeted at all
German production sectors, a new result is introduced in the first column of Table 6.9.
The reduction in the magnitude of the economy-wide rebound effect in moving from the
own-sector (MAN) effect to own-country production results in Table 6.9 is explained
by the reduction in activity in most other German production sectors. Part of this
is due to crowding out of other non-energy supply sectors (which haven’t received the
efficiency boost). However, negative multiplier effects in energy supply triggered by the
reduction in MAN demand for energy as its efficiency improves also make an important
contribution, just as they did in Scenarios 1 and 2 (where crowding out also occurred,
but all sectors benefited from the efficiency improvement).
Second, as in Scenarios 1 and 2, rebound increases when the change (increase)
in household energy use is incorporated to move to the total German (own-country)
economy-wide rebound. Note that this element increases by proportionately more in
Scenarios 3 and 4 relative to Scenarios 1 and 2 respectively. This is because, while the
absolute magnitude of the increase in household consumption and energy use is greater
in Scenarios 1 and 2, in relative terms (given the smaller shock) households receive a
bigger income boost with proportionately larger increases in capital and labour returns
in Scenarios 3 and 4.
Finally, as we expand the geographical focus first from German to EU level, there
is a smaller contraction in the size of the rebound effect relative to Scenarios 1 and 2.
This is explained by the greater boost to REU production under Scenarios 3 and 4,
where only the targeted German MAN benefits from positive competitiveness effects.
Here the negative multiplier effects in energy supply triggered by the energy efficiency
improvement are only sufficient to bring about a decrease in the REU CPN (coke, refined
petroleum and nuclear fuel) sector. The sector E (electricity and gas sector), on the other
hand, receives a net boost as a result of the expansion in German MAN, household and
other REU activity. As we further expand the geographical focus from EU to world
economy level the impact on the energy supply sectors is negligible. Given the boost to
all non-MAN, non-energy supply sectors in REU and ROW, the contraction in economy-
wide rebound as we expand spatial focus is almost entirely attributable to the crowding
out of the external MAN sectors.
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6.7 Conclusions and directions for future research
This paper extends the analyses of ‘economy-wide’ rebound from the national focus
of previous studies and investigates whether international spillover effects from trade
in goods and services have the potential to change the overall (global) rebound of local
energy efficiency improvements. On that account, we propose a measure of economy-wide
rebound that is appropriate for use if the boundaries of ‘the economy’ in question are
expanded beyond the borders of the national economy where an efficiency improvement
takes place (in one or all sectors). Whether rebound rises or falls as the boundaries are
extended depends on whether there is a net increase or decrease in energy use in the
area of activity being introduced. While demand-side factors may be expected to cause
incremental increases in the size of the proportionate rebound measure as the boundaries
are expanded (i.e. considering spatial boundaries in the same additive way as implicitly
proposed in the wider literature by, for example, Sorrell (2009)), our findings concur
with those of Turner (2009b) and Lecca et al. (2014) in demonstrating that there are
downward pressures on economy-wide rebound once price and supply considerations are
introduced to the analysis. In the course of our analysis, we share Turner’s (2009) focus
on increased efficiency in productive energy use through consideration of how positive
and negative rebound pressures interact when international spillover effects are taken
into account in considering economy-wide rebound at a supra-national level. However,
Lecca et al. (2014) demonstrate that similar negative pressures impact the economy-wide
response to increased efficiency in household energy use (though the nature of positive
rebound pressures is somewhat different).
We identify and study three broad channels through which international spillover of
local efficiency improvements regarding sectoral energy use can occur. First, we consider
General Demand Channels and how these are restricted by constraints on factor supply.
Positive demand effects affecting energy use in non-energy production and household
consumption are present in all of the simulation results. However, the strength of these
depends particularly on the strength of effects through the second channel identified.
This is referred to as the Competitiveness Channel and the nature and magnitude of im-
pacts depends on changes in the price of output in domestic sectors (which may or may
not be the target of efficiency improvements) relative to those in corresponding external
sectors. The strength of competitiveness effects again depend generally on factor supply
conditions but their nature – who benefits (directly or indirectly) – depends very much
on the case under study. Here we found that a general efficiency improvement across
all German production sectors means that (despite opposing pressure from increased
factor prices) any positive demand boost to external production will be offset from a
relative reduction in foreign competitiveness. On, the other hand, where only one Ger-
man production sector (manufacturing) benefited from an efficiency improvement, both
demand and competitiveness effects/channels were enjoyed by non-competing sectors in
the wider EU and global economies. Nonetheless, in one of the two cases simulated here,
with only the German manufacturing sector experiencing an efficiency improvement, the
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positive competitiveness effect in the targeted German sector was strong enough (even
given its relatively low energy efficiency) to be the main determinant of the observed
contraction in economy-wide rebound in moving first from German to EU-wide then the
global level.
Within the third spillover channel identified, the Energy Market Channel, contrac-
tions in both domestic and external energy supply chain resulting from the initial demand
reduction as efficiency improves dominate and were shown to have the strongest negating
impact on rebound (at all spatial levels) the larger the efficiency improvement. That
is, where the efficiency improvement is applied to all German sectors and there is the
strongest initial contraction in demand. When we limit the efficiency improvement to
German manufacturing, which has a relatively low energy-intensity to begin with, pos-
itive demand effects in energy supply from boosted activity in household consumption
in all regions, and in REU and ROW production sectors, lessens the negating impact of
the Energy Market Channel on rebound at all levels.
In terms of how the research presented here should be developed in the future, supply
side issues would seem to be the main priority. First, given the importance of what is
assumed about factor supply in the simulations reported here, a key area for developing
this strand of research will be to introduce more sophisticated treatment of labour and
capital markets. For example, permitting factor mobility between regions would permit
consideration of additional potential spillover channels. Moreover, introducing treat-
ment of dynamic adjustment of factor supply would allow us to consider the evolution
of economy-wide rebound over time. Second, given the importance of energy supply re-
sponses in the results reported here, a priority must be to develop a more sophisticated
treatment of energy supply. This should include (but not be limited to) consideration of
issues such as just how capacity decision are made (which adds emphasis to the need for
consideration of dynamic adjustment), the impact of increasing exploitation of renew-
able energy sources and technologies, and how energy prices are determined in local and
international markets. Finally, application of the type of framework developed here (and
further developed through the aforementioned future research priorities) wold be invalu-
able in considering the domestic and international spillover effects of domestic policies
to increase efficiency in household energy use, and the implications in terms of interde-
pendence of energy efficiency policy implementation (for example, under EU 20-20-20)
in one nation on energy use in others.
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Chapter 7
Sailing into a dilemma: An
economic and legal analysis of an
EU trading scheme for maritime
emissions
Abstract
On the basis of a joint economic and legal analysis, we evaluate the effects of a regional
(European) emission trading scheme aiming at reducing emissions of international ship-
ping. The focus lies on the question which share of emissions from maritime transport
activities to and from the EU can and should be included in such a system. Our findings
suggest that the attempt to implement an EU maritime ETS runs into a dilemma. It
is not possible to design a system that achieves emission reductions in a cost-efficient
manner and is compatible with international law.
This chapter is based on the following paper:
Hermeling, Claudia, Jan Henrik Klement, Simon Koesler, Jonathan Ko¨hler and Dorothee
Klement (2014), Sailing Into a Dilemma - An Economic and Legal Analysis of an EU
Trading Scheme for Maritime Emissions, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 14-021, Mannheim,
Germany.
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7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 Background
Transport is a key contributor to global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (ITF, 2010).
Despite the need for a comprehensive approach to fight global warming, so far, the
global community has failed to agree on global mechanisms to reduce GHG emissions
resulting from transport. At date, emissions from air and water transport are gen-
erally excluded from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCC). According to Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCC, states shall
pursue the limitation or reduction of emissions of GHG from aviation and marine bunker
fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the
International Maritime Organization (IMO). The duty of the contracting states to co-
operate within IMO and ICAO refers to the potentially most effective way forward for
international climate politics. However, a prohibition of unilateral measures such as the
implementation of a regional regulation by the EU cannot be derived from the Kyoto
Protocol.
Given this situation, the EU has decided to consider unilateral action. In fact, since
2012, air transport emissions are regulated in the EU by means of an inclusion of avia-
tion activities in the existing European emission trading scheme (EUETS) (EU (2009):
EU Directive 2009/29/EC). In addition, the EU has made clear that it is willing to
regulate maritime emission as well if IMO does not develop a mechanism targeting ship-
ping emissions in the near future (EU (2002): EU Decision 1600/2002/EC). Indeed,
in summer 2013 the European Commission submitted a Proposal for a Regulation on
the monitoring, reporting and verification of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime
transport and (EU (2013): EU Proposal 2013/0224 (COD), hereinafter referred to as
MRV-Proposal). According to the Commission “a robust system for monitoring, re-
porting and verification (MRV) of greenhouse gas emissions from maritime transport
is a prerequisite for any market-based measure or efficiency standard, whether applied
at EU level or globally” ((European Commission Proposal 2013/0224, p. 3).Thus, the
provided regulation could be extended in the future and evolve into a mechanism aiming
at reducing maritime emissions (cf. Engel, 2013). In 2014, the European Parliament has
approved the proposal with amendments after first reading. The proceedings have not
yet been concluded.
With respect to aviation in 2013 the EU has backed away from applying its scheme
for aviation fully to flights to and from the EU to third party countries (EU (2012b):
EU Memo MEMO/12/854; EU (2012c): EU Proposal 2012/328 (COD)) reacting to the
difficult economic situation, the criticisms made by foreign states as the United States
of America, China, India and Russia as well as the progress made at ICAO regarding
a global mechanism. Instead, the EU now proposes amending the EUETS so that only
the part of a flight that takes place in European airspace is covered by the EUETS (EU
(2013): EU Proposal 2013/0344 (COD)). It is hence conceivable that the EU may choose
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a corresponding approach also for maritime emissions and may consider regulating only
emissions generated by ships in EU waters in the future.
In this paper we evaluate the effects of a potential regional emission trading scheme
(ETS) aiming at reducing emissions of international shipping. Thereby we focus specif-
ically on a possible future scheme for maritime emissions by the EU and evaluate the
implications of regulating different parts of voyages to and from EU ports. Building on
a joint economic and legal analysis, we show that a comprehensive regional EU-scheme
that regulates not only shipping emissions in the territorial waters of EU Member States
but also in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and on the High Sea could, in fact,
contribute to a reduction of emissions and bring about an environmental benefit in an
efficient manner. However, a trading scheme with such a wide field of application would
presumably not comply with international law.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. First, we provide a brief overview
of the literature discussing market-based mechanisms to reduce emissions from interna-
tional shipping. Then we outline and briefly review the general setup of a possible
European maritime emission trading scheme (EUMETS) seeking to reduce maritime
emissions. The described ETS will serve as a basis for the subsequent analysis. Next
and on the basis of different possible definitions of the scope, we study the environmental
effectiveness, the economic rational and the legal feasibility of the scheme and discuss
associated issues in detail. Subsequently, we contrast our findings from the different
dimensions and elaborate the implications of our findings regarding the design of a re-
gional scheme for maritime emissions. Finally, we conclude with a brief summary of our
findings and relate them to the current developments at the EU and IMO level.
7.1.2 Current state of research
While there exists a rather broad literature with regard to regulating emissions from
aviation using a regional emission trading scheme (e.g. Klement, 2007; Pache, 2008;
Anger and Ko¨hler, 2010; Athen, 2012), reducing maritime emissions by means of a
market-based mechanism (MBM) has so far not attracted so much attention. However,
there is a small set of economic and legal reports dealing with some form of European
action to regulate shipping GHG emissions.
On the field of economic research, Miola et al. (2011) provide an overview of the
instruments that are being discussed at IMO. Above all, they reason that due to its
diversity and complexity, the maritime industry does not allow for a simple and clear-
cut GHG reduction policy. As a result policy makers will have to dare to balance binding
long-term targets with a high degree of flexibility with regard to the implementation of
the measure.
In a technical support paper commissioned by the EU Commission, a consortium
around CE Delft discusses various policy options to reduce CO2 emissions from maritime
transport (Faber et al., 2009). Overall, they conclude that an ETS or a tax for maritime
emissions should be the instrument of choice when targeting a reduction of CO2 emissions
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of maritime transport. Reports realised at the MEDDE (2012) and by Franc and Sutto
(2014) investigate on the basis of a modelling exercise a cap-and-trade scheme in the
maritime sector focusing on the effects of shipping lines and ports. Their findings suggest
that an ETS restricted to Europe will lead to distortions and thus argue in favour of
a global scheme. In this context, they point in particular to the risk of an undesired
modal shift for inter-european transport services.
Koesler et al. (2012) in turn take the perspective of ship operators and evaluate the
effects of an ETS for maritime emissions on the organisation and operations of shipping
companies. According to their analysis which builds on a series of interviews among
ship operators, it is unlikely that a maritime ETS will add significant overhead costs to
shipping operations because most of the required monitoring and reporting processes and
similar trading activities are already in place due to business reasons or other regulations.
The literature features also some analysis of legal aspects. Ko¨nig and Morgenstern
(2009) focus on whether a regional EU trading scheme for maritime transport would
comply with international law and give a negative answer, while Lassen (2010) reaches
the opposite conclusion. Kremlis (2010) deals with different design options for the im-
plementation of a trading scheme from a legal perspective. Ringbom (2011) addresses
various international law questions linked to a potential future EU emission trading
scheme for shipping. According to him, international law does “not necessarily” prevent
the establishment of a trading scheme that covers emissions that have occurred beyond
the territorial waters of the member states or even in other states’ maritime zones but
places “a number of important limitations on its design”. Engel (2013) gives a short
legal analysis of the EU Commission’s MRV-proposal mentioned above. He concludes
that the Commission has not yet decided whether to use market based instruments to
combat maritime greenhouse gas emissions. However, he believes that the inclusion of
an EUMETS into the existing European trading scheme would be a “likely scenario”.
A detailed interdisciplinary research on environmental, economic and legal aspects
of the integration of Marine Transport into the European Emissions Trading System
is carried out by Bra¨uerle et al. (2010) in a study on behalf of the German Federal
Environment Agency. This work tackles a similar research question as our paper. It also
investigates a possible integration of maritime transport into the EUETS and studies
the issue taking a legal and an economic perspective. However, the authors build their
analysis on a different concept with regard to which emissions are covered in the scheme
and explore considering a ship’s historic emissions over a certain period as a baseline,
regulating the emissions of a ship during its last voyage and an approach regulating not
the ship’s emissions but rather the maritime transport emissions related to the carried
cargo. With regard to a potential environmental benefit, they argue that regulating
historic emissions is more effective than the other two options. The legal analysis takes
the position that in principle the implementation of an EUMETS does not infringe
international law even if it covers emissions arising from vessels outside the territorial seas
of EU Member States. Thus, the authors conclude that regulating maritime emissions
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by including shipping transport into the EUETS is environmentally effective, possible
from a legal point of view and it will not entail significant negative effects. This holds
true in particular if the reach of the scheme is extended beyond only European shipping
activities. But this approach seems to be prone to some legal challenges such as the
definition of adequate penalties in case of noncompliance, the discrimination of specific
types of ships or the implementation of the scheme without affecting the
”
Construction,
Design, Equipment and Manning Standards“ of UNCLOS. Nevertheless, they conclude
that regulating maritime emissions by including shipping transport into the EUETS
is environmentally effective, possible from a legal point of view and it will not entail
significant negative effects. This holds true in particular if the reach of the scheme is
extended beyond only European shipping activities.
7.1.3 Outline of a EU maritime emission trading scheme
There are many possible options of how a future European maritime emission trading
scheme could be designed. We focus in our analysis on the implications of different
definitions of the scope of the scheme, that is we explore the effects of regulating different
parts of shipping routes from and to EU ports. For the time being, we take all other
elements of the system as given.1 In Table 7.1 we outline the basic elements of the scheme
which we use as a framework for our analysis if not explicitly stated otherwise. Thereby
we build on the IMO proposal for a global emission trading scheme by Norway (IMO
(2010): IMO Submission MEPC 60/4/22) and the EU regulation for emissions from
aviation (EU (2009): EU Directive 2009/29/EC; EU (2013): EU Proposal 2013/0344
(COD)).
7.1.4 Methodology of environmental and economic impact assessment
We assess and quantify the changes in emissions and economic implications of a regional
maritime ETS building on a general equilibrium analysis using a task-specific extended
version of the Basic WIOD CGE model (Koesler and Pothen, 2013). The WIOD model
is particularly suited for this analysis, as it is capable of reproducing international trade
flows on the basis of trade in intermediates. To be able to address the research question
of this paper, we developed a transport module which is integrated into the basic model.
Thereby the model is enlarged by three main elements: an explicit modelling of inter-
national transport services, a modified trading structure accounting for trade specific
transport costs, and special provisions required by a regional market based mechanism
targeting transport emissions. The respective changes are presented in the following.
Other parts of the basic WIOD CGE model remain unchanged.2
1Discussions of other design elements can be found inter alia in Faber et al. (2009) and Koesler et al.
(2012).
2For more information on the Basic WIOD CGE model, the reader is kindly referred the short
overview of the Basic WIOD CGE model in the Appendix and to the report of Koesler and Pothen
(2013).
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Table 7.1: Principle design elements of the maritime emission trading scheme under
investigation
Element Design Option
Regulated entity: All ships with more than 400GT traveling to or from EU ports
irrespective the flag they are sailing under
Geographical scope: Depends on scenario:
WR: emission on the whole route are regulated
EEZp: only emissions within the EU Economic Zone and EU
territorial waters are regulated
ETW: only emissions within EU territorial waters are regulated
Links with other ETS systems: No, allowances cannot be traded with other ETS schemes
Allocation of emission rights: Full auctioning by EU
Use of revenues: Possible revenues are included in national budgets
Reference value for emissions: Bunker fuel consumption during the voyage to or from the EU
Reduction target: 0%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 30% with respect to 2009 emission levels
The original WIOD data includes for each region three sectors associated to trans-
port services, namely air, inland and water transport. But in reality transport service
providers can be active globally and their activity need not be in relation to their home
region. As a consequence, input-output data does not allow inferring where the activ-
ity of a regional transport sector has actually taken place. For example, although one
knows that there has been some form of activity in the US water transport sector, it is
impossible to say whether this is generated by a US ship travelling from Japan to the
US or from Australia to China.
But a regional maritime market based mechanism targets emissions and thus activity
arising at certain point of the globe and does not differentiate between the origins of
the transport service provider. In contrast to a more standard application of a cap-
and-trade approach, for example the EUETS for stationary installations, such a scheme
has to cater for the fact that only a certain part of the emissions of the international
transport pool is subject to the regulation. Imagine for example an ETS regulating only
the total amount of emissions resulting from shipping freight to the EU and leaving
out emissions for instance arising from transporting freight from Australia to China.
Given the importance of specific transport flows for our research question, instead of
using the potentially misleading regional input-output data of the WIOD model all
regional transport sectors are aggregated and our model eventually includes only three –
now international – transport sectors that supply transport services for each trade flow
worldwide. The relevant trade-flow-specific transport costs are calculated on the basis
of ad-valorem costs implied by transporting commodities from one region to another
region. Thereby, the global transport sectors source their inputs (e.g. energy) and
sell their output (i.e. transport services) on world markets as all other sectors in the
economy.
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Similar to the production of standard commodities in the basic WIOD CGE model,
all transport services associated with a particular trade flow are produced on the basis of
a four-level constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function as outlined in Figure 7.1.
The sum of value-added V A(r) from all regions is joined with a Leontief aggregate of
energy A(eg,r) and related emissions EM(em) in the third nest. The value-added-energy
composite is then combined with an aggregate of non-energy commodities A(neg,r) at the
second level of the production function. Potential process emissions of transport arise
at the last production stage.
TRN(u,i,uu,mkt,trnmode)
0
EM(em) σKLEM(trnmode,INT)
A(neg,r) . . .
σKLE(trnmode,INT)
V A(r)
A(eg,r) EM(em)X
Figure 7.1: Production structure of trade-specific transport flows
In all sectors, emissions are modelled as a necessary input in production which is
required if energy or process emission related intermediates are used. The amount of
emission required to produce one unit of output is given by the emission intensity of
production provided for all sectors in WIOD. The necessary input is supplied by the
government agent and in particular in our context can be understood as an emission
allowance. Initially the supply of allowances is unlimited and emissions are therefore
costless. Only when emissions are capped, the supply is restricted according to the
reduction target and as for any other input, market forces determine a price of the
allowances, respectively the emissions. If emissions are costly, there are basically three
options of how sectors can react. First, sectors can reduce their activity and therefore
their need for inputs including emissions to reduce costs. Second, they can adjust their
input mix in such a way that fewer emissions are required. They can for example
choose to employ more capital, labour or non-energy intermediates instead of energy.
All substitution possibilities of the transport sectors are outlined in Figure 7.1. Third,
provided that demand for their output is sufficiently inelastic, they can increase their
prices to compensate for the additional costs. In this study, we only consider CO2
emissions.
Moreover, as a consequence of interpreting transport as a complement to trade flows,
the Armington (1969) aggregation of the basic model is updated so that it additionally
includes transport costs. As illustrated in Figure 7.2, the Armington composite is now
produced on the basis of a four-level CES production function. As before, the Armington
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composite is domestic production in combination with an import aggregate and the
import aggregate is a composite of all imports of a commodity composed in the second
level of the Armington production function. On the now additional third level, imports
of a commodity are combined with necessary transports cost from all transport modes
arising from moving the commodity from its origin to the importing region. The fourth
level combines the transport costs from the different transport modes (air, inland, water).
Note that transport costs are trade flow specific.
A(ntrn,u,mkt)
Y(u,ntrn)
σa(u,ntrn)
. . .
σmm(u,ntrn)
Y(uu,ntrn) σTRNmode
. . . TRN(uu,ntrn,u,mkt,trnmode)
Figure 7.2: Armington structure of trade-specific transport flows
The model is calibrated to the year 2009 using an extended WIOD input-output table
including the transport costs implied by each individual trade flow. The analysis is done
for the year 2015. To cast the economic structure of 2009 into the future, we employ esti-
mations for annual average real GDP growth rates from the OECD (2012). The basis for
computing trade-flow-specific transport costs is information on ad-valorem costs implied
by transporting commodities from one region to another region. Ad valorem transport
costs for maritime transport were calculated on the basis of the Maritime Transport
Costs (MTC) database provided by OECD (2012). Costs for air and road/inland trans-
port were approximated on the basis of average cost proportions between maritime, air
and inland transportation given in Group (2009).3 For substitution elasticities we turn
to estimates from Koesler and Schymura (2015). Armington elasticities are taken from
GTAP7 (Badri and Walmsley, 2008). We assume that air, water and inland transport
are perfect substitutes for transportation between regions. Inland transport between
regions with no land link is however not possible.
For our analysis of a regional maritime ETS installed by the EU, we consider five
regions with different distances to the EU namely “Europe” (EU), “North America”
(NAM), “Middle Distance” (MID), “Far East” (FEA) and “Rest of the World” (ROW).
3In order to ensure that the WIOD dataset remains balanced, we are obliged to adjust some of the
data provided by the MTC database. In the process we scale the ad-valorem transport costs of all inputs
to one sector / final demand agent by the same parameter such that the overall input transport costs of
the sector / final demand agent match the corresponding transport input in the WIOD dataset. Note
that this process does not distort the original input cost structure of the sector, as it does not affect
relative input costs.
120
An overview of the regions is given in Table E.1 in the Annex of this paper. With regard
to the sectoral aggregation, we distinguish between three different sectors on the basis of
their ad-valorem transportation costs: HIGH, LOW and NTR, three transport modes:
AIR, INLAND, WATER and one energy carrier ENERGY which also features high
ad-valorem transport costs. NTR covers sectors with no cross-regional international
transport needs like construction. Table E.2 in the Annex gives an overview of the
sectors. To analyse the effects of different geographical scopes of a regional maritime
emission trading scheme installed by the EU, we use information on shipping routes and
lengths given in USNGA (2001) to calculate the share of emissions which are released
within the limits of European territorial waters (ETW) and the European economic
zone plus European territorial waters (EEZp) for different routes. Thereby we assume
that for all routes at least 50 nautical miles are travelled within ETW. An overview
of the respective shares is given in Table E.4 in the Annex. The model is run for a
set of scenarios covering different scopes (Whole Route, only EEZp and only ETW)
and emission reduction targets with regard to 2009 emission levels (0% to -30%). An
overview of the scenarios studied in this paper is given in Table E.3 in the Annex. All
results are compared to a business as usual situation (BAU), that is a situation where
maritime emissions are not regulated.
7.2 Effectiveness with regard to emission reductions
The overall aim of the ETS is to reduce emissions. Given the effectiveness of the cap-
and-trade approach, the introduction of the system clearly reduces emissions within the
scope of the scheme and could upfront be considered to be environmentally successful.
But in the context of a regional scheme with only limited coverage, the more intriguing
question are if the scheme is successful in reducing global emissions and if the definition
of the scope of the system, in the sense of the share of emissions considered from a
regulated entity, affect its environmental effectiveness.
Figure 7.3 presents our simulation results with regard to changes in global trans-
port CO2 emissions in the year 2015. They suggest that a regional ETS regulating all
maritime emissions on voyages to and from the EU on global emissions is effective in
reducing emissions. Compared to a business as usual situation (BAU), global transport
emissions drop in 2015 by 0.8% when a 5% reduction target is applied and by 2.8% in
case of a 30% target. Details on results from other reduction targets are given in Table
7.3 There are no noteworthy effects on emissions of other non-transport sectors. This
was to be expected as transport generally composes only a very small share of input
costs. Global emissions from water transport reduce between 5.2% and 19% compared
to BAU. The emission change for inland transport is positive but in no case more than
1.2%. Emissions from air transport do not change much as a result of regulating shipping
emissions and even in the case of a very stringent reduction target (-30%), air transport
emissions increase only by a maximum of 0.2%. So while there is some carbon leakage
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to other transport modes in consequence of the EU scheme capping a part of shipping
emissions, the overall emission reduction is positive. There are three main reasons for
such a limited shift of transport emissions. First, of all transport modes, water trans-
port is the cheapest option for transporting most commodities and apparently even the
introduction of a regional emission regulation does not impede this comparative advan-
tage. Second, leakage to inland transport is limited to the cases where there is a land
link between regions. Third, until recently and still in our simulations, European air
transport is also included in the EUETS and thus a corresponding shift would also incur
additional emission costs.
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Figure 7.3: Global transport CO2 emissions in 2015 relative to BAU as a result of a
regional ETS regulating all maritime emissions arising on voyages to and from the EU
for different emission reduction targets [Index value of one indicates 2015 BAU level]
When determining the scope of the scheme, policy makers are often primarily con-
cerned about the potential environmental benefit, that is how many emissions can be
reduced by the scheme implied by their choice. But from an aggregated perspective,
for a given stringency (equal reduction targets), the scope of the scheme has no direct
effect on the amount of avoided emissions. This becomes clear when recalling two things.
First, although the total amount of regulated emission may vary for different scopes, for
a specific requested absolute emission reduction, the cap implied by a certain reduc-
tion target will be scaled accordingly. Thus if the regulation covers a bigger amount of
emissions but the same absolute emission reductions are demanded, the corresponding
reduction target can be set less strict and the overall cap will be bigger. Second, for
ships, almost all CO2 abatement technologies involve high fix costs or are non-variable
in their use.4 This implies that in total, abatement options are applied homogenously
4Consider for example the installation of alternative propulsion systems such as Sky Sails or the
application of special hull coatings to reduce water resistance. Since there is a strictly positive and
convex relationship between emissions and speed, except for extreme cases, also slow steaming makes
most sense when applied homogenously along the whole route.
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during the complete voyage of a ship and are not applied only when a ship enters regu-
lated waters. As a consequence emission intensities can be assumed to be constant along
the whole route.
So eventually it is the stringency of the system that determines how many emissions
are reduced and the costs of the regulation. The mere scaling of the regulated emissions,
that is what share of emissions is included, has no effect to this regard. This also becomes
clear when recalling that the total amount of emission of a regulated industry TE is:
TE =
∑
j
((
αj
ej
sj
sj − aj
)
+ (1− αj) ej
sj
sj
)
, (7.1)
where aj is the total amount of emission that are reduced by entity j as a result of the
regulation, ej is emissions irrespective of any regulation, sj is the distance travelled and
αj the share of ej that is regulated. Thereby the term in the first parenthesis of the sum
includes regulated emissions and the entities reaction in form of abated emission. The
second term includes the unregulated emissions of the entity. Both feature the constant
emission intensity
ej
sj
. Summing over all aj makes it clear that the total amount of
emissions is independent of αj and thus the total amount of emissions is not directly
influenced by the choice of the scope. Accordingly, from an environmental point of
view, when designing a regional maritime ETS, policymakers can choose whatever scope
they prefer and do not have to fear consequences with regard to the effectiveness of the
scheme.
7.3 Economic perspective
Thanks to their effectiveness in establishing financial incentives for emission abatement
in the form of an emission price and the cost-efficiency that comes along with it, market
based mechanisms are generally acknowledged by economists to be a superior approach
to deal with the externalities of CO2 emissions (e.g. Stavins, 2003). Thereby the potential
advantages of such mechanisms depend crucially on what they cover and initially hold
only within the system. Cost-efficiency in the EUETS for example is only granted among
entities regulated by the EUETS (e.g. other EU power plants) and not relative to entities
outside the EUETS (e.g. domestic heating in EU or US power plant). But while usually
this problem relates to the question which entities are incorporated, in a regional system
covering mobile entities such as ships, cost-efficiency may not always be granted even
among regulated entities and may not be achieved for certain designs of the scope of the
system. The stringency of a scheme is generally seen as the parameter determining the
costs of the regulation. The mere scaling of the emissions should have no effect. This
however neglects that the neutrality of the scope holds only if the scaling of the emissions
is homogenous across entities. In the context of regulating transport emissions this may
however not be the case. Transport services with European involvement feature a highly
varying share of regulated emissions with respect to different definitions of the scope.
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Table 7.2: Example illustrating the economic issues associated with the definition of the
scope of a maritime ETS
Distance Travelled Emission Intensity Share of Emissions in Coastal Waters
Ship 1 100 nm 1 t per 1 nm 100%
Ship 2 100 nm 1 t per 1 nm 50%
Case 1 Emission Acquired Allowance required for one Share of Allowances
Whole Route Reduction Allowances additional Ton of Emissions Costs
Ship 1 10t 90 1 50.0%
Ship 2 10t 90 1 50.0%
Total 20t 180 (=cap)
Case 2 Emission Acquired Allowance required for one Share of Allowances
Costal Waters Reduction Allowances additional Ton of Emissions Costs
Ship 1 10t 90 1 66.7%
Ship 2 5t + 5t 45 0.5 33.3%
total 20t 135 (=cap)
In such a case, emission costs of entities are not distributed solely on the basis of their
share of emissions.
Table 7.2 illustrates the issue on the basis of a simple example. There are two ships
which both travel the same distance of 100 nautical miles (nm) and feature the same
emission intensity of one tonne (t) per nautical mile and same convex abatement costs.
The only difference between the two ships is that the first cruises solely through coastal
waters while the second is 50% on the high sea and only 50% in coastal waters. Both
ships are subject to an ETS with a 10% reduction target, but depending on the scope
may not see the same amount of emissions regulated. In the first case, emissions along
the whole route are regulated. Thus in the face of the 10% reduction target both ships
implement emission reductions to reduce their emission by 10t and buy 90 allowances.
If one of the ships would choose to emit one ton more, it would be required to buy one
additional emission allowance. In the second case only emissions in coastal waters are
regulated. To comply with the regulation, the first ship again abates 10t of emissions
and buys 90 allowances. The second ship in turn finds only 50% of its route / emissions
subject to the regulation, but must also reduce its emission intensity by 10% and buys
45 allowances to comply. Because of the reasons stated before, the emission intensity is
however constant along the whole route, so Ship 2 also saves 10t (5t+ 5t) of emission in
total. In this situation Ship 1 again requires one allowance to emit an additional ton of
emission on its route. But at the same time, Ship 2 now needs only half an allowance
for the same purpose. Thus in the second case, the marginal costs for one additional
ton of emissions are not equal and cost-efficiency – the main benefit of a market based
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mechanism – is not achieved. What is more, for the same environmental benefit, Ship
1 has to carry a higher share of the burden associated with the reduction target. This
implies that a scheme regulating only a share of total emission along a route comes along
with distortions which may have a disproportional negative effect to routes featuring a
relatively high share of regulated emissions.
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Figure 7.4: Transport activities in 2015 from or to Europe relative to BAU for different
definitions of the scope in the case of a maritime ETS with a 20% reduction target [Index
value of one indicates 2015 BAU level]
This issue is also apparent in our simulation results. Figure 7.4 illustrates the devel-
opment of all transport activities in 2015 either originating from or traveling to Europe
for different definitions of the scope in the case of a 20% reduction target. Clearly, lim-
iting the scope of the scheme to a share of emissions arising along the routes of ships
has a negative effect on shipping activities and leads to a modest increase in modal
shift, in particular to inland transport. There are three main reasons why shipping is
not replaced by other transport modes to a larger extent. First, of all transport modes,
water transport is the cheapest option and even with the ETS in place it remains so for
most applications. Second, a shift to inland transport is limited to the cases where there
is a land link between regions and the infrastructure between the regions is sufficiently
good. Third, if European air transport is also regulated, activity there cannot increase
without additional emission costs. The effect of the distortions is even clearer when
studying the effect on specific routes which are illustrated for the year 2015 in Figure 7.5
for a 20% reduction target. In a setting covering all emissions of a voyage, all routes are
affected in a similar manner (-15.5% to -19.5% relative to BAU). Differences relate to
the possibilities to substitute to other transport modes. Transport between NAM and
Europe for example cannot be shifted to inland transport because there is no land link
and thus water transport is affected less. But the picture is different for other definitions
of the scope. For the reasons outlined above, short routes with a relative high share of
regulated emissions are affected more than longer routes in such a case. As they must
carry a comparatively high burden, in particular voyages linking MID and Europe suffer
from a limited scope (-63.5%).
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Figure 7.5: Water transport activities in 2015 on different routes from or to Europe
relative to BAU for different definitions of the scope in the case of a maritime ETS with
a 20% reduction target [Index value of one indicates 2015 BAU level]
Hence, limiting the scope of a maritime ETS provokes distortions and puts a higher
burden on routes featuring a high share of regulated emissions. Moreover it impedes
cost-efficiency. As a consequence, from an economic point of view, policy makers should
choose a comprehensive definition of the scope and include all emissions arising on the
whole route that is travelled by a ship.
7.4 Legal feasibility
7.4.1 Assumptions, applicable law and legal methodology
From a legal point of view, a maritime ETS is based on the obligation to surrender
allowances (“permission to emit one ton of carbon dioxide during a specified period”, cf.
EU (2003): EU Directive 2003/87/EC) equal to the total emissions of shipping activities
calculated on the basis of a ship’s fuel consumption in a past period. Under the regime
of a maritime ETS the total annual amount of allowances for navigation is capped in
order to achieve a reduction in GHG emissions. Allowances may, however, be sold and
purchased. Non-compliance with the obligation to surrender allowances would lead to
penalties and the loss of the right to carry out shipping activities within the EU.
Within a comprehensive EUMETS model, the obligation to surrender allowances
would not only apply to vessels sailing under a flag of a Member State, but also to
vessels from anywhere else. Moreover, it would include all emissions stemming from
sea voyages arriving at or departing from a port situated in the territory of an EU-
Member State regardless of their point of departure and their destination and would
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include all parts of a sea voyage and not only to the parts that lie within EU-Member
States Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) or their territorial seas. However, with respect
to the right to innocent passage (Article 17 UNCLOS) vessels just passing through the
territorial sea of an EU-Member State would not fall within the scope of the application
of a comprehensive EUMETS.
Such a legal design raises a number of questions concerning the compatibility of an
EUMETS with international law. We have focussed our legal analysis on the following
legal provisions:
 UNCLOS, as the “constitution for the oceans” (Tan, 2006, 192) with many of its
provisions merely expressing and clarifying customary international maritime law
as developed over time (ECJ, Case C-286/90 – Poulsen and Diva Navigation [1992],
ECR I-6019, para. 10; Ringbom (2011), p. 613 (629); Graf Vitzthum (2006), chap.
4 para. 106).
 In the absence of explicit provision in UNCLOS by directly applying rules of cus-
tomary international law. In any case, the special provisions of UNCLOS have to
be seen and interpreted in the light of these underlying more general rules.
 The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships, 1973
as modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL), which has been drafted and is
exercised by IMO.
 Bilateral treaties in form of so called mixed agreements concluded between both
the EU and its Member States on the one hand and a third country on the other,
in particular the Agreement on maritime transport between the European Com-
munity and its Member States and the government of the People’s Republic of
China which came into force on 1st March 2008.
 Bilateral treaties that have been concluded by Member States of the European
Union with third countries, e.g. the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty
(Freundschafts-, Handels- und Schiffahrtsvertrag) between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the United States of America, which was signed 29 October 1954
and entered into force 14 July 1956.
 World Trade Law, namely the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
The analysis is based on the principles of interpretation as recognised in jurispru-
dence. It has not covered legal limitations arising from European Union Law itself.
Needless to say a Directive establishing a scheme for the trade of emission allowances
would have to comply with the various legal provisions as set forth in the Treaty on
European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (ChFREU).
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7.4.2 Infringements of international law
The analysis of the legal provisions mentioned above cannot be presented here in detail.
For this reason, we will draw attention to the most significant outcome of our consider-
ations. We will show that the EU and its Member States do not have law-making com-
petence (prescriptive jurisdiction) for the regulation of GHG emissions resulting from
vessels sailing under Non-EU flags outside the territorial seas due to the EU lacking
jurisdiction to regulate these kinds of activities.
7.4.2.1 Division of jurisdiction
The core prerequisite of the legality of a legislative act is that the legislator has “Pre-
scriptive Jurisdiction” on this subject. The division of powers to set binding rules for
international shipping activities is basically governed by UNCLOS as interpreted in the
light of and amended by customary law. Within this legal framework jurisdiction is
distributed between three key players, namely the port state, the coastal state and the
flag state (Molenaar (1998), p. 91–95). Furthermore, jurisdiction depends on where
the regulated activity takes place. In this respect the law distinguishes the territorial
sea (Article 2 UNCLOS), the EEZ (Article 55 UNCLOS) and the high seas (Article
86 UNCLOS). For the purpose of this paper the differentiation between the EEZ and
the high seas is not of importance since in general the UNCLOS-provisions for the high
seas “apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with
this Part” (Article 58 (2) UNCLOS). Consequently, with respect to the international
jurisdiction emissions in the EEZ are to be considered emissions on the high seas. In
the following, the jurisdiction of the EU to implement an EUMETS is considered for
three different models of regulation. To be discussed first is an EUMETS designed to
cover solely emissions produced on the territorial seas of the EU-Member States (4.2.2).
The second and third models of an EUMETS impose the obligation to surrender al-
lowances for emissions irrespective of where the emissions were produced. Insofar one
has to distinguish between an EUMETS encompassing EU-vessels only (4.2.3) and a
comprehensive scheme applicable irrespective of the flag the ship is sailing under (4.2.4).
7.4.2.2 Jurisdiction for emissions on the territorial seas of EU-Member
States
In general, each sovereign state exercises prescriptive jurisdiction over its own territory
(territorial principle). With regard to the law of the seas this principle of customary
international law is confirmed by Article 2 UNCLOS. The territorial sea forms the mar-
itime part of the territory of a State and covers a zone not exceeding 12 nautical miles
from the baseline (Article 3 UNCLOS) plus the maritime internal waters (Article 8
UNCLOS).
The territorial principle is in some respects limited by UNCLOS and other rules of
international law (explicitly Article 2 (3) UNCLOS), namely by the right to innocent
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passage through the territorial sea (Article 17 UNCLOS) and by the obligation not to
hamper the free entry into a State’s port or internal waters (Article 211 (3) UNCLOS).
Though Coastal States may implement regulations for the prevention, reduction and
control of marine pollution from foreign vessels passing through their territorial water
(Article 211 (4) UNCLOS), these regulations “shall not apply to the design, construc-
tion, manning or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally
accepted international rules or standards” (Article 211 (4), Article 21 (2) UNCLOS,
with an exception in Article 211 (6) UNCLOS). It is widely accepted that this refers
to environmental regulations of MARPOL and the IMO (Ringbom (2011), p. 21, 22).
According to Article 211 (3) UNCLOS even the Port State’s law-making competence to
set out “particular requirements for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution
of the marine environment” is limited. Thus, the right to innocent passage and the
right of free entry into a port and the internal waters limits the State’s competences for
unilateral environmental regulation on their territorial seas.
However, these restrictions of national sovereignty do not affect the jurisdiction for
the establishment of an EUMETS. Art. 211 (3) UNCLOS and the MARPOL only
cover measures against pollution “of the marine environment” as defined by Article 1
Nr. 1 (4) UNCLOS: the introduction by man of substances or energy into the marine
environment which results or is likely to result in deleterious effects. Even if a measure
that purports climate protection might as well have an indirect influence on the marine
environment, it is not within the scope of these provisions. Furthermore and even more
importantly, the provisions of Article 211 (3), (4) and Article 21 (2) UNCLOS refer
only to requirements directly concerning the vessel’s technical characteristics including
construction and equipment (Ringbom (2011), p. 613, 621). This interpretation takes
account of the objective of UNCLOS to establish international acknowledged rules and
standards, which cannot be amended unilaterally, thereby enabling the free movement
of vessels without the need to adapt to different standards for maritime navigation
(Ringbom (1999), p. 21, 22). Thus, Article 211 (3) and (4) UNCLOS merely hinder
the implementation of protective measures as the technical characteristics of a vessel are
concerned. Since a maritime ETS does, however, not impose the duty to comply with
specific technical requirements it does not interfere with the legal interest protected by
Article 211 UNCLOS.
As a result, on the basis of the territorial principle the EU could, in principle, es-
tablish a maritime ETS for emissions transmitted in the territorial seas of its Member
States including emissions resulting from vessels sailing under foreign flags.
7.4.2.3 Prescriptive jurisdiction for extra-territorial emissions from EU-
vessels
It is comprehensible that the EU would go one step further and implement an EU-
METS that calculates GHG emissions on the basis of shipping activities not only on the
territorial seas, but also on the high seas and on foreign territorial seas.
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Under international law there are several principles giving law-making competences
as to the regulation of extra-territorial behaviour. Of relevance in the model at hand is
the personality principle that allows states to exercise jurisdiction over their nationals.
As ships have the nationality of the state flag they are entitled to fly (Article 91 (1) UN-
CLOS), they fall within the scope of the prescriptive jurisdiction of that state (Article 92
(1) and 94 (1) UNCLOS, cf. Molenaar (1998), p. 83)). This flag state jurisdiction does
not cease to exist when a vessel sails into the territorial seas of another state. There-
fore, EU-Member States would have jurisdiction to regulate extra-territorial emissions
attributable to ships sailing under their own flags. If the EU were to limit the personal
scope of an EUMETS to EU-vessels, this would not raise any legal concerns.
7.4.2.4 Prescriptive jurisdiction for extra-territorial emissions from Non-
EU- vessels
However, in order to avoid flagging out by European ship operators and competitive
disadvantages to EU-companies, a comprehensive EUMETS would in all probability
include extra-territorial emissions of ships sailing under foreign flags. Such a regulation
could constitute an infringement of the flag-state principle and the freedom of the high
sea, i.e. the prohibition to all States to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty
(Article 87, 89 UNCLOS).
7.4.2.4.1 Incompatibility with flag-state-principle
According to Article 92 (1) UNCLOS there is an exclusive rule-making competence of the
flag state for all shipping activities on the high seas as defined in Article 86 UNCLOS
(Graf Vitzthum (2006), chap. 4 para. 30; Proelß (2010), para. 64). International
Sea Law provides exceptions from these basic provisions in just a few cases, such as
the cooperation in the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances engaged in by ships on the high seas (Article 108 UNCLOS).
Apart from these clearly defined exemptions States are not allowed to regulate ship-
ping activities of foreign vessels on the high seas – including the EEZ (Article 58 (2)
UNCLOS) – and a fortiori (Article 2 (1) UNCLOS) in parts of the sea that are included
in the territorial sea of another State. The EU, which exercises – from the international
law perspective – the national sovereignty of their Member States, does interfere with
the flag-state-principle when imposing legal duties on ships sailing under foreign flags in
the high seas.
7.4.2.4.2 EUMETS as “extra-territorial” regulation
Furthermore, it has to be considered whether and to what extent a comprehensive EU-
METS model that calculates fuel consumption on the basis of sea voyages without geo-
graphical limitation has to be regarded a “regulation” of activities on the high seas and
therefore beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
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One has to keep in mind that as long as vessels do not enter a port of an EU-
Member State, an EUMETS does not impose any legal duties on vessels sailing on the
high seas. The decision to sail into the territorial sea and to enter a port therein remains
free from legal restrictions. Thus, contrary to the legal situation for emissions from
permanent installations such as factories falling within the scope of the existing ETS (cf.
Article 4 EU Directive 2003/87), vessel’s operators would presumably not need a special
permission for emitting GHG in the EU’s territorial seas. The allowance trading scheme
is only activated when a vessel factually enters a Member State’s port for the first time.
At first glance, any activity on the high seas, in the EEZ, and on foreign territorial
seas, remains legally unrestricted. The same applies if the operator fails to comply with
his obligation to surrender emissions allowances. European Law would provide penalties
(cf. Article 16 (3) EU Directive 2003/87) and attribute the competence to the European
Commission to decide on the imposition of an operating ban on the shipping operator
as the last resort (cf. Article 16 (5) EU Directive 2003/87). In any case, in accordance
to international law, the geographical scope of an operating ban would be limited to
the territorial seas of the EU-Member States. Once again, in sensu strictu the freedom
of navigation on the high seas seems to be unlimited. However, further examination
reveals that even when vessels are sailing on the high seas and on foreign territorial
seas, operators are directly affected by EU legal provisions. An EUMETS would entail
the duty to monitor the emissions of the vessel and report them to the administration
(cf. Article 14 (3) and Part B of Annex IV to EU Directive 2003/87) for the purpose
of determining the number of allowances to be surrendered (cf. Article 12 (2a) EU
Directive 2003/87). In this respect EU law governs extra-territorial behaviour. Beside
this, one must not only take legal duties into account. When adopting a rather material
approach one has to admit that the obligation to surrender emissions allowances for
parts of any sea voyage performed outside the EU territorial seas has consequences for
behaviour that is as such not subject to the prescriptive jurisdiction exercised by the
EU Member States (cf. Pache (2008), p. 65). Although extra-territorial activities are
not directly addressed by legal duties, they are subject to the steering effects of the
trading scheme. The legal duties of vessels’ operators set out by an EUMETS Directive
are designed to influence shipping activities on the high seas in order to reduce GHG
emissions. It purports vessels’ operators to react to the regulation with operational
measures such as slow steaming or different route planning, and possibly with technical
measures such as alternative fuels. Furthermore, ship operators would be encouraged to
reduce the distance of direct sea voyages to or from an EU port to an absolute minimum
(for example via intermediate stops in North Africa).
The question whether to factor the economic effects when deciding on the EU’s juris-
diction depends on the interpretation of the UNCLOS. It follows from Article 24 (1) lit.
a UNCLOS that beyond legal restrictions international sea law also inhibits measures
that have the “practical effect of denying or impairing” the freedom of navigation. Al-
though Article 24 applies directly only to the right to innocent passage, its rationale can
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be transposed by analogy to the freedom on the high seas as defined in Article 87 UN-
CLOS. Hence, “freedom of navigation” (Article 87 (1) lit. a UNCLOS) means not only
freedom from legal restrictions but also the effective freedom to navigation by absence
of all influences not authorized under the UNCLOS regime. If read as a guarantee of
legal freedom only, the provision of Article 87 (1) UNCLOS would – aside the flag-state
principle (Article 92 UNCLOS) and the prohibition to purport to subject any part of
the high seas to national sovereignty (Article 89 UNCLOS) – be superfluous.
This interpretation is in conformity with the Convention’s provisions on environmen-
tal protection. Though – in accordance with customary international law – UNCLOS
does not provide state competences for investigations in respect of any activities carried
out on the high seas in general, concerning pollution offences Article 218 (1) UNCLOS
provides for an exception forming an “universal” port state jurisdiction (Boyle (2006),
p. 15, 24). According to this provision the port state shall have the limited competence
to undertake investigations and institute proceedings in respect of any illegal discharge
from that vessel on the high seas whenever a vessel is voluntarily within the port. The
fact that UNCLOS does explicitly empower the legal authority of a state to exercise
such competences suggests that states may not tie any administrative consequences as
to activities outside the territorial sea (cf. Graf Vitzthum (2006), chap. 4 para. 88).
The ECJ did not share the foregoing opinion in its Judgment of 2011, concerning
the inclusion of aviation activities in the Scheme for GHG emission trading, however:
“It follows that the European Union had competence, [. . . ] to adopt Directive 2008/101,
in so far as the latter extends the allowance trading scheme laid down by Directive
2003/87 to all flights which arrive at or depart from an aerodrome situated in the terri-
tory of a Member State.” (ECJ (2011), para. 130)
In its reasoning, the ECJ adopted an extremely limited point of view stating that
Directive 2008/101 would not infringe the principle of territoriality or the sovereignty
of third states, being only applicable to aircraft flights which depart from or arrive at
an aerodrome situated in the territory of one of the Member States. While aircrafts are
“physically in the territory” of the European Union, they are, according to the Court,
subject to the “unlimited jurisdiction of the European Union”. And while flying over
the high seas, they are not subject to the allowance trading scheme (ECJ (2011), para.
125 et seq.).
This argument of the ECJ disregards the legal duties for monitoring and reporting
as well as the economic impacts of the ETS. As follows from the foregoing, a purely
formal approach is not convincing in the light of international law, especially in the
field of navigation. Moreover, it does not fit in the European legal framework as the
European fundamental rights (cf. ChFREU) as well as the Basic Freedoms of the TFEU
as interpreted by the ECJ protect against any measures enacted by the Union itself or
its Member States which are – not only by imposing legal obligations but also de facto
– capable of hindering the usage of freedom (cf. ECJ, Case 8/74 – Dassonville [1974],
ECR 837, para. 5). It is therefore not surprising that the ECJ Judgment on the Air
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transport sector faces criticism (cf. Athen (2012), p. 337, 339 et seq.; Mayer (2012), p.
1113, 1128 et seq.).
Hence, it is more convincing to interpret UNCLOS as not allowing, in principle, any
state to generate considerable economic impacts on navigation on the high sea as an
EUMETS purports and would probably have.
7.4.2.4.3 No Justififaction of “extra-territorial” regulation by the effects
principle
There exist, however, principles of customary international law establishing extra-territorial
jurisdiction over non-nationals that our analysis should consider in order to examine a
possible justification of the implementation of an EUMETS. In particular, the so called
“effects principle” may allow exceptions from the basic principles of national sovereignty,
exclusive flag-state-authority and freedom of the high seas. In core terms, according to
the effects principle a state may have jurisdiction to rule on extra-territorial behaviour
in order to prevent the occurrence of significant and foreseeable effects for a state, its
population or its territory (Molenaar (1998), p. 71; Ringbom (2011), p. 630). In this
context the effects principle authorizes states to defend its economic interests against in-
terference caused by foreign public authorities or private companies situated in a foreign
country (e.g. cartel agreements concluded extra-territorially but affecting the compe-
tition interests of national companies) (Doehring (2004), para. 823). However, in the
practice of the Courts the application of the effects principle has always been limited
to competition and antitrust law (Ko¨nig and Morgenstern (2009), 181, 189; Ringbom
(2011), 630). Whether it could and would be applied in the field of international envi-
ronmental law and in particular the combat against global warming is left to speculation
(cf. Ringbom (2011), 613, 630). Apparently, little legal basic research has been ded-
icated to this topic. A “handbook” of the law of the Sea does not even mention the
effects principle as being capable of justifying interference with the freedom of the high
seas with regard to environmental protection (Graf Vitzthum (2006), chap. 2 paras.
82¬–93). As far as legal literature has explicitly touched the question, most authors are
nevertheless in favour of the application of the effects principle as a justification of a
maritime ETS (Ko¨nig and Morgenstern (2009), 181, 189; Lassen (2010), 570, 574; with
regard to the aviation sector Pache (2008), 75 et seq.; Bra¨uerle et al. (2010), 85 et seq.;
Athen (2012), 337, 340; Mayer (2012), 1113, 1130). For this purpose, they argue that
the goal of climate protection is a common good that is of essence for individual states
as well as the international community. On the further premise that all states and their
population would suffer under the effects of a global climate change, it is then argued
that all states have a sufficient interest to pass legislation that combats GHG emissions.
While initially plausible, at second glance this motivation is not convincing. The
mere fact that climate change is a global phenomenon and does therefore affect national
interests of all states cannot be sufficient to extend national legislation on all extra-
territorial activities producing GHG emissions. The exceptional nature of the effects
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principle prompts a narrow interpretation. Thus the effects principle gives jurisdiction to
regulate such activities that are only formally performed outside its territory, but having
consequences exclusively or at least primarily inside that territory. It is persuasive from a
more material point of view to regard such activities “territorial”. Insofar effects of GHG
emissions on the high seas or on foreign territorial seas cannot specifically attributed to
EU-Member States. Obviously, effects of gas emissions are different from the pollution
of a State’s coast caused by the average of an oil tanker within the EEZ (Mayer (2012),
1113, 1130 et seq.). Due to the high complexity of the climate change process, a chain
of causes and effects that would clearly link GHG emissions from vessels anywhere in
the world with specific environmental outcome, can scarcely be identified.
But even if the outcome could be described precisely, the effects of climate change
would be tangible world-wide and would not lead to particular and extraordinary signif-
icances for EU-Member states. Member States and their population are not affected by
shipping emissions as “individuals”, but only as part or constituents of the international
community. With regard to the effects principle, their interests ought not be considered
sufficient to establish extra-territorial jurisdiction. Where all states are affected the same
way, there is no reason to allow for an exception from the basic principles of national
sovereignty and of the freedom of the high seas in favour of specific states. Giving up
these basic principles would cause severe risk of overlapping and contradictory regula-
tion, of duplication of measures and costs, and the prospect of uncontrolled addition of
interferences within the scope of fundamental rights. The international community of
states has reasonably placed the environmental protection regards shipping emissions in
the hands of the IMO; a global ETS should be implemented on this basis and not under
the jurisdiction of a single player as the EU.
Moreover, even if the effects principle covered measures against global warming, that
does not necessarily mean establishing jurisdiction for the inclusion of emissions of for-
eign flagged vessels outside the territorial seas of the EU-Member States. The effects
principle is limited by the principle of proportionality. In its broadest sense this prin-
ciple entails three criteria, i.e. suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the narrow
sense. When it comes to balancing (principle of proportionality in the narrow sense)
the interests that are to be taken into account are to be confined precisely. As the
effects principle exceptionally provides law-making competences for extra-territorial be-
haviour, the proportionality-test does not include a free balancing of advantages and
disadvantages of a maritime ETS as a measure against global warming (different point
of view: Lassen (2010), 570, 575). It is not decisive whether a maritime ETS is an
appropriate measure, but merely whether the EU-Member States shall have the juris-
diction for its implementation. For this purpose, it is necessary to examine whether the
legislation-interests of EU-Member States, namely the importance of regulation for the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities and the degree
to which the desirability of such regulation (cf. Ringbom (2011), 613, 631 f.), prevail
over the sovereignty of the countries affected by EUMETS (Molenaar (1998), 82). Other
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aspects to consider are the extent to which the regulation is consistent with traditions
of international law, the likelihood of conflicts with regulation imposed by other states,
and finally the importance of regulation for the international political, legal or economic
system should be considered. As GHG emissions affect EU interests neither directly nor
specifically the EU would by establishing a maritime ETS act rather as a procurator in
behalf of global than of own interests. In other words, the specific importance of the
regulation for the regulating player can be seen as relatively low. An EUMETS would
aim to subject the high seas to the Union’s sovereignty in order to achieve a political goal
that other states – exercising their sovereignty – do not share or do not try to achieve
via the implementation of a maritime ETS or other regulatory means.5 The lack of an
IMO agreement demonstrates the controversy on a global emission allowance trading
scheme. The decision a political goal such as the reduction of GHG emissions is set,
and which measures are taken to its achievement should remain in the realm of national
sovereignty.
The analysis concludes that a comprehensive EUMETS would not meet the require-
ment of proportionality in the narrow sense as set out by the effects principle.
7.4.2.5 Results
One has to state as a result that international law does not hinder the EU to imple-
ment an EUMETS that encompasses emissions produced within the territorial seas of
EU-member states. Likewise, an EUMETS designed to capture territorial as well as
extraterritorial emissions of EU vessel does not raise deep concerns as to its compati-
bility with international law. A comprehensive EUMETS model, however, that includes
emissions of non-EU vessels irrespective of their local production would have relevant
extra-territorial effects incompatible with the flag-state principle (Article 92 UNCLOS).
Furthermore, it would disregard the prohibition to all states to subject any part of the
high seas to its sovereignty (Article 89 UNCLOS) as well as the national sovereignty over
the territorial sea (Article 2 UNCLOS).
7.5 Summary and conclusion
On the basis of a joint economic and legal analysis, we evaluate in this paper the effects
of a “regional” (European) emission trading scheme aiming at reducing emissions of
international shipping. The focus lies on the question which share of emissions from
maritime transport activities to and from the EU can and should be included in such a
system.
Our findings suggest that the attempt to implement an EUMETS runs into a dilemma.
It is impossible to design a scheme that achieves the goal of emission reductions in a
cost efficient manner and is compatible with international law:
5Cf. for the aviation sector Mayer (2012), 1113 (1138): “[. . . ] an attempt by 27 States to concert
and use their sovereign rights to promote the aims of international law”.
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From an economic point of view, the EU should choose a comprehensive definition
of the scope and include all emissions arising on the whole route that is travelled by
a ship. This result is in line with the main findings of the existing literature even
though none of the reports so far has analysed this research question using a general
equilibrium approach. Franc and Sutto (2014) and the MEDDE (2012) findings suggest
that an ETS restricted to Europe will lead to a loss of competitiveness of French and
European ports. Faber et al. (2009) proposes to regulate all emissions of voyages to and
from the EU because of the suggested large environmental effectiveness and the little
scope for avoidance. We have shown, that limiting the scope of the ETS would put a
disproportional burden on routes featuring a high share of regulated emissions, i.e. short
routes traveling mainly within EU territorial waters, and impede cost-efficient emission
abatement among regulated ships. From a legal point of view, however, deep concerns
as to the compatibility of a comprehensive scheme regulating all emissions arising on
voyages to and from the EU with international law arise. A comprehensive scheme
would have extra-territorial effects in conflict with the flag-state principle (Article 92
UNCLOS) and disregard the prohibition to all states to subject any part of the high
seas to its sovereignty (Article 89 UNCLOS).
The aforementioned dilemma does not arise in a situation with an ETS applied to
shipping activities on a global basis. As a consequence, although the effects of such
a global maritime ETS remains to be studied in detail, policy makers should continue
working on an international agreement to reduce maritime emissions instead of resorting
to regional schemes.
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Chapter 8
Effects of unilateral
environmental regulation on
multi-stage production processes
Abstract
In the last decades supply chains emerged that stretch across many countries. Decreasing
trade and communication costs have been identified as main drivers of this process. We
extend the literature by analyzing if and how unilateral environmental regulation induces
offshoring of parts of the supply chain to unregulated jurisdictions. We first apply an
analytical partial-equilibrium model of a two-stage production process that can be dis-
tributed between two countries and investigate the effects of unilateral emission pricing
and its supplementation with border carbon taxes. We find that unilateral reductions
force emission-intensive producers to offshore a greater proportion of their supply chain
to unregulated jurisdictions. Border taxes are successful in mitigating this. However,
whereas medium-emission intensive upstream production can be protected successfully,
downstream industries from regulated countries lose competitiveness on foreign markets.
We subsequently apply a new multi-sector multi-region computable general equilibrium
model (CGE) of the world economy that in particular has additional structure with re-
gard to sectoral supply chains. Using input-output data from the World Input-Output
Database to calibrate the model, we find mixed effects of a unilateral carbon emission
reduction by the European Union (EU) on the degree of vertical specialisation of Eu-
ropean industries. If the mitigation policy is complemented with border carbon taxes,
vertical specialisation decreases particularly in carbon-intensive upstream sectors.
This chapter is based on the following paper:
Schenker, Oliver, Simon Koesler and Andreas Lo¨schel (2014), On the Effects of Unilateral
Environmental Regulation on Offshoring in Multi-Stage Production Processes, ZEW
Discussion Paper No. 14-121, Mannheim, Germany.
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8.1 Introduction
Actuated by decreasing trade, transportation and communication costs, in the last
decades supply chains have emerged that stretch across many countries. Dietzenbacher
et al. (2012) for example report that exports of processed goods, where the major part
of intermediates are imported from abroad and then assembled for re-exporting, ac-
counted for more than 50 percent of China’s exports in the period 1996-2007. Much has
been written about the emergence of off-shoring and vertical specialisation. Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) even argued that this fundamentally changed the nature of
international trade, claiming that “[i]ts not wine for cloth anymore”.
As denoted by Hummels et al. (2001), who used input-output data for the years
1970 to 1990 to compute international trade induced by vertical specialisation, most
supply chains in these timespan integrated only industries from industrialized countries.
But in a process Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2014) termed “globalization’s second
unbundling” less developed countries have been integrated in these supply chains as
well. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008; 2012) and Costinot et al. (2012) explain the
evolution of such supply chains with decreasing costs of managerial efforts to supervise
and assure the quality of processed intermediate goods.
Although it is indisputable that the technological advancements that reduced com-
munication and trade costs are the most important driver of the emergence of global
supply chains, we argue that differences in regulation between countries provide addi-
tional incentives to offshore certain production stages to countries with lower regulation
costs. An evident example are differences in environmental regulation. Developed coun-
tries have often more stringent environmental regulations compared to developing ones.
The well-known pollution haven hypothesis argues that polluting industries escape from
environmental regulation in the developed countries by moving to unregulated develop-
ing countries. This in turn makes unilateral environmental regulation less effective. The
most prominent example is the so-called “carbon leakage effect” which proposes that a
unilateral regulation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions may rise production costs of
carbon-intensive goods and reduce the competitiveness of producers in regulated coun-
tries, leading to a shift of production to unregulated ones.
But industries may respond to regulation not only with a complete change of the
production location but also with the offshoring of single production stages along the
vertical supply chain and thereby contribute to the “second unbudling”. Albeit of the
large literature on how international trade affects the effectiveness of environmental reg-
ulation, almost all studies assess the topic through the lens of “horizontal specialisation”,
i.e. specialisation in final goods. Exceptions are the papers of Benarroch and Weber
(2006) and McAusland (2004) which study trade in intermediates and their environmen-
tal consequences in industries with increasing returns to scale, but focus rather on the
economies of scale than on the disentangling of the effects on the supply chain.
Including the supply chain effects in the analysis has also important implications for
policy conclusions. Most proposals to cure the competitiveness of industries from the un-
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intended sided effects of unilateral carbon emission regulation focus on so called “energy
intensive, trade exposed” industries. These industries are mostly classified by the energy
use of their final production stage and export shares as well as the substitutability of
their final output but ignoring the vulnerability from upstream supply chain disruptions
and the emissions embodied in the supply chains. Since a large fraction of international
trade volumes is trade in intermediates this may have important consequences for policy
design.
This paper aims to close this gap by analyzing the effects on the supply chain compo-
sition of two unilateral environmental policy measures, a sole carbon price on domestic
emissions and a carbon price in combination with a tax on imported embodied emissions.
In order to understand the basic effects those regulations have on offshoring decisions,
we use in a first step a partial equilibrium model of a two stage production process with
two regions. The model blends Ricardian international trade in a continuum of goods
Dornbusch et al. (1997) and multi-stage production as in Yi (2003) with a model of
a pollutant-emitting production as in Copeland and Taylor (1994). Not surprisingly,
we find that emission pricing polices force more emission-intensive producers to shift
a greater share of their supply chain to the unregulated region and thereby increasing
vertical specialisation. Border taxation in turn fetches these stages home that are off-
shored due to the unilateral regulation. However, this comes with the cost of losing
market shares in emission-intensive goods that depend on emission-intensive upstream
intermediates.
In reality, supply chains are a much more complex interweaved network of sectoral
relationships. For this reason, we extend eventually the simple partial equilibrium model
and apply a new full fledged computable general equilibrium (CGE) model which features
for the first time an explicit specification of international trade flows between sectors in
different regions. This clarification is vital for studying changes in global supply chains
as it allows to trace intermediate flows through the global economy. The CGE model is
calibrated to the multi-regional input-output data of the World Input-Output Database
(WIOD) that maps trade flows between sectors and regions. We solve this model nu-
merically to analyse the effect of a twenty percent carbon emission reduction through an
emission trading scheme in the European Union (EU) - a stylized representation of the
EU’s emission reduction targets for 2020 - on the supply chains of European industries.
As in the analytical model and counterfactual, we supplement this policy with a border
tax on imported carbon emitted in unregulated regions. The simulated results show that
a unilateral twenty percent emission reduction in the EU has differentiated impacts on
the vertical specialisation of sectors depending on the emission-intensity of their supply
chain. The main driver of a change in the imported value-added content of production
is thereby the switch away from emission intensive energy inputs. In general, all sectors
increase their degree of vertical specialisation. The pattern of change is however more
divers than in the analytical model. Eventually sectoral differences can be explained by
heterogeneity in input intensities and substitution elasticities. If the domestic carbon
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pricing is complemented with a border carbon tax, vertical specialisation decreases in
virtually all sectors with the largest impacts on emission-intensive sectors. What is more,
almost all European sectors that are subject to the border carbon tax regime loose a
small share of their market in foreign regions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we lay
out the analytical model and illustrate the basic effects of unilateral regulation on ver-
tical specialisation. Subsequently we enlarge the model and include further aspects of
economic activity. Before applying the CGE model, we briefly elaborate the situation
of vertical specialisation in Europe and give an indication of the importance of foreign
emission embodied in European output. Next, we investigate the implication of the two
unilateral policies and contrast our findings to the insights derived on the basis of our
theoretical model. Finally, we summarise our results and conclude.
8.2 An analytical framework of offshoring
In this section, we lay out an analytical model that provides intuition how environmental
regulation can affect offshoring decisions of certain stages along the supply chain and
how these decisions affect the efficiency of environmental regulation. The model blends
Ricardian international trade in the tradition of Dornbusch et al. (1997) and multi-stage
production as in Yi (2003) with a model of different emission-intensive industries as in
Copeland and Taylor (1994). This provides a tool to examine the effects of environmental
policy on the vertical organization of industries. However, the analysis is kept as simple
as possible and neglects several mechanisms of interaction such as general equilibrium
effects on factor prices and on final demand. For analytical tractability, the analysed
supply chains contain only two stages where a single upstream good is used in the
downstream industry and emission-intensity varies between supply chains but not within.
As already pointed out above, these limitations will be addressed below with a more
inclusive calibrated general equilibrium model. Nevertheless, this simplified analytical
framework provides important insights on how environmental regulation can influence
offshoring decisions.
8.2.1 Firms and technology
We consider a world with two regions r, called North (N) and South (S). Following
Dornbusch et al. (1997), there is a continuum of goods, indexed by z ∈ [0, 1]. Each good
z is produced with a single production factor in two stages, a upstream (stage 1) and
a downstream stage (stage 2) and differs in its emission-intensity of production. These
emissions have a not further defined negative effects on welfare and thus are going to be
regulated by an exogenous policy maker. The upstream good is a required intermediate
input in the downstream industry which eventually produces the final good. We assume
constant returns to scale on both stages of production and zero profit in all industries.
Further, we assume constant factor prices and no factor mobility across countries but
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between sectors.
8.2.1.1 Upstream firms
As in Copeland and Taylor (1994) the upstream production of any good z combines
factor l and emissions d in a Cobb-Douglas fashion.1
y1r (d
1
r , l
1
r ; z) =

(
A1rl
1
r
)1−α(z)
d1r
α(z)
if d1r ≤ λl1r
0 if d1r > λl
1
r ,
(8.1)
where 0 ≥ 1−α(z) ≤ 0 is the value share of factor l that varies across goods. A1r can be
interpreted as a stage specific, factor augmenting technology used by region r at stage
1. λ > 0 is a technology efficiency parameter that limits the substitution between factor
input and emissions because output must be bounded above for a given factor input.
Therefore, production sets where d1r > λl
1
r are not feasible (see Copeland and Taylor
(1994)). In order to avoid corner solutions we focus on cases where d1r ≤ λl1r . In those
cases, the unit costs of a upstream firm in region r can be characterized by
c1r(τr, wr, A
1
r ; z) = φ(z)τ
α(z)
r
(
wr
A1r
)1−α(z)
, (8.2)
where φ(z) = (1−α(z))α(z)−1α(z)−α(z) is an industry specific constant, τr describes the
input costs of a unit emissions and wr is the price of the factor. Note that in order to
avoid corner solutions τr has to be strictly positive but can be infinitesimal.
8.2.1.2 Downstream firms
The upstream output y1r (z), is a required intermediate input in the downstream produc-
tion of good z. Upstream products from N and S are perfect substitutes and trade costs
are zero. Following Yi (2003), emissions, the factor input, and the upstream intermediate
input are compounded in a nested Cobb-Douglas production function.
y2r (x
2
r , d
2
r , l
2
r ; z) =

[(
A2rl
2
r
)1−α(z)
d2r
α(z)
]1−θ
x2r,s
θ
if d2r ≤ λl2r
0 if d2r > λl
2
r ,
(8.3)
where x2r,s is region r’s use of the upstream good from region s and, similar to stage
1, A2r is a stage- and region-specific technology that determines factor productivity of
stage 2 in region r. θ is the value share of upstream goods in the downstream industry.
We assume a constant upstream value share across all sectors. Similar to the upstream
stage, production sets where d2r > λl
2
r are not feasible. Downstream output of industry
z in region r has unit costs of
1Although a joint product of output in most production processes, we follow Copeland and Taylor
(1994) and model emissions as input. This requires that the joint production technologies satisfy certain
regularity conditions. See the Appendix of Copeland and Taylor (1994) for a detailed derivation.
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c2r(τr, wr, p
1
s; z) = ψ(z)
[
τα(z)r
(
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A2r
)1−α(z)]1−θ
p1s(z)
θ
, (8.4)
where ψ(z) = (1−θ)θ−1θ−θφ(z)1−θ is a downstream industry specific constant and p1s(z)
is the input cost of the upstream intermediate from region s faced by the downstream
producer that minimizes her costs.
8.2.2 Offshoring due to unilateral environmental regulation
After introducing the production technologies we turn our attention to the effects of
two types of policy measures that have been discussed widely in the literature on envi-
ronmental regulation in open economies. First, a unilateral increase in the input costs
of emissions by North - either caused through a tax on emission or through a tight-
ened cap in an emission trading scheme that reduces the supply of emission permits
and thus increases emission costs - is examined. Practiced examples are the European
Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) that regulates carbon emission in some
sector of the EU or the SO2 Reductions and Allowance Trading in the United States.
Subsequently we analyse the implications of complementing the unilateral emission pric-
ing scheme with a border tax by the North on imported embodied emissions from the
South. Although it has so far not been applied, a border tax on carbon has been widely
debated, both among academics and policy makers, as a supplement to climate policy
measures in order to respond to the losses in comparative advantages and effectiveness
that accompany such measures if implemented unilaterally. The idea was incorporated
into the Waxman/Markey bill (H.R. 2454 “The American Clean Energy and Security
Act of 2009”), an in the end unsuccessful attempt to regulate U.S. carbon emission,
but has also been discussed in Europe in addition to the EU ETS.2 Both instruments
are challenged with the questions (i) how the respective instrument affects the vertical
organizational structure of emission-emitting industries and (ii) how the adjustment of
supply chains affects the effectiveness of the policy instrument. Note that although we
acknowledge that offshoring decisions of stages in the supply chain are (mainly) driven
by many factors such as reductions in communication and trade costs,3 in this paper we
are agnostic about those other factors and focus on effects of environmental regulation
as an offshoring-inducing factor.
Following Copeland and Taylor (1994), we rank goods according to their emission-
intensity which is a strictly increasing function of α and assume that every good z is
produced with the same emission intensity α(z) all along its value chain. In order to
structure our economy further, a minimal set of additional assumptions are required.
2See Markusen (1975) and Copeland (1996) for an early analysis. They find that a border tax belongs
to the optimal policy portfolio in case of an unilateral regulation of trans-boundary pollutants. More
recently, Fischer and Fox (2012) provide an numerical analysis of specific climate policy schemes, showing
that these schemes can support domestic competitiveness but have almost no effect on global carbon
emissions.
3See for example Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2014) for an excellent overview to this regard.
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In the following, we assume that 1 ≤
(
wN
wS
)
≤
(
A1N
A1S
)
≤
(
A2N
A2S
)
, meaning that N ’s
relative wage is lower than its relative technology used in both production stages. This
implies that in the absence of any unilateral environmental policy (so that τN = τS) up-
and downstream production take both place in the North. The third inequality
(
A1N
A1S
)
≤(
A2N
A2S
)
implies that North has a relative comparative advantage in the downstream stage.
Since Ricardian comparative advantage forces determine the composition of the supply
chain in equilibrium, a unilateral increase in production costs in N – e.g. induced by an
increase in emission costs – affects at the margin first the location of upstream production
before the downstream production is offshored. This situation defines the baseline for
our analysis.
8.2.2.1 Unilateral emission pricing
Our starting point is our baseline scenario, where we assume that τN = τS =  and  is
infinitesimal, but positive. Now suppose that a policy action in N unilaterally increases
the costs of emissions, either by an increasing emission tax or by a reduced supply of
emission permits under a constant demand of such permits, and therefore τN > τS .
A purchasing manager in the downstream (stage 2) industry has to decide where to
source its intermediate input. She buys the intermediate upstream good used in sector
z from region S if c1S(τS , wS ; z) ≤ c1N (τN , wN ; z). The input costs of the upstream good
in the downstream industry is thus p1(z) = arg min[c1S(τS , wS ; z), c
1
N (τN , wN ; z)]. This
leads to same condition for downstream production in the South as in the one-stage
model of Copeland and Taylor (1994):
A1 ≡ A
1
N
A1S
≤ wN
wS
(
τN
τS
) α(z)
1−α(z)
≡ ωT (z). (8.5)
Conversely, the upstream good will be sourced from N if A1 ≥ ωT (z). With τN > τS
and α(z) > 0, T (z) is increasing in z. Because of North’s relatively higher emission
prices, its relative cost advantage in producing the upstream part of good z declines as
expenditures for emissions become a larger share of total costs.
The cut-off emission intensity α(z) of the upstream sector z where the purchasing
manager is indifferent between offshoring its upstream production to S or remain in N
can be be found by equalizing the inequality (8.5) and solving for α(z). This leads to
α(z) =
ln (A
1
ω )
ln ( τNτS ) + ln (
A1
ω )
= α. (8.6)
Note that the greater the difference between τN and τS , the lower is the cut-off emission
intensity. The same calculus is then used by the final consumers in both regions. Goods
of different origin are perfect substitutes and there are no trade costs. Thus, they source
the final good z from S if c2S(τS , wS , p
1; z) ≤ c2N (τN , wN , p1; z). We can rewrite this
purchase decision as:
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Figure 8.1: Vertical specialisation at the extensive margin
A2 ≡ A
2
N
A2S
≤ wN
wS
(
τN
τS
) α(z)
1−α(z)
≡ ωT (z). (8.7)
The final good is purchased from North if A2 ≥ ωT (z). From A1 < A2 and Ricardian
comparative advantage forces it follows that in equilibrium the final good is never pro-
duced in South if the upstream good is sourced in North. The cut-off emission intensity
α(z) of industry z, such that the final consumer is indifferent between purchasing the
final good z from S or N , has the same structure as Equation (8.6):
α(z) =
ln (A
2
ω )
ln ( τNτS ) + ln (
A2
ω )
= α. (8.8)
Thus, every industry with an emission intensity equal or higher that α is shifting
its whole supply chain to S. Combining (8.5) and (8.7) allows to study the industry
structure for given emission prices. Three different production patterns are possible. A
good z can either (i) be produced entirely in N , it can (ii) be produced entirely in S,
or (iii) it can consist of a Southern upstream good that is processed in North to a final
good. The latter is a situation with a vertically specialised production setup.
Vertical specialisation at the extensive margin
We define vertical specialisation at the extensive margin as a production setting where
upstream and downstream production are located in different regions. That is, in our
analytical framework the production setups South-North and North-South feature ver-
tical specialisation at the extensive margin. Industry z produces vertically specialized
and offshores its upstream production from the North to the South if
A1 ≤ ωT (z) ≤ A2. (8.9)
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The offshoring decision at the extensive margin of the different emission-intensive
industries are illustrated in Figure 8.1. The supply chains of industries with emission
intensity α(z) ≤ α(z) are not affected by relative increase of N ’s emission prices. The
production of both stages still takes place in N . When emission costs account only for a
small share of overall costs, comparative advantages based on relative production tech-
nologies determine the supply chain. But ωT (z) has an upward slope. With increasing
emission intensity and thus increasing share of emission costs, the ωT (z) locus cuts A1 at
α from below. We know from condition (8.5) that if A1 < ωT (z) the upstream produc-
tion stage is off-shored to S. But below the A2-line, the final good processing remains
in N . With increasing emission-intensity ωT (z) cuts the A2-line and the technological
comparative advantage of N ’s downstream production stage is dominated by the disad-
vantage in emission costs for α(z) ≥ α. Thus, the final good processing is shifted to S
as well.
Insight 1. A unilateral relative increase in emission costs fragments the supply chain
and induces vertical specialisation at the extensive margin for medium emission-intensive
industries between α and α. While industries with emission-intensities below α do not
alter the supply chain, industries with high emission-intensities above α shift the com-
plete supply chain to regions with lower relative emission costs.
The offshoring of upstream process has also implication on emissions from the re-
spective industries. While initially the discontinuation of production in the North has
positive effects on emissions, establishing the upstream production in the South comes
along with additional emissions there. So eventually the shift of emission-intensive pro-
duction to less regulated regions reduces the effectiveness of the unilateral emission
pricing policy and results in so-called carbon leakage. We will asses the magnitude of
this problem later and calculate carbon leakage rates with the help of a calibrated com-
putable general equilibrium model in the next section.
Vertical specialisation at the intensive margin
Having examined how unilateral environmental regulation can induce offshoring and the
fragmentation of supply chains (vertical specialisation at the extensive margin), we turn
now our attention to the effects of the policy on the intensity of upstream intermedi-
ate use in downstream production. Since we are interested in offshoring and vertical
specialisation effects, we focus in the subsequent analysis on industries with emission-
intensities between α < α < α where environmental regulation results in vertically spe-
cialised supply chains. We define the increased substitution of downstream production
with offshored upstream output as vertical specialisation at the intensive margin. That
is vertical specialisation at the intensive margin increases the share of used upstream
intermediates in the final good.
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The upstream intensity of a fragmented produced final good is I2N (z) = y
1
S(z)/y
2
N (z).
Combining this with Hicksian demand derived from the cost function (8.4) leads to:
I2N (z) =
[
θ
1− θ
(
τN
τS
)α(z)(wNA1S
wSA2N
)1−α(z)]1−θ
∀ α(z) < α(z) < α(z) (8.10)
The derivation of equation (8.10) by τN shows that a marginal increase in North’s
emission costs causes a marginal increase in the intensity of used upstream goods pro-
duced in S. The marginal effect is also increasing in α(z).
Insight 2. A marginal unilateral rise in the emission costs of N increases the intensity
of used foreign upstream goods in N ’s final good production and therewith vertical spe-
cialisation at the intensive margin. The marginal rise in upstream-intensity is increasing
with the emission-intensity α(z).
Changes in vertical specialisation at the intensive margin also have effects on emis-
sions of the respective industries. While the existing literature on carbon leakage mainly
focuses on changes in the location of production of final goods. Here, we observe leakage
through another channel. As fragmented industries increase the content of offshored
parts in their supply chain and, thus, shift a larger share of their supply chain to unreg-
ulated and more emission intensive regions, the overall production of a good becomes
more emission intensive. Again, we will investigate the magnitude of this “within-value
chain” carbon leakage using the calibrated CGE model later in this paper.
8.2.2.2 Unilateral emission pricing with border emission taxes
Suppose that the policy makers in N want to tackle the adverse effects on competi-
tiveness and policy efficiency that N ’s unilateral environmental policy causes and add a
border tax on embodied emissions imported from S to the domestic emission regulation
set. The border tax is aiming at leveling the playing field on the domestic market and
taxes each unit of imported carbon emissions that has been used in the production of
the good with the difference in its respective emission price (τN − τS).
Border carbon taxes on intermediate good markets
A unit of a upstream good in industry z produced in S contains the following amount
of embodied emissions:
E1S(z) =
d1S
y1S
=
(
A1Sl
1
S
)α(z)−1
d1S
1−α(z)
=
(
α(z)
1− α(z)
wS
τSA1S
)1−α(z)
.
(8.11)
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Figure 8.2: Purchase decision tree of N and S consumers and downstream industries
purchase managers. Red lines mark trade links that are affected by N ’s border tax on
imports from S. Since it is by assumption about comparative advantages not profitable
for a final good producer in S to outsource its upstream intermediate production to
N (dotted line) and since border taxes prevent the profitability of offshoring upstream
stage for N ’s downstream producer vertical specialisation is eliminated
The border emission tax applied on N ’s import in industry z of S’s upstream good
is thus t1N (z) = (τN − τS) × E1S(z). This term is positive and increases the sourcing
costs of intermediates in the N ’s downstream industry. A border carbon tax affects the
offshoring decision of N ’s final good industries and puts a wedge between the prices
N and S downstream purchasing managers face. The intermediate sourcing decision
of final good producers in S are not affected and are still described by condition (8.5).
This, however, is different for a downstream purchasing manager in N .
She faces additional costs when sourcing the intermediate input from S. Intermediate
input costs in N ’s downstream industry z are now p1∗N (z) = arg min[c
1
S(τS , wS ; z) +
t1N (z), c
1
N (τN , wN ; z)], where the asterisk indicates the border carbon tax regime and the
subscript the importing region. With some algebra we can derive the following condition:
Industry z, located in N , sources its intermediate input from S if
A1Γ(z) ≡ A
1
N
A1S
(
α(z)τN + (1− α(z))τS
τS
) 1
1−α(z)
≤ wN
wS
(
τN
τS
) α(z)
1−α(z)
≡ ωT (z). (8.12)
Since τS < τN , S produces the same good z at least not less emission-intensive
than N . Thus, with border taxes the emission costs per unit imported to N are not
lower for any good z produced in S relative to N . As a consequence, under a border
tax regime in N , A1Γ(z) > ωT (z) holds for all α(z) if τN > τS . This implies that
baseline Ricardian comparative advantage forces dominate again and offshoring due to
environmental regulation is not a profitable motivation any more. Figure 8.2 summarises
the underlying logic and a formal proof is given in the Appendix F.1. So eventually
downstream producers of good z in N never offshore their upstream production to S.
Insight 3. Border emission taxes eliminate offshoring of upstream production stages
and fragmentation of supply chains that has been induced by unilateral emission pricing
policies, both at the extensive and intensive margin.
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Border emission taxes on final good markets
Since border taxes drive a wedge between N and S good markets, also final consumers
in N and S face different purchase problems. As showed above, the supply chain of
industry z is under a border tax regime either completely based in S or N . Thus, no
parts of final goods that are traded on the S market crossed the border to N and are
hence not affected by the border tax. However, on Northern markets final goods are
potentially available that are entirely produced in S and hence taxed accordingly when
reaching N markets.
By exploiting separability the unit cost function of a final good z produced entirely
in S is c2S = ψ(z)τ
α(z)
S w
1−α
S
(
A2S
1−θ
A1S
θ
)α(z)−1
. Shepard’s Lemma shows that one unit
of the final good z produced completely in S includes
E2S(z) =
(
α(z)
1− α(z)
wS
τSA2S
1−θ
A1S
θ
)1−α
, (8.13)
units of emissions and the tax on imported final goods from S is thus t2S = (τN−τS)E2S(z).
The final consumer in the North purchases final good z from N if c2N (τN , wN ; z) ≤
c2S(τS , wS ; z) + t
2
S . Rearranging this condition provides:
(A1)θ(A2)1−θ ≤ ωT (z)χ 11−α(z) Γ(z), (8.14)
where χ = (1− θ)1−θθθ. So again baseline Ricardian comparative advantages dominate
and the North relies only on domestic final goods.
Insight 4. If N implements a border tax on imported embodied emissions, all trade to
N ’s final good market induced by unilateral emission pricing is prevented.
In the South, the situation looks slightly different. There, the consumers are not
directly confronted with the border tax. But indirectly, since under the border tax
regime no goods are available that are produced in a vertically specialised manner.
Ultimately, a final consumer in S will source the final good from N if c2N (z) ≤ c2S(z),
that is if:
(A1)θ(A2)1−θ ≤ ωT (z). (8.15)
This points out that consumers in S switch from final goods produced in N to goods
produced in S emission-intensive industries if the ωT (z)-locus cuts the (A1)θ(A2)1−θ-
line from below. Thus, in contrast to a regime with unilateral domestic emission pricing
where only fragmented supply chains emerged for industries with an emission intensity
between α and α, in a border tax regime all industries produce within a single region.
Figure 8.3 shows the consequences for the industry structure over the good space z
for N industries that are active on S markets. The effects are ambiguous. On the one
hand, the border tax regime in N makes more integrated industries competitive and
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Figure 8.3: Purchase decision of consumers in the South in the presence of a border tax
reverses the offshoring of upstream production and fetches them back to N . But on the
other hand, the North looses competitiveness due to higher costs on intermediates for
some of the more energy-intensive final goods.
Insight 5. On final good markets in unregulated S, the introduction of a tax on imported
embodied emissions as a supplement to a unilateral emission pricing has ambiguous ef-
fects. On the one hand, it enables N to retrieve some of the upstream production stages
that were lost to S due to N ’s unilateral emission regulation. On the other hand, the bor-
der tax cause in cases where relative emission-intensive industries have already offshored
their upstream production stages due to the unilateral emission pricing a dislocation also
of the downstream industries to the South.
With the change in the production setup, the presence of a border carbon tax also has
effects on emissions from production. For markets in the regulated North the implications
are straightforward: offshoring due to emissions regulation is not a profitable strategy
anymore and leakage becomes irrelevant. But the situation is different for markets in
the South. Here on the one hand, border taxes reduce emissions because some upstream
processes are brought back to N and N produces cleaner than S due to higher emission
costs. On the other hand, other industries now also move their downstream stages S
and thus increase the emissions. Depending on which of the effects is greater, the border
carbon tax can also have a negative effect on carbon leakage. Although the effects are
of course limited to goods sold in Southern final goods markets.
Insight 6. Although the border carbon tax reduces carbon leakage for most production
setups, by inducing a transfer of parts of the downstream production to the unregulated
South, the border tax can also induce some new carbon leakage.
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8.3 Quantitative assessment of complex supply chains
The above described analytical partial equilibrium framework revealed several important
insights about the effect of environmental regulation on offshoring and fragmentation of
supply chains. However, the model offered only a stylized representation of supply
chain management under environmental regulation and ignored at least five important
dimensions due to trade-offs with analytical tractability. In this section, we extend the
illustrative framework first and foremost to a general equilibrium representation that
includes repercussions on factor and good markets. Thus, supply chains may interact.
Second, we study trade and offshoring relationships in a universe consisting of more
than two regions. Third, final goods are produced in more than two stages and can span
over multiple regions. Fourth, an intermediate good may be used in several industries,
so supply chains are not straight lines but complex interweaved networks of sectoral
relationships. Fifth, also the representation of industries is more complex. They vary in
more dimensions than only their emission-intensity and may also differ in their ability
to change the source of their upstream intermediates, their ability to substitute in the
production process the intermediates with factor input, and their intensity of upstream
intermediate goods use.
8.3.1 Model structure
To account for the aforementioned additional aspects and to quantify the effects of
unilateral regulation on vertical specialisation, we apply for the first time a unique CGE
model with an explicit specification of the origin as well as the recipient of intermediate
flows on a regional and sectoral level (for a general model description see Koesler and
Pothen (2013)). The rich bilateral and bi-sectoral trade structure is calibrated on WIOD
(World Input Output Data).
Similar to our analytical model, production is modeled using constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) functions, although more nuanced with heterogeneity among regions
and industries regarding value shares and elasticities. The production of final sectoral
output is described by:
yr,i =
θr,ixρldxr,ir,i + (1− θr,i) [(1− αr,i)lρldr,ir,i + αr,idρldi,rr,i ]
ρldxr,i
ρld
r,i

1
ρldx
r,i
. (8.16)
Note that industries are no longer distributed continuously but are discrete and of finite
number, indexed by i. Final output yr,i in industry i from region r is produced in a simi-
lar structure as in the analytical model. On the first stage, a production factor composite
lr,i consisting of capital and labour is blended with a carbon-emitting energy input dr,i,
where σldr,i = 1/(1− ρldr,i) denotes the elasticity of substitution between these two inputs.
Each sector uses a fixed mix of energy sources, each with a specific carbon emissions
coefficient. Note that in contrast to the analytical model, also process emissions – a
fixed byproduct of sectoral production – are taken into account and affect the emission
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Figure 8.4: Structure of the numerical model, dashed lines indicate extensions to the
analytical model
intensity of a sector. On the second stage, the composite of factors of production and
energy is combined with a bundle of intermediate goods xr,i sourced from other sectors,
where σldxr,i = 1/(1 − ρldxr,i ) denotes the elasticity of substitution between these two in-
puts. In contrast to the analytical model, we account now for more complex production
structures and consider intermediates from various sectors. However, we assume that
the mix of intermediates remains constant.
Each intermediate good aj,r,i used in sector i in region r consists of a combination
of domestic and foreign final inputs from sector j. While assuming in the analytical
model above that goods from different regions are perfect substitutes, it its now assumed
that goods of different origin are only imperfect substitutes Armington (1969), with
an elasticity of substitution parameter between domestic and foreign output ρar,i and
between different foreign regions ρmmr,i . Eventually, each intermediate input aj,r,i arises
from
aj,r,i =
βj,r,imr,j,r,iρar,i + (1− βj,r,i)
∑
s∀s 6=r
γs,j,r,i(ms,j,r,i)
ρmmr,i

ρar,i
ρmm
r,i

1
ρa
r,i
, (8.17)
where βj,r,i indicates sector yr,i’s share of domestic intermediates from sector j and γs,j,r,i
with
∑
s∀s 6=r γs = 1 is the respective share of intermediate j sourced from region s.
Note that in contrast to most other CGE models, WIOD enables to model Armington
bundles specific for each sourcing sector. This additional structure does not only allow to
trace sectoral supply chains more detailed but also creates additional variation in sectoral
supply chain adjustments as responses to the examined policy interventions. The overall
production structure of the CGE model and an illustration of how this relates to the
analytical model is presented in Figure 8.4. Further details on the CGE model can be
taken from the general model description in Chapter 2 and Appendix A.1.
Similar to the analytical model, a purchasing manager has two responses if emissions
become more costly – e.g. due to unilateral climate policy regulation: On the one hand,
she can substitute energy, which became more costly due to the policy, for domestic
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production factors. We might call this ’direct abatement action’, which increases the
intensity of domestic production factors of final output and therewith indirectly reduces
vertical specialisation. On the other hand, she can increase the use of foreign, non-
regulated intermediates and implicitly offshore production to non-regulated regions. This
mirrors what has been defined as ’vertical specialisation and offshoring at the intensive
margin’ in the analytical discussion. The magnitude of theses two substitution effects
depends on the respective input intensities and elasticities of substitution. If the input
intensities or the elasticities of either production stage are particularly high, then one
of two substitution responses dominates and thus governs changes in the composition
of the supply chain. As can be seen from Table 8.1, industries vary substantially in
their pre-policy input intensity of foreign intermediate use. Later in our deliberations
we identify this as the main source in sectoral heterogeneity of the reaction to policies
with regard to vertical specialisation.
8.3.2 Data, calibration and aggregation
The model is calibrated with the novel WIOD dataset.4 WIOD provides an annual
consistent representation of the world economy for the period 1995 to 2009. The dataset
contains production, trade and emissions data for 35 sectors of 27 member states of the
European Union plus 13 other major economies.
The originally 40 economies included in WIOD are aggregated to eight regions. Table
F.1 in the Appendix shows the regional aggregation in detail. Some are large countries,
such as China or the United States; others are multi-country regions such as the Euro-
pean Union (EU). The primal 35 sectors are aggregated to 18 sectors, details are given
in Table F.2 in the Appendix. We focus on sectors were a higher embodiment into cross-
border supply chains is expected, such as manufacturing sectors. Thereby we broaden
the picture generally drawn by the literature and not only consider the output side when
assessing the trade exposure of sectors but also the input side and the sourcing of up-
stream intermediates. Since service sectors have neither a high emission intensity nor
are expected to have particular intense cross-border supply chains, several service sec-
tors have been aggregated. Furthermore we distinguishes between three types of energy
which are sourced from the three WIOD sectors “coke, petroleum, nuclear fuel” (COPN),
“mining and quarrying” (MINI), and “electricity, gas, water supply” (ELGW).
For substitution elasticities determining the flexibility of production with regard to
inputs, estimates from Koesler and Schymura (2015) are applied which are derived from
the same data the model is also calibrated to. The average of the elasticity of substitution
between value-added and energy (σld(r,i)) is 0.4, the minimum is 0.1 and the maximum
is 1.1.5 The average substitutability between the value-added-energy composite and
4See Timmer et al. (2012) and Dietzenbacher et al. (2013) for an extensive description of the dataset,
which can be downloaded for free at http://www.wiod.org. Data downloaded on the 17th of April 2013
has been used for this analysis.
5Note, Koesler and Schymura (2015) do not provide a reliable substitution elasticity between value-
added and energy for the Coke Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel (CPN) sector, here we assume that
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Figure 8.5: Share of foreign non-energy value added content in 2005 for 18 European
sectors [%]
material (σldx(r,i)) is 0.6 and varies from 0.1 to 2.3. An overview of the different elasticities
is also given in Table 8.1. The Armington elasticities required by the model are taken
from GTAP7 Badri and Walmsley (2008); Hertel et al. (2007, 2008) and are mapped to
WIOD sectors prior to the implementation into the model. The average elasticity for
the choice between domestic and foreign goods (σar,i) is 3.1 and varies between 1.6 and
4.4, while the elasticity for the regional allocation of inputs (σmmr,i ) is 6.2 and ranges from
3.1 to 8.8.
8.3.3 Benchmark situation
The model has been calibrated to the year 2005 to avoid drawing conclusions from latter
periods of economic turmoil where international trade and the related supply chains
may have been distorted. Accordingly the benchmark for our counterfactual analysis
will build on production as WIOD describes them for the year 2005.
We define the degree of vertical specialisation of an industry by calculating the share
of foreign value added that is not related to energy consumption per unit of output.
This corresponds to what we defined as vertical specialisation at the intensive margin
above. Note that due to the Armington trade structure a discrete offshoring of entire
production stages to non-regulated regions – defined in the analytical model as vertical
specialisation at the extensive margin – is ruled out. To compute the quantity of value
added embodied in sectoral output we follow Leontief’s input output concept Leontief
(1970) and construct a Leontief inverse from the aggregated World Input-Output Table
provided by WIOD. This provides us with an input coefficient matrix which includes
all necessary information of global intermediate input use along the supply chain for all
considered sectors. Subsequently combining this matrix with the value added or carbon
intensity of foreign sectoral production also available from WIOD results in estimates
for the amount of non-regulated value added or carbon embodied in domestic output.
Figure 8.5 shows the share of foreign value added in the production of European
this elasticity is equal to the corresponding elasticity for the chemical and chemical products sector
(0.717).
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Figure 8.6: Share of non-European carbon embodied on European sectoral output [%]
sectors in the year 2005. The content varies from 3.4 percent in the service sector
(SERV) to 16.3 percent in the energy intensive sector of coal, petroleum and nuclear
(COPN) production. Apart from services, sectors with a low degree of fragmentation
are upstream sectors covering mining and quarrying (MINI), agriculture (AGRI) and
construction (CONS). More fragmented with more non-European value added embodied
in its output are on the one hand manufacturing sectors such as the production of
electronic equipment (ELEQ), transport equipment (TREQ), and machinery (MACH).
On the other hand, also European basic material sectors such as metals (META) and
chemicals (CHEM) are characterised with a high content of foreign value added. But
the two groups differ in their emission intensity: Whereas ELEQ, TREQ, and MACH
are sectors with low emission intensity, META and CHEM emit plenty of carbon during
their production process.
Obviously, not only value added has been added along the supply chain but often also
emissions. Figure 8.6 illustrates the amount of foreign carbon embodied in EU sectoral
output. Its foreign carbon share ranges from 10.7 (ELGW) percent to 56.4 (ELEQ)
percent. In particular the European sectors that produce coke, petroleum and nuclear
fuel, but also electrical equipment – the most fragmented sector – contain high shares
of foreign embodied carbon. But note that both sectors feature very different absolute
values in embodied carbon. Sectors with only little foreign carbon embodied in their
production are the sectors associated to electricity gas and water supply (ELGW) as
well as non-metallic minerals such as cement where in contrast a large part of emission
is added during the last production stage.
8.3.4 Simulation results
To quantify the magnitude of the effects identified in the analytical model, we study
two policy scenarios that correspond to those evaluated in the simplified framework. In
the first examined policy regime we assume that the EU commits itself to unilaterally
reduce its carbon emissions by 20 percent relative to baseline of 2005. Thereby we assume
that the required emission reductions within the EU are granted by an emission trading
scheme with full auctioning encompassing emissions in all sectors. This can be seen as a
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Table 8.1: Input content and elasticities of European production in benchmark
Sector CO2 [
g
USD
] VA [%] E[%] NEG[%] FNEG[%] σld σldx σa σmm
TREQ 15.36 23.49 1.50 75.01 6.38 0.16 0.38 3.55 7.10
ELEQ 17.70 33.77 1.54 64.69 10.42 1.06 0.64 4.40 8.80
CONS 21.36 40.19 2.03 57.78 2.44 0.15 0.61 1.90 3.80
MACH 23.53 36.01 1.76 62.22 5.43 0.20 0.55 4.05 8.10
SERV 26.78 61.01 1.57 37.42 2.02 0.27 1.48 1.57 3.13
MANU 39.66 34.50 2.23 63.27 4.72 0.18 0.53 3.75 7.50
WOOD 53.07 32.48 2.98 64.54 4.43 0.21 0.71 3.40 6.80
TEXT 61.25 32.28 2.73 64.98 5.36 0.26 0.58 3.79 7.58
FOOD 62.86 26.77 2.67 70.56 3.93 0.19 0.63 3.00 6.00
PAPE 82.14 37.86 3.42 58.72 4.08 0.25 0.66 2.95 5.90
CHEM 168.55 32.57 6.50 60.94 6.64 0.57 0.87 3.30 6.60
META 272.96 32.53 6.64 60.83 6.02 1.01 0.11 3.75 7.50
AGRI 217.97 49.51 4.67 45.82 2.83 0.40 0.98 2.50 5.00
MINI 338.43 61.95 11.02 27.00 2.16 0.42 0.22 4.12 8.25
TRAN 348.12 43.76 5.38 50.85 3.42 0.48 0.45 1.90 3.80
ONME 940.16 37.45 12.70 49.85 2.82 0.25 0.81 2.90 5.80
COPN 533.54 12.25 59.47 28.27 9.81 0.72 0.42 2.10 4.20
ELGW 1948.75 40.55 35.03 24.42 3.10 0.46 0.68 2.80 5.60
Input content from WIOD and elasticities from Koesler and Schymura (forthcoming) (σld,
σldx) and Badri and Walmsley (2008) (σa, σmm).
VA: value-added, E: energy, NEG: non-energy intermediates, FNEG: foreign non-energy in-
termediates, σld: substitution elasticity between factor input and energy, σldx: substitution
elasticity between factor-energy composite and intermediate composite, σa: Armington elas-
ticity between domestic and foreign goods, σmm: Armington elasticity between goods from
different foreign regions.
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stylized replication of EU 2020 climate policy, that aim at reducing GHG emissions by
20 percent relative to the 1990 level by 2020.6 In other regions, no emission reduction
regulations are in place. Ultimately, this results in a positive emission price in the EU,
while in all other regions emitting carbon does not imply any direct costs.
In a further policy scenario, we supplement the unilateral domestic climate policy of
the EU by a border tax on all carbon that is embodied in imports to the EU. Embodied
carbon is calculated by taking into account the carbon emitted along the supply chain
when entering the jurisdiction of the EU. The tax is on carbon embodied along the
supply chain descending from non-regulated regions. Thus, we account for a possible
multi-regulation of emissions at different production stages of a good. The imported
embodied carbon is priced according to the prevailing price of carbon in the emission
trading scheme regulating EU emissions. The introduction of a border tax in turn
implies that now carbon emissions arising in non-EU regions also become costly if they
are imported in the EU.
8.3.4.1 Unilateral carbon pricing
Figure 8.7 shows the changes in embodied foreign value added in output of European
sectors under the different scenarios, the core result of the numerical model. As in
the analytical framework, sectors are ranked according their emission intensity. The
unilateral European policy to reduce carbon emissions by 20 percent indeed alters the
sourcing of intermediates in European sectors. The median increase in vertical speciali-
sation is 3.3 percent. In particular industries with a high emission intensity such as as
electricity, gas and water supply (ELGW, +21.2%), the production of metal products
(META,+8.5%) or other non-metallic minerals (ONME, +13.1%) are becoming more
dependent on foreign intermediates and more vertically specialised. To a smaller ex-
tent, but due to the size of the sectors also important, the European chemical industries
(CHEM, +3.9%) and manufacturing (MANU, +3.2%) offshore production capacities to
non-regulated regions and increase the share of non-European value added in their final
output.
But as the Figure 8.7 shows, the supply chain reactions are patchy. Several industries
– such as services (SERV, -3.1%) or electrical equipment (ELEQ, -1.5%) – become less
fragmented and reduce the use of foreign input. So while in general our simulation results
reflect Insight 2 derived from the analytical model, here we observe more heterogeneity
in the reaction of sectors to the European policy than one would have expected. To shed
light upon the sectoral differences, we take a closer look at the cross-price elasticities
of demand for foreign value added with regard to changes in European energy prices
which are at the heart of the effects provoked by our policy scenarios. Note that thereby
we only consider marginal price changes and for the moment disregard any general
equilibrium effects. The respective cross-price elasticities feature two components. One
describing the change induced by a change in the amount of energy directly used in the
6For an more comprehensive assessment of this policy, see Bo¨hringer et al. (2009).
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Figure 8.7: Changes in vertical specialisation for European sectors relative to benchmark
scenario [%]
production of a European sector and another one describing the change in the amount
of European energy used to produce intermediates required for the production of the
European sector. Most importantly, the cross-price elasticities are composed of input
intensities and substitution elasticities. If sectors differ only in their energy respectively
emission intensity – as is the case in out analytical model where sectors feature different α
but are otherwise alike – the demand for foreign value added induced by a change in local
energy prices follows a linear function which is increasing in the energy/emission intensity
(c.f. Insight 2). But accounting for additional sectoral heterogeneity in input intensities
and substitution elasticities leads to a more complex pattern of changes. The graphs
in Figure 8.8 illustrates how the reaction evolves when taking more and more sectoral
specifications into account and moving step-by-step from the illustrative specification
of the analytical model to our simulation exercise which is informed by WIOD data.7
Graph 8.8a only accounts for WIOD data for energy intensities and otherwise uses a
setup as in the analytical model. Graph 8.8b additionally accounts for WIOD data for
intermediate intensities. Graph 8.8c accounts further for informed shares for the origin
of intermediates (domestic vs. foreign).
Although all graphs feature a rather clear positive trend in emission intensity, sec-
toral differences become clearer as additional information from WIOD is used. With an
increase in vertical specialisation of 4.5 percent in the full simulation exercise, the coke,
petroleum and nuclear fuel sector (COPN) for example features a lower change then
one would have expected given its relatively high level of energy respectively emission
intensity. Studying the associated cross-price elasticity then reveals that its relatively
high original share in foreign intermediate use decreases the impact of the policy on this
7For parameters that are originally not part of the analytical model or have not been explicitly
specified we assume the following: θ = 0.5, β = 0.2, esa = 10. We choose these values as they are fairly
close the values supplied by WIOD and Koesler and Schymura (2015).
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sector. Accordingly, when moving from Graph 8.8b to Graph 8.8c the corresponding
cross-price elasticity drops. The opposite can be observed for construction (CONS), for
which the increase in vertical specialisation is higher (+4.8) than expected on the basis
of Insight 2. Also for this sector, Figure 8.8 reveals that additional heterogeneity with
regard to input intensities and their implication on the cross-price elasticity can explain
parts of the variability of the overall simulation results presented in Figure 8.7.
The decrease in vertical specialisation of the service and electrical equipment sec-
tor however cannot directly be explained by differences in the reaction to energy price
changes. Both sectors are characterized by a particular low energy and emission inten-
sity and are thus initially not affected much by the energy price change. In addition
to this, both sectors are comparatively value added intensive and can benefit from the
decrease in the price of value added (-4.7%) that follows the implementation of the pol-
icy in Europe. So eventually also general equilibrium effects that resonate throughout
the economy after the policy implementation can have an important impact on the pro-
duction setup of sectors and should therefore also be considered when studying vertical
specialisation.
Obviously, changes in the vertical structure of an industry and the respective supply
chain adjustments also cause changes in the amount and source of emissions embodied in
an industries’ output. We measure the change in the origin of carbon that is embodied
in a unit of output as:
∆CEURi =
∆ecNoEURi
∆ecEURi
, (8.18)
where ∆ecNoEUi is the change in embodied carbon from non-European sources and
∆ecEURi the change in embodied carbon from European sources, both in output of indus-
try i relative to the Bechmark. Note that an increase of non-European carbon embodied
in European output due to lower prices of non-European energy intensive intermediates
is one part of what generally encompasses carbon leakage. The change in the origin of
carbon in non-European industries’ supply chains is presented in Table 8.2. All sectors
apart of the transportation sector (TRAN) increase the amount of embodied carbon
from non-EU regions and therewith contribute to leakage. Transportation is an excep-
tion because although it reduces its output and in Europe, this is not accompanied by
a comparatively large expansion of production and related emissions abroad. The main
contributor is the coke, petroleum and nuclear fuel sector.
8.3.4.2 Unilateral emission pricing with border emission taxes
Changes in the degree of vertical specialisation if the domestic emission reduction policy
in the EU is complemented by a border tax on all carbon that is embodied in imports
to the EU are also illustrated in Figure 8.7. With a median decrease of 18.9 percent,
vertical specialisation drops significantly for virtually all sectors. The strongest drop
takes place in the metal production sector (META, -28.7%), a sector which in Europe
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Figure 8.8: Cross-price elasticities of demand for foreign value added with regard to
changes in European energy prices parameterised with different values for input in-
tensities and substitution elasticities. Graph (a) accounts for WIOD data for energy
intensities and otherwise uses a setup as in the analytical model. Graph (b) additionally
accounts for WIOD data for intermediate intensities. Graph (c) accounts further for
informed shares for the origin of intermediates (domestic vs. foreign).
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Table 8.2: Change in the origin of embodied carbon in output of European sectors [%]
Sector Unilateral carbon pricing Unilateral carbon pricing and border tax
ELEQ 5.43 -56.74
CONS 27.35 -52.89
MACH 15.94 -52.81
SERV 3.67 -35.98
MANU 16.30 -51.83
WOOD 11.93 -39.13
TEXT 7.77 -45.62
FOOD 6.82 -29.52
PAPE 7.83 -33.22
CHEM 8.40 -44.44
META 5.97 -36.28
AGRI 0.78 -22.62
MINI 1.46 -25.24
TRAN -3.52 -17.18
ONME 17.10 -30.04
COPN 88.85 -78.95
ELGW 0.43 -12.72
relies heavily on now more costly carbon intensive intermediate inputs from abroad. The
sector with the smallest but still very much noticeable drop of 7.0 percent is the sector
related to the supply of coke, petroleum and nuclear products (COPN). This sector also
uses carbon intensive inputs, but these tend to be very upstream intermediates and have
thus not yet collected as much now taxed embodied carbon along the value chain. For the
same reasons and the fact that because the non-energy intermediates it imports feature
a relatively low emission intensity, the electricity, gas and water sector (ELGW, +3.6%)
increases its share of vertical specialisation and indeed offshores parts of its production
despite the border tax.
According to Insight 5 from the analytical model, the introduction of a border carbon
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Figure 8.9: Changes of final demand served by European sectors in non regulated regions
relative to REDO [%]
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tax will results in the offshoring of some parts of the production originally supplying
non-European final demand and thus will also have an effect on the market share of
European sectors in the non-regulated regions. Figure 8.9 shows the simulation results
to this regard. Virtually all European sectors see the demand for their final goods
reduced in the non-regulated regions, the median decrease is -0.25 percent. While the
most affected sector is agriculture (AGRI, -0.65%), the coke, petroleum and nuclear
fuel sector (COPN, +0.03%) is an exception and experiences a slight increase in foreign
demand. The effect can be expected to be stronger for sectors where more non-European
carbon is embodied in the European final good, that is for example electrical or transport
equipment (ELEQ, -0.19%; TREQ, -0.26%). However, there is a multitude of factors
such as relative factor abundancy, productivity or trade elasticities that also play a role.
Eventually we observe a picture that is low in magnitude and rather divers. Further
research should be directed in the specific drivers of the shifts in market share. Note
also that in our setting and in contrast to the theoretical potential mentioned in Insight
6 we do not observe any additional leakage (c.f. Table 8.2).
Overall, in the setting with a border carbon tax, our simulation exercise comes to
the same results as our theoretical deliberations summarised in Insight 4. Although in
the numerical model, owing to the more complex setup of value chains, the Armington
structure of trade, and the lack of clear cut comparative advantages, we still observe
some vertical specialisation in the presence of a border tax on carbon.
8.3.4.3 General results
After having presented details on how vertical specialisation is affected by environmen-
tal policy in the last section, the following section presents more general implications of
reducing emissions in the EU. Table 8.3 summarizes the change in key economic indica-
tors for the EU following the European emission reduction efforts under the both policy
scenarios. If the EU reduces its emissions unilaterally, GDP in the EU falls by 0.48
percent and welfare, measured in Hicksian equivalence, drops by 0.50 percent. Imports
and exports are are affected to a stronger degree and reduce by 4.63 percent and 4.25
percent respectively. From a sectoral perspective the impact is yet rather minor and
output reduces generally between 0 and 5 percent. For sectors with a low CO2 intensity
it might even lead to an increase in output. The electrical equipment sector (ELEQ) for
example slightly raises its output in the unilateral carbon pricing scenario as it makes
use of reduced factor prices. As is to be expected, energy intensive sectors such as coke
and petroleum production (COPN), mining and quarrying (MINI), and electricity and
gas supply (ELGW) belong to the most affected sectors under a regime with domestic
reduction policy only (REDO). Particulary mining and quarrying suffers under a policy
that addresses only domestic emissions and a 20 percent reduction of CO2-emissions
leads to a decrease in output by about 27 percent. With 39.46 percent carbon leakage
is relatively high, although this rate is consistent with findings from Bednar-Friedl et al.
(2012) who also account process emissions. Besides the EU, in particular Russia and the
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Table 8.3: Change in key economic indicators in the EU [%]
Unilateral carbon pricing Unilateral carbon pricing and border tax
GDP -0.48 -0.38
Exports -4.25 -21.79
Imports -4.63 -22.08
Welfare -0.50 -0.31
Carbon leakage 39.46 25.75
’Rest of the World’ are negatively affected by the EU policy and they see their GDP fall
by 0.40 percent and 0.19 percent while their welfare decreases by 0.40 percent and 0.14
percent respectively. This relates mainly to a drop in energy exports of these regions as
the EU reduces it energy use to cut emissions.
The implementation of a border carbon tax on imports from unregulated countries
eases the effect of the reduction policy on the EU economy and GDP losses amount
0.38 percent only while welfare falls by 0.31 percent. But it comes at the cost of strong
reductions in exports (−21.79%) and imports (−22.08%). This also gives an indication
that the effect that the border tax regime limits all trade induced by unilateral climate
policy as described by Insight 4 can be observed in our simulation exercise. What is more,
the border carbon tax redistributes the climate policy costs among EU sectors. Sectors
such as electrical equipment (ELEQ) or machinery (MACH) that were less hit under
REDO have now to cope with stronger output losses of up to 5 percent. An explanation
might be the dependence on carbon-intensive intermediate imports such as steel that are
becoming more costly with a border carbon tax. The tariff however effectively reduces
the comparative advantage of non-regulated sectors beyond EU borders and carbon
leakage is reduced by almost 14 percentage points. Thus, in our modelling framework
and with regard to overall effects, the issue of an increase in carbon leakage because of a
large scale relocation of parts of the supply of goods consumed in non-regulated regions
to these regions described in Insight 5 does not arise. The likely reason for this is that
in our numerical exercise comparative advantages are not as clear cut as in the small
scale theoretical model and because of the Armington structure of trade, even in the
benchmark all sectors are active in all regions. The border carbon tax leads also to a
different burden sharing of the costs of climate policy between regions. Under regulation
of only domestic carbon emissions, the EU has to bear the majority of the climate policy
costs, the effects for other regions are negligible and only Russia and ’Rest-of-the-World’
are confronted with relevant reductions. But the carbon tax results in a shift of the costs
to the main trading partners, in particulary of energy intensive goods, of the EU. As a
result, if expressed in terms of welfare loss, a EU policy with a border carbon tax has
costs for Russia of more than 4 percent and of nearly 1 percent for ’Rest-of-the-World’.
But also China is significantly affected, coping with costs of now 1 percent.
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8.4 Summary and conclusion
The evolution of global value chains reshapes the economic landscape. This paper inves-
tigates the effects of unilateral regulation, more specifically a unilateral carbon pricing
on domestic emitters and a border tax on imported embodied carbon, on vertical spe-
cialisation. We first analyse the general economics of vertical specialisation on the basis
of an analytical partial equilibrium model of a two stage production process with two
countries.
In the process we distinguish between vertical specialisation on the extensive mar-
gin, that is the implementation of a fragmented production structure by offshoring one
production step, and vertical specialisation at the intensive margin, which indicates by
how much a sector relies on intermediates produced in earlier production steps abroad.
We find that unilateral emission reduction polices force more emission-intensive produc-
ers to shift a greater share of their supply chain to the unregulated region and thereby
increasing vertical specialisation at the extensive as well as at the intensive margin.
Border carbon taxation in turn is successful in fetching these stages back home. But by
shifting parts of the final good production to unregulated regions may also have negative
implications, such as a loss of market shares and the shift of emissions to unregulated
jurisdictions.
In reality though, the production setup of sectors is far more complex and interweaved
with other sectors. Because of this, we next make use of a full fledged CGE model
that is calibrated to WIOD data and investigate the implications of unilateral emission
reduction policies by the EU. Overall, the findings of the CGE model corroborate the
results of the theoretical analysis. However, as intermediate intensities and elasticities
of substitution define how well offshoring can be a response to unilateral policies, the
magnitude of the effects on vertical specialisation vary across sectors.
When the EU unilaterally implements a 20 percent reduction in emissions, sectors
increase vertical specialisation by up to 21 percent, whereas the median sector increases
its degree of vertical specialisation by about 3 percent. While overall carbon leakage
amounts to 39 percent, changes in the supply chain of sectors result in an increase in
the amount of embodied carbon from non-European sources for most industries. The
median increase to this regard equals 8 percent. If the EU complements its policy with
a border tax on all carbon that is embodied in imports, the policy no longer results in
more vertical specialisation. On the contrary, in such a situation supply chains shrink
notably and the median sector reduces its level of vertical specialisation by almost 19
percent compared to the benchmark setup. What is more due to the border tax, EU
sectors loose market share in foreign final demand markets.
Overall, our results indicate that unilateral regulation can have effects on the produc-
tion structures of industries and complement other drivers such as transportation costs
in shaping the value change of sectors. It also has implications on the overall emission
intensity of production. This implies that researchers and policy makers alike should not
only consider direct effects such as export potentials of sectors when discussing unilateral
163
policy measures but also less tangible but as important changes in vertical specialisation.
However, in order to be able to assess these effects comprehensively more research is
necessary. It is particularly important to better understand the substitution possibilities
and the flexibility to adjust the value chains. In addition, the interaction of drivers of the
different vertical specialisation such as unilateral policy and transportation costs needs
further research in order to be able to derive better indications of how value chains may
change in future.
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Appendix A
The Basic WIOD CGE Model
A.1 Short description
The Basic WIOD CGE model is a static, multi-region, multi-sector computable general
equilibrium (CGE) model. It has been developed within the project ’WIOD World Input-
Output Database: Construction and Applications’ funded by the European Commission,
Research Directorate General as part of the 7th Framework Programme and has been
designed deliberately as flexible as possible in order to allow researchers to use the
World Input-Output Database (WIOD) in the framework of a CGE model in various
applications. While a comprehensive description of the Basic WIOD CGE Model and
the data it uses is provided by Koesler and Pothen (2013), the following provides a
concise description of the model.
The model distinguishes between two groups of commodities in region r: energy com-
modities Y(eg,r) and non-energy commodities Y(neg,r). The production of these goods is
characterised by production functions with constant elasticities of substitution (CES)
and constant returns to scale. Nested CES functions with three levels are employed
to specify the substitution possibilities between capital K(r), labour L(r), energy inputs
A(eg,r) and non-energy intermediate inputs A(neg,r) of sectoral production. A KLEM
production structure is applied for all sectors i, thus capital and labour enter the pro-
duction function on the lowest level, on the second level value added is combined with
energy and finally on the top level of the CES function the energy-value-added compos-
ite is combined with a non-energy material aggregate. An overview of the production
structure is given in Figure A.1 and the corresponding zero-profit condition is given in
Equation A.1. Thereby and for all following CES functions, pi denotes profits and CES
stands for a constant elasticity of substitution function. The arguments of the CES
function is given in parentheses and the corresponding elasticity of substitution in the
upper index. Small p’s are prices of commodities and factors.
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Figure A.1: Structure of commodity production
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(A.1)
Sectoral output can be used for intermediate use and/or final consumption domesti-
cally and/or exported to other regions. Perfect competition is assumed in all markets.
Interregional trade is fully flexible and need not be balanced as long as the agent’s overall
budget is balanced.
As is the case for many other models, the choice among imports and domestically
produced commodities is based on Armington’s idea of regional product differentiation
(Armington, 1969), i.e. domestic and foreign goods are not necessarily perfect substitutes
and in combination form an Armington aggregate. However, in the Basic WIOD CGE
Model, Armington goods are not only region specific to account for regional differences
in preference for domestic and foreign goods, but also sector specific in order to allow
intermediates to be traced from their origin to their destination. Figure A.2 gives an
overview of the underlying Armington structure and Equations A.2 and A.3 present
the zero-profit and market clearance conditions for international commodity markets.
Y(r,i) is domestic production, Y(rr,i) is production by foreign regions, small p’s are prices
and M(i,rr,mkt) are imports of commodity i of market mkt (final demand and sectors)
in region rr. While the Armington elasticity σes a(r,i) governs the substitutability between
domestic and foreign goods, σes mm(r,i) controls the substitution between the same good
from different regions. Apart from this, the basic model abstracts from other potential
trade distortions.
piA(i,r,mkt) ≤CES
σes a
(r,i)
(i,r,mkt)
[
py(r,i), CES
σes mm
(r,i)
(i,r,mkt)(py(rr,i))
]
with rr 6= r, (A.2)
M(i,r,mkt) ≥
∑
rr;rr 6=r
(
∂piA(i,r,mkt)
∂py(rr,i)
A(i,r,mkt)
)
, (A.3)
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ρA(i,r)
Y(i,r)
ρMM(i,r)
Y(i,rr) . . . x
Figure A.2: Structure of Armington aggregate
U(r,fd)
ρU(r,fd) = 0
A(eg,r) A(neg,r)
Figure A.3: Structure of utility of representative agents
Each region may be represented by up to five aggregated representative agent who
embraces all final demand types available in WIOD. The representative agents max-
imise their utility by purchasing bundles of consumption goods subject to their budget
constraint. Utility of representative agents U(fd, r) is given as a Leontief composite of
energy A(eg,r) and a non-energy commodities A(neg,r). The structure of the utility func-
tions is given in Figure A.3 and the related zero-profit condition is given in Equation
A.4.
piU(r,fd) ≤CES0
[
CES0(pa(neg,r)), CES
0(pa(eg,r))
]
. (A.4)
As described exemplarily for households and a government agent in Equation A.5 and
A.6, the budget is determined by factor and tax income along with (intertemporal and
interregional) borrowing or saving. In the basic version, agents supply a fix amount
of capital and labour. Factors are mobile across sectors within regions but not across
regions and therefore the model in its basic version abstracts from interregional factor
mobility and investment.
B(r,FC HH) =pk(r)
∑
i
(
K(r,i)
)
+ pl(r)
∑
i
(
L(r,i)
)
− Saving(r,FC HH) +Borrowing(r,FC HH),
(A.5)
B(r,GOV ) =Tax(r)− Saving(r,GOV ) +Borrowing(r,GOV ). (A.6)
Besides standard economic activity, the model makes provisions for the accounting
of CO2 and other air emissions (N2O, CH4, NOX, SOX, NH3, NMVOC, CO) caused by
economic activity. For CO2, the model distinguishes between energy related emissions
and process emissions from sectoral production as well as consumption. Because the
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WIOD dataset does currently not allow to tie any of the other air emissions to particular
inputs, these emissions are considered only as process emissions from production and
consumption. From a modelling perspective, when emissions are related to energy, they
occur during the production process parallel to the use of energy. That is they are
associated with the second nest of the production structure outlined in Figure A.1 and
the first branch of Figure A.3 depicting the structure of utility. Process emission in
turn are understood as a byproduct of production and consumption and are thus tied to
sectoral output and final demand. If required, an emission trading system or a taxing
scheme can be applied to all types of emissions.
Following Rutherford (2005) and Bo¨hringer et al. (2003), the equilibrium in our model
is characterised through three types of equilibrium conditions, namely market clearance
conditions for all commodities and factors (supply = demand), income balances (net
income = net expenditure) and zero profit conditions (cost of inputs = value of output).
The variables defining the equilibrium are activity levels for the constant-returns-to-
scale production, commodity and factor prices, and the price of final consumption. The
market clearance condition related to the production of commodities is illustrated in
Equation A.7.
Y(r,i) ≥
∑
ii
(
∂piY(r,ii)
∂py(r,i)
Y(r,ii)
)
+
∑
fd
(
∂piU(r,fd)
∂py(r,i)
U(r,fd)
)
+
∑
rr;r 6=rr
∑
mkt
(
∂piA(i,rr,mkt)
∂py(r,i)
A(i,rr,mkt)
)
.
(A.7)
The market clearance condition for final demand is given in Equation A.8.
B(r,fd) ≥U(r,fd). (A.8)
For factor markets the following market clearance conditions must hold.
K(r,i) ≥
∑
ii
(
∂piY(r,ii)
∂pk(r)
Y(r,ii)
)
, (A.9)
and
L(r,i) ≥
∑
ii
(
∂piY(r,ii)
∂pl(r)
Y(r,ii)
)
. (A.10)
Numerically, the model is formulated as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP)
in the mathematical optimization program GAMS, a program that is frequently used
to develop and run CGE models. It is written in GAMS using the MPSGE syntax (c.f.
Rosenthal, 2010; Rutherford, 1999). The model is solved using the PATH algorithm (c.f.
Dirkse and Ferris, 1993).
Regarding the basic economic structure and information on emissions, the model
builds on data from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) (Timmer et al., 2012;
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Dietzenbacher et al., 2013) and can be calibrated to any year WIOD covers (currently
1995 to 2009). The required Armington elasticities are taken from GTAP7 (Badri and
Walmsley, 2008; Hertel et al., 2007, 2008) and are mapped to WIOD sectors prior to the
implementation into the model. For substitution elasticities determining the flexibility
of production with regard to inputs, estimates from Koesler and Schymura (2015) are
applied.
A.2 Additional tables
Table A.1: List of data sources used to generate WIOD.gdx
Short Data Source
WIOT Analytics World Input-Output Tables
SEA Socio-Economics Accounts
AIR Emissions to Air
CO2 CO2 Emissions
EU Energy Use
EM Energy Use Emission Relevant
KS Koesler and Schymura (2015)
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Table A.2: List of regions, sectors and final demand types
Short Region Short Sector or Final Demand
AUS Australia AtB Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing
AUT Austria C Mining and Quarrying
BEL Belgium 15t16 Food, Beverages and Tobacco
BGR Bulgaria 17t18 Textiles and Textile Products
BRA Brasil 19 Leather, Leather and Footwear
CAN Canada 20 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork
CHN China 21t22 Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing
CYP Cyprus 23 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel
CZE Czech Republic 24 Chemicals and Chemical Products
DEU Germany 25 Rubber and Plastics
DNK Denmark 26 Other Non-Metallic Mineral
ESP Spain 27t28 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal
EST Estland 29 Machinery, Nec
FIN Finland 30t33 Electrical and Optical Equipment
FRA France 34t35 Transport Equipment
GBR Great Britain 36t37 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling
GRC Greece E Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
HUN Hungaria F Construction
IDN Indonesia 50 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel
IND India 51 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles
IRL Ireland 52 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods
ITA Italia H Hotels and Restaurants
JPN Japan 60 Inland Transport
KOR South Korea 61 Water Transport
LTU Lithuania 62 Air Transport
LUX Luxemburg 63 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies
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Short Region Short Sector or Final Demand
LVA Latvia 64 Post and Telecommunications
MEX Mexico J Financial Intermediation
MLT Malta 70 Real Estate Activities
NLD The Netherlands 71t74 Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities
POL Poland L Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security
PRT Portugal M Education
ROM Romania N Health and Social Work
RUS Russia O Other Community, Social and Personal Services
SVK Slovakia P Private Households with Employed Persons
SVN Slovenia
SWE Sweden FC HH Final consumption expenditure by households
TUR Turkey FC NP Final consumption expenditure by non-profit organisations serving households (NPISH)
TWN Taiwan FC GOV Final consumption expenditure by government
USA United States of America FC CF Gross fixed capital formation
RoW Rest of the World FC IV Changes in inventories and valuables
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Table A.3: Elements in core data file WIOD.gdx
Element Description Source Unit
CiffobAdj(r,mkt,t) Cif fob adjustments on exports WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
Capital(r,i,t) Computed absolute values for capital compensation WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
Labor(r,i,t) Computed absolute values for labor compensation WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
DirPur(r,fd,t) Direct purchases abroad by residents WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
FinalDemand(r,i,rr,fd,t) Final demand inputs and outputs WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
Intermed(r,i,rr,ii,t) Intermediate inputs and outputs WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
IntTransMa(r,mkt,t) International Transport Margins WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
TotOutputCol(r,mkt,t) Output at basic prices in columns WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
TotOutputRow(r,i,t) Output at basic prices in rows WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
PurNonRes(r,fd,t) Purchases on the domestic territory by non-residents WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
TaxFinalDemand(r,fd,t) Taxes less subsidies on final demand WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
TaxOutput(r,i,t) Taxes less subsidies on products WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
TotIntermed(r,mkt,t) Total intermediate consumption WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
V alueAdded(r,i,t) Value added compensation at basic price WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
es kl KS(r,i,t) Elasticity of substitution between K and L KS
es kle KS(r,i,t) Elasticity of substitution between KL and E KS
es klemKS(r,i,t) Elasticity of substitution between KLE and MS KS
es ms KS(r,i,t) Elasticity of substitution between M and S KS
EM Sec(eg,r,i,t) Emission relevant energy use of industries EM Terajoules
EM FD(eg,r,fd,t) Emissions relevant energy use of final demand EM Terajoules
EM Total(eg,r,t) Total emissions relevant energy use per energy carrier EM Terajoules
EU Sec(eg,r,i,t) Energy use of industries EU Terajoules
EU FD(eg,r,fd,t) Energy use of final demand EU Terajoules
EU Total(eg,r,t) Total energy use per energy carrier EU Terajoules
CO2FD(co2source,r,fd,t) CO2 emissions per final demand CO2 Kilotons
CO2Sec(co2source,r,i,t) CO2 emissions per sector CO2 Kilotons
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Element Description Source Unit
CO2Total(co2source,r,t) Total CO2 emissions per source CO2 Kilotons
AirSec(em,r,i,t) Air emissions of sector AIR Tons (CO2 in Kilotons)
AirFD(em,r,fd,t) Air emissions of final demand AIR Tons (CO2 in Kilotons)
TotAirFD(em,r,t) Total air emissions of final demand AIR Tons (CO2 in Kilotons)
TotAirSec(em,r,t) Total air emissions of sector AIR Tons (CO2 in Kilotons)
TotAir(em,r,t) Total air emissions of sectors and final demand AIR Tons (CO2 in Kilotons)
LABShare(origR,origSec,t) Labor share
SecShare(origR,origSec,r,i,t) Output share
aggE(origE,eg) Set – Aggregation of energy carriers
aggFD(origFD,fd) Set – Aggregation of final demand
aggMKT(origMKT,mkt) Set – Aggregation of markets
aggR(origR,r) Set – Aggregation of regions
aggSec(origSec,i) Set – Aggregation of sectors
aggco2src(co2src,co2source) Set – Aggregation of sources for CO2 emission
mkt Set – All markets - sectors plus final demands
em Set – Emissions to Air
eg(mkt) Set – Energy goods
fd(mkt) Set – Final demand
r, alias rr, s Set – regions
i(mkt), alias ii, j Set – sectors to be used in the model
co2source Set – Sources of CO2 emissions
t Set – time
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Table A.4: Elements in core data file WIOD PreAgg.gdx
Element Description Source Unit
CAP SEA PreAgg(origR,origSec,t) Absolute values for capital compensation from YL files SEA current mio. local currency
LAB SEA PreAgg(origR,origSec,t) Absolute values for labor compensation from YL files SEA current mio. local currency
V A SEA PreAgg(origR,origSec,t) Absolute values for value added from YL files SEA current mio. local currency
CiffobAdj PreAgg(r,mkt,t) Cif fob adjustments on exports WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
DirPur PreAgg(r,fd,t) Direct purchases abroad by residents WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
FinalDemand PreAgg(r,i,rr,fd,t) Final demand inputs and outputs WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
Intermed PreAgg(r,i,rr,ii,t) Intermediate inputs and outputs WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
IntTransMa PreAgg(r,mkt,t) International Transport Margins WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
TotOutputCol PreAgg(r,mkt,t) Output at basic prices in columns WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
TotOutputRow PreAgg(r,i,t) Output at basic prices in rows WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
PurNonRes PreAgg(r,fd,t) Purchases on the domestic territory by non-residents WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
TaxFinalDemand PreAgg(r,fd,t) Taxes less subsidies on final demand WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
TaxOutput PreAgg(r,i,t) Taxes less subsidies on products WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
TotIntermed PreAgg(r,mkt,t) Total intermediate consumption WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
V alueAdded PreAgg(r,i,t) Value added compensation at basic price WIOT Analytics current mio. US Dollar
es klKS PreAgg(r,i,t) Elasticity of substitution between K and L KS
es kleKS PreAgg(r,i,t) Elasticity of substitution between KL and E KS
es klemKS PreAgg(r,i,t) Elasticity of substitution between KLE and MS KS
es msKS PreAgg(r,i,t) Elasticity of substitution between M and S KS
EM Sec PreAgg(eg,r,i,t) Emission relevant energy use of industries EM Terajoules
EM FD PreAgg(eg,r,fd,t) Emissions relevant energy use of final demand EM Terajoules
EM Total PreAgg(eg,r,t) Total emissions relevant energy use per energy carrier EM Terajoules
EU Sec PreAgg(eg,r,i,t) Energy use of industries EU Terajoules
EU FD PreAgg(eg,r,fd,t) Energy use of final demand EU Terajoules
EU Total PreAgg(eg,r,t) Total energy use per energy carrier EU Terajoules
CO2FD PreAgg(co2source,r,fd,t) CO2 emissions per final demand CO2 Kilotons
185
Element Description Source Unit
CO2Sec PreAgg(co2source,r,i,t) CO2 emissions per sector CO2 Kilotons
CO2Total PreAgg(co2source,r,t) Total CO2 emissions per source CO2 Kilotons
AirSec PreAgg(em,r,i,t) Air emissions of sector AIR Tons (CO2 in Kilotons)
AirFD PreAgg(em,r,fd,t) Air emissions of final demand AIR Tons (CO2 in Kilotons)
TotAirFD PreAgg(em,r,t) Total air emissions of final demand AIR Tons (CO2 in Kilotons)
TotAirSec PreAgg(em,r,t) Total air emissions of sector AIR Tons (CO2 in Kilotons)
TotAir PreAgg(em,r,t) Total air emissions of sectors and final demand AIR Tons (CO2 in Kilotons)
em Set – Emissions to Air
origFD(origMKT ) Set – Original final demand of goods in WIOD
origSec(origMKT ) Set – Original industries in WIOD (35 industry level)
origMKT Set – Original markets in WIOD (industries and final consumption)
origR Set – Original Regions
origE Set – Original types of energy in WIOD
co2src Set – Original sources of CO2 emission
t Set – time
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Table A.5: Notation in Basic WIOD CGE Model
Element Description
A(i,r,mkt) Armington composite production
es a(r,mkt,t) Armington elasticity of substitution between import composite and domestic commodity
es mm(r,mkt,t) Armington elasticity of substitution between imports of different countries
Borrowing(r,fd,t) Borrowing of final demand agents
Saving(r,fd,t) Saving of final demand agents
Y(r,i) Commodity production
C(r,fd) Consumption good production
EmissionRdcTarget(em,ETSGroup,t) Emission reduction target
EmissionPerUnit(em,co2energy,r,mkt,t) Emissions per unit of energy use (energy related emissions) or per unit of output (process emissions)
GOV(r) Final demand agent – government
FC HH(r) Final demand agent – representative household
flaggAggR Flag used in the regional aggregation process
flaggAggSec Flag used in the sectoral aggregation process
pa(i,r,mkt) Price of Armington good
pk(r) Price of capital
py(i,r) Price of commodity
pem(em,ETSGroup) Price of emission
peem(eg,r,fd) Price of energy good
pc(r,fd) Price of final demand
pl(r) Price of labour
pstock(r,i,rr,′FC HH′) Price of old stock
RA(r,fd) Representative agent
mkt Set – All markets - sectors plus final demands
co2energy(co2source) Set – CO2 sources related to energy emissions
ETSGroup Set – Emission trading groups
em Set – Emissions to Air
eg(mkt) Set – Energy goods
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Element Description
fd(mkt) Set – Final demand
neg(mkt) Set – Non-energy goods
r, alias rr, s Set – regions
i(mkt), alias ii, j Set – sectors
co2source Set – Sources of CO2 emissions
Process Set – Sources related to process emissions
t Set – time
es kl(r,i,t) Substitution elasticity between capital and labour in commodity production
es kle(r,i,t) Substitution elasticity between capital-labour composite and energy in commodity production
es klem(r,i,t) Substitution elasticity between capital-labour-energy composite and other intermediated goods in commodity production
es e(r,i) Substitution elasticity between different energy goods in commodity production
es ce(r,t) Substitution elasticity between different energy goods of final demand agents
es ms(r,i,t) Substitution elasticity between different non-energy Armington goods in commodity production
es c(r,t) Substitution elasticity between energy and other goods of final demand agents
es stock(r,i,t) Substitution elasticity between newly produced commodities and old stock in commodity production
t f(r,i,t) Tax – factor
t i(r,i,t) Tax – input
TotIntermed(r,i,t) Vale of total intermediates used in benchmark
capital(r,i,t) Value of capital used in production of commodity
emAllowance(em,ETSGroup,r) Value of emission allowances
GrossF inalDemand(r,fd,t) Value of gross final demand
GrossTotOutputCol(r,i,t) Value of gross total output
labour(r,i,t) Value of labour employed in production of commodity
stock(rr,i,r,fd,t) Value of old stock of final demand agent fd in region r used in production of commodity i in region rr in benchmark t
InputDemand(i,r,mkt,t) Value of the sum of all intermediates employed in the commodity production or final demand
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Appendix B
Substitution elasticities in a CES
framework
B.1 Additional tables
Table B.1: List of regions included in the analysis
Region Region Code Region Region Code
Australia AUS Italy ITA
Austria AUT Japan JPN
Belgium BEL Latvia LVA
Brazil BRA Lithuania LTU
Bulgaria BGR Luxembourg LUX
Canada CAN Malta MLT
China CHN Mexico MEX
Cypres CYP Netherlands NLD
Czech Republic CZE Poland POL
Denmark DNK Portugal PRT
Estonia EST Republic of Korea KOR
Finland FIN Romania ROU
France FRA Russia RUS
Germany DEU Slovakia SVK
Great Britain GBR Slovenia SVN
Greece GRC Spain ESP
Hungary HUN Sweden SWE
India IND Taiwan TWN
Indonesia IDN Turkey TUR
Ireland IRL United States of America USA
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Table B.2: List of sectors included in the analysis
Sector NACE Code Group
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing AtB Basic Materials
Mining and quarrying C Basic Materials
Food, beverages and tobacco 15t16 Manufacturing
Textiles and textile 17t18 Manufacturing
Leather, leather and footwear 19 Manufacturing
Wood and products of wood and cork 20 Basic Materials
Pulp, paper, printing and publishing 21t22 Manufacturing
Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 23 Energy
Chemicals and chemical 24 Manufacturing
Rubber and plastics 25 Manufacturing
Other non-metallic mineral 26 Manufacturing
Basic metals and fabricated metal 27t28 Manufacturing
Machinery, nec 29 Manufacturing
Electrical and optical equipment 30t33 Manufacturing
Transport equipment 34t35 Manufacturing
Manufacturing nec; recycling 36t37 Manufacturing
Electricity, gas and water supply E Energy
Construction F Manufacturing
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles
and motorcycles; retail sale of fuel 50 Services
Wholesale trade and commission trade,
except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 51 Services
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and
motorcycles; repair of household goods 52 Services
Hotels and restaurants H Services
Inland transport 60 Transport
Water transport 61 Transport
Air transport 62 Transport
Supporting and auxiliary transport activities
activities of travel agencies 63 Transport
Post and telecommunications 64 Services
Financial intermediation J Services
Real estate activities 70 Services
Renting of m&eq and other business activities 71t74 Services
Public admin and defence; compulsory social security L Services
Education M Services
Health and social work N Services
Other community, social and personal services O Services
Total industries TOT Total
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Appendix C
Catching the rebound
C.1 Additional tables
Table C.1: List of regions
Short Regions Associated WIOD Regions
GER Germany DEU
ROW Rest of the World AUT, BEL, BGR, CYP, CZE, DNK, ESP, EST, FIN,
FRA, GBR, GRC, HUN, IRL, ITA, LTU, LUX, LVA,
MLT, NLD, POL, PRT, ROM, SVK, SVN, SWE, AUS,
BRA, CAN, CHN, IDN, IND, JPN, KOR, MEX, ROW,
RUS, TUR, TWN, USA
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Table C.2: List of sectors
Short Sectors Associated WIOD Sectors
AGWO Agriculture and Wood AtB, 20
ATRN Air Transport 62
CHEM Chemicals and Plastics 24, 25
CONS Construction F
ELEQ Eletrical Equipment 30t33
ENER Energy C, 23, E
FOOD Food, Beverages, Tobacco 15t16
ITRN Inland Transport 60
MACH Machinery 29
MANU Manufacturing 36t37
META Metal 27t28
ONME Other Non-metallic Minerals 26
PAPE Paper 21t22
SERV Services 51, 52, H, 63, 64, J, 70, 71t74,
L, M, N, O, P
STRN Services for Private Transport Equipment 50
TEXT Textiles and Leather 17t18, 19
TREQ Transport Equipment 34t35
WTRN Water Transport 61
Table C.3: Overview of scenarios
Short Scenario Habit Substitution
θ σUmetrns σTRNpropriv σTRNetrnma
NP-MIN no persistence 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
inflexible consumption
MP-MIN medium persistence 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
inflexible consumption
HP-MIN high persistence 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00
inflexible consumption
NP-FLEX no persistence 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.42
flexible consumption
MP-FLEX medium persistence 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.42
flexible consumption
HP-FLEX high persistence 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.42
flexible consumption
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Appendix D
Beyond national economy-wide
rebound effects
D.1 Quantifying rebound in a multi-regional setting
To consider the full economy-wide rebound effect in the domestic economy, d, we must
also consider the impact on energy use on the (final) consumption side of the econ-
omy, which generally equates to household energy consumption. Thus, the own-country
economy-wide rebound formulation, Rd is given as:
Rd =
(
1 +
δEd
βγ
)
× 100, (D.1)
where β is the initial (base/reference year) share of sector i energy use in total energy
use (in both production and consumption) in the domestic economy d. The term E˙dβγ can
be expressed as:
E˙d
βγ
=
δEd
γEi
=
δEi + δE
−i
p + δEc
γEi
=
E˙i
γ
+
δE−ip
γEi
+
δEc
γEi
, (D.2)
where the c subscript indicates ’consumption’ (households) and the −i superscript all
production excluding sector i. Substituting Equation (D.2) into Equation (D.1) and
using equations (6.1) and (6.4) gives:
Rd = Rp +
(
δEc
γEi
)
× 100, (D.3)
which is Equation 6.5 in the main text.
The global rebound rebound effect, Rg, defining the total impact on energy use in
all countries resulting from increased efficiency in the use of energy in sector i within
the home economy, d:
Rg =
(
1 +
δEg
χγ
)
× 100, (D.4)
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where χ is the initial (base/reference year) share of sector i (within country d) energy
use in total energy use (in both production and consumption in all countries) in the
global economy, g. The term
E˙g
χγ can be expressed as:
E˙g
χγ
=
δEg
γEi
=
δEi + δE
−i
p + δEc + δE
−d
g
γEi
=
E˙i
γ
+
δE−ip
γEi
+
δEc
γEi
+
δE−dg
γEi
, (D.5)
where the −d superscript indicates global energy use without the domestic economy
where the efficiency shock occurs (i.e. not including sector i or any other production,
p, or consumption activity, c, in country d). Substituting Equation (D.4) into equation
(D.5) and using equations (6.1), (6.4) and (D.3) gives:
Rg = Rd +
(
δE−dg
γ
)
× 100, (D.6)
which is Equation 6.6 in the text.
D.2 Additional tables
Table D.1: List of sectors
Short Sectors Associated WIOD Sectors
E Electricity and Gas E
SER Services 50, 51, 52, H, 63, 64, J, 70, 71t74, L, M, N, O,
P
TRN Transport 60, 61, 62
CON Construction F
MAN Manufacturing 17t18, 19, 21t22, 24, 25, 26, 27t28, 29, 30t33,
34t35, 36t37
CPN Coke Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 23
FOB Food Beverages and Tobacco 15t16
PRI Primary Goods AtB, C, 20
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Table D.2: List of regions
Short Regions Associated WIOD Regions
AUT Austria AUT
BEL Belgium BEL
BGR Bulgaria BGR
CYP Cypress CYP
CZE Czech Republic CZE
DNK Denmark DNK
ESP Spain ESP
EST Estonia EST
FIN Finland FIN
FRA France FRA
GBR Great Britain GBR
GER Germany DEU
GRC Greece GRC
HUN Hungary HUN
IRL Ireland IRL
ITA Italia ITA
LTU Lithuania LTU
LUX Luxembourg LUX
LVA Latvia LVA
MLT Malta MLT
NLD The Netherlands NLD
POL Poland POL
PRT Portugal PRT
ROM Romania ROM
SVK Slovakia SVK
SVN Slovenia SVN
SWE Sweden SWE
REU Rest of Europe AUT, BEL, BGR, CYP, CZE, DNK, ESP, EST, FIN, FRA, GBR, GRC,
HUN, IRL, ITA, LTU, LUX, LVA, MLT, NLD, POL, PRT, ROM, SVK,
SVN, SWE
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Table D.3: Stylised facts on Germany economy and German manufacturing - Authors’
calculations based on WIOD
German Production German Manufacturing
Main Export Partner REU Final Demand 21.01% REU Final Demand 21.06%
(Share of Export) ROW Final Demand 18.70% ROW Final Demand 20.56%
REU MAN 15.45% REU MAN 18.92%
ROW MAN 15.55% ROW MAN 17.10%
REU SER 7.77% REU SER 6.32%
ROW SER 7.31% ROW SER 4.52%
Main Import Partner REU MAN 38.97% REU MAN 53.8%
(Share of Imports) ROW MAN 22.75% ROW MAN 30.12%
REU SER 9.08% REU SER 3.39%
ROW SER 8.62% ROW SER 3.8%
Main Input SER 25.82% MAN 37.15%
(Share of total Inputs) MAN 13.66% SER 22.32%
Energy 2.69% Energy 2.88%
Share of Energy Use NA 28.58%
in German Production (α)
Share of Energy Use 57.99% 16.57%
in German Economy (β)
Share of Energy Use 10.81% 3.09%
in EU (ψ)
Share of Energy Use 2.95% 0.84%
Worldwide (χ)
Share of Output NA 26.73%
in German Economy
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Table D.4: Results of sensitivity analysis with regard to consumption structure - Sce-
nario 1: 10% increase in energy efficiency in all German sectors, but assuming different
elasticities of substitution for consumption (es c) and fixed national labour and capital
supply
Own-country Own-country
production Rp total Rd EU Rg World Rg
Leontief composite
Rebound [%] 46.60 50.18 47.28 46.58
Change [percentage points] 3.58 -2.90 -0.70
es c = 0.5
Rebound [%] 47.57 55.87 53.50 53.03
Change [percentage points] 8.30 -2.37 -0.47
Cobb-Douglas composite
Rebound [%] 48.55 61.58 59.74 59.50
Change [percentage points] 13.3 -1.84 -0.24
Change of household energy use Germany REU ROW
Leontief composite 0.4948% 0.0005% -0.0003%
es c = 0.5 11454% 0.0141% 0.0027%
Cobb-Douglas composite 17991% 0.0274% 0.0057%
Table D.5: Results of sensitivity analysis with regard to consumption structure - Scenario
3: 10% increase in energy efficiency in German manufacturing, but assuming different
elasticities of substitution for consumption (es c) and fixed national labour and capital
supply
Own- Own-country Own-country
sector Ri production Rp total Rd EU Rg World Rg
Leontief composite
Rebound [%] 56.44 47.63 51.31 50.22 48.11
Change [percentage points] -8.81 3.68 -1.09 -2.11
es c = 0.5
Rebound [%] 57.05 48.29 52.22 50.96 48.86
Change [percentage points] -8.76 3.93 -1.26 -2.10
Cobb-Douglas composite
Rebound [%] 57.63 48.93 53.12 51.68 49.63
Change [percentage points] -8.70 4.19 -1.44 -2.05
Change of household energy use Germany REU ROW
Leontief composite 0.1453% 0.0004% -0.0004%
es c = 0.5 0.1551% -0.0017% -0.0008%
Cobb-Douglas composite 0.1653% -0.0038% -0.0013%
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Appendix E
Sailing into a dilemma
E.1 Additional tables
Table E.1: List of regions included in the analysis
Short Region Associated WIOD Region
EU Europe AUT, BEL, BGR, CYP, CZE, DNK, ESP, EST, FIN, FRA, GBR, GER,
GRC, HUN, IRL, ITA, LTU, LUX, LVA, MLT, NLD, POL, PRT, ROM,
SVK, SVN, SWE
NAM North America CAN, MEX, USA
FEA Far East CHN, JPN, KOR, TWN
MID Middle Distance RUS, TUR
ROW Rest of the World AUS, BRA, IDN, IND, ROW
Table E.2: List of sectors included in the analysis
Short Sector Associated WIOD Sector
INLAND Inland Transport 60
WATER Water Transport 61
AIR Air Transport 62
NTR No Transport Costs F, 50, 51, 52, H, 63. 64, J, 70, 71t74, L, M, N, O,
P
HIGH High Ad-valorem Transport Costs AtB, 15t16, 20, 21t22, 34t35, 36t37
LOW Low Ad-valorem Transport Costs 17t18, 19, 24, 25, 26, 27t28, 29, 30t33
ENERGY Energy C, 23, E
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Table E.3: List of scenarios included in the analysis
Scope of ETS
Reduction Target of ETS Whole Route European Economic Zone plus European Territorial
(w.r.t. 2009 Emission Levels) (WR) Territorial Waters (EEZp) Waters (ETW)
0% WR0 EEZp0 ETW0
5% WR5 EEZp5 ETW5
10% WR10 EEZp10 ETW10
20% WR20 EEZp20 ETW20
30% WR30 EEZp30 ETW30
Table E.4: Share of regulated emissions
Route Whole Route European Economic Zone plus European Territorial
(WR) Territorial Waters (EEZp) Waters (ETW)
EU-NAM / NAM-EU 100% 9.0% 2.2%
EU-FEA / FEA-EU 100% 3.2% 0.8%
EU-MID / MID-EU 100% 22.5% 5.6%
EU-ROW / ROW-EU 100% 4.9% 1.2%
Table E.5: Overview of legal framework
Short Description
Directive 2003/87/EC Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance
trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC,
as last amended by Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 23 April 2009
GATS World Trade Organization - General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT World Trade Organization - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Kyoto Protocol Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change
MARPOL International Maritime Organization: International Convention for the Pre-
vention of Pollution From Ships, 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978
MRV-Proposal Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil on the monitoring, reporting and verification of carbon dioxide emis-
sions from maritime transport and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013,
COM(2013) 480 final
UNCLOS United Nation - Convention on the Law of the Seas
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Appendix F
Unilateral regulation and
multi-stage production processes
F.1 Proof Insight 3
The cut-off determining the outsourcing of upstream production to S as in condition
(8.12) is:
A1Γ(z) ≡ A
1
N
A1S
(
α(z)τN + (1− α(z))τS
τS
) 1
1−α(z)
≤ wN
wS
(
τN
τS
) α(z)
1−α(z)
≡ ωT (z). (F.1)
By assumption A1 ≥ ω. Thus, it becomes clear that Γ(z) ≤ T (z) must hold for (8.12)
to hold. Since 0 < α(z) < 1, Γ(z) can attain values in the interval limα(z)→0 Γ(z) = 1
and limα(z)→1 Γ(z) =
τN
τS
.
At the lower bound of α(z),
lim
α(z)→0
Γ(z) = 1 < lim
α(z)→0
T (z) = 1 (F.2)
must hold.
Since τN > τS , (F.2) never holds, at the upper bound of α(z)
lim
α(z)→1
Γ(z) =
τN
τS
< lim
α(z)→1
T (z) =
τN
τS
(F.3)
must hold.
Since τN > τS , (F.3) never holds for α(z) < 1, (8.12) can never hold either.
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F.2 Additional tables
Table F.1: Regional aggregation
Short Region Associated WIOD Region
BRA Brazil BRA
CHN China CHN
EAS Other East Asia JPN, KOR, TWN
EU European Union (EU27) AUT, BEL, BGR, CYP, CZE, DEU, DNK, ESP, EST,
FIN, FRA, GBR, GRC, HUN, IRL, ITA, LTU, LUX,
LVA, MLT, NLD, POL, PRT, ROM, SVK, SVN, SWE
IND India IND
RUS Russia RUS
USA United States of America USA
ROW Rest of the World AUS, CAN, IDN, MEX, ROW, TUR
Table F.2: Sectoral aggregation
Short Sectors Associated WIOD Sectors
FOOD Food, Beverages, Tobacco 15t16
TEXT Textiles, Leather, Footwear 17t18, 19
WOOD Wood Products 20
PAPE Pulp, Paper, Printing, Publication 21t22
COPN Coke, Petroleum, Nuclear Fuel 23
CHEM Chemicals, Rubber, Plastic 24, 25
ONME Other Non-metalic mineral 26
META Basic Metals, Fabric. Met. 27t28
MACH Machinery Nec. 29
ELEQ Electrical & Optical Equi. 30t33
TREQ Transport Equipment 34t35
MANU Manufacturing Nec., Recycling 36t37
TRAN Transport Activities 60, 61, 62, 63
AGRI Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing AtB
MINI Mining and Quarrying C
ELGW Electricity, Gas, Water E
CONS Construction F
SERV Sale, Tourism, Financial Services, Health 50,51,52,H,64,J,70,71t74,L,M,N,O,P
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